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# DOCUMENT

"STUDY OF SIGNAL, TRANSPORTATION, ORDNANCE,  
CHEMICAL AND QUARTERMASTER CORPS"  
INTERIM REPT (PHASE I)

JUNE 1967

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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SIGNAL, TRANSPORTATION, ORDNANCE, CHEMICAL AND QUARTERMASTER CORPS

INTERIM REPORT

PHASE I

STATEMENT #4 UNCLASSIFIED

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(Army) ATTN: "DCSPER"-PRD  
Washington, D.C. 20310

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

JUNE 1967

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# ABSTRACT

Examines the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps to determine the functions to be performed by the officers in those corps in the light of the Army's requirements for functional specialists, logistics generalists, weapons systems managers, materiel managers, and commodity specialists. Develops statements of roles and missions for these branches. Addresses the personnel recommendations made by the Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board) which were referred to the board for further consideration. Recommends realignment of the branches concerned and assesses the impact of the recommendations on the other branches of the Army.

## SUMMARY (U)

### PROBLEM:

1. Conduct a study to develop roles and missions and officer training and career patterns of the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps that fulfill the following objectives:

a. Determine the officer logistics skill requirements of the Army from the present time (1967) through 1975. This will include the requirements for weapons systems/ materiel managers, commodity specialists, functional specialists and logistics generalists. (Phase I)

b. In light of skill requirements, develop Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps roles and missions. (Phase I)

c. In light of the above determinations, develop Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps officer personnel management programs which identify skills required and provide career patterns that include appropriate educational programs and command and staff assignments. (Phase II)

### BACKGROUND

2. On 7 February 1967, the Chief of Staff, Army, was briefed on an OPO study concerning realignment of the Signal, Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps.

3. On 9 February 1967, the Chief of Staff, Army, was briefed on Volume V, "Personnel, Training, and Organization, Report by Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System", dated January 1967, which contained recommendations concerning realignment of the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation Corps.

4. On 20 February 1967, the Chief of Staff, Army, issued CSM 67-71 directing that the OPO study be withdrawn from staffing and that a plan for

studying the total concept and future status of officer personnel of the Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation and Chemical Corps be prepared (Incl 1).

5. On 25 February 1967, the Chief of Staff, Army, announced his decisions on Volume V of the Brown Board (Incl 2).

6. On 24 March 1967, the Chief of Staff, Army, issued CSM 67-120 directing this study (Incl 3).

7. This report is an interim report of the findings on Phase I. The final report will be published after the approval of Phase I and completion of Phase II.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

8. The 1962 reorganization of the Army left the "technical services" without the clear roles and missions which previously formed the basis for career development of the officers of those corps.

9. Two major tasks were fundamental to fulfillment of the study objectives. They were:

- a. Determine the officer logistical skills required by the Army.
- b. Determine how the branches should be aligned for the best training, development and management of officers possessing these skills.

10. In accomplishing these fundamental tasks, the needs of Army Materiel Command and other DA commands and agencies were considered, as well as were the needs of the Army in the field. As these tasks were accomplished, the board correlated its findings with the Brown Board personnel recommendations on which decisions were deferred (Annex G, Section I). Special study and analysis was given to the following areas:

- a. Staffing of repair parts supply officer positions.
- b. Aircraft maintenance responsibilities
- c. Elimination of the LOP.
- d. Staffing or logistics generalist type positions.
- e. Battalion Staffing (S-4)
- f. Retention or abolishment of Chemical Corps.

11. Appropriate role and mission statements, reflecting the recommendations of the board, were prepared for the STOCQ branches.

12. The impact of the study recommendations on the other branches and on the Army as a whole were assessed and weighed against the advantages to be gained from the proposed changes.

#### LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS AND OFFICER LOGISTICS SKILL REQUIREMENTS

13. Logistics functions required in performance of the Army's mission were categorized as follows:

- a. Maintenance
- b. Supply
- c. Movements
- d. Research and development (R&D)
- e. Acquisition of materiel
- f. Materiel evacuation and disposition
- g. Acquisition, construction, operation, maintenance, and disposition of facilities and real property.
- h. Hospitalization and evacuation
- i. Logistics services

14. Performance of these functions provides the Army with the goods and services essential to the prosecution of war. The types of officer positions existing in Army organizations reflect a close function/commodity relationship.

15. The Army requires officers trained and experienced in logistics to fill four general type of positions. These are positions which encompass responsibilities for (1) a single function for a single commodity; (2) a single function for several commodities; (3) several functions for a single commodity; and (4) several functions for several commodities. Although the lines of distinction are not always clear, officer skills can be categorized in broad terms as function oriented, commodity oriented, or logistics generalist.

16. Skill requirements for officers in the lower grades usually can be identified by either function or commodity orientation. The greatest requirements for officers in these grades are for positions in the functional organizations of the Army in the field; hence, most require functional orientation. There are, however, requirements for commodity oriented officers in all grades within the wholesale logistics system.

17. In the field organizations, logistics functions typically merge at the higher operational and staff levels. Centralized responsibility for materiel (supply and maintenance), transportation and services, above the battalion level, and, at the top, for all logistics are common. Officers in these positions need have a broad knowledge of the several functional areas for which they are responsible. In the words of this study, these officers are logistics generalists.

18. The greatest number of requirements army-wide is for functional specialists. Functional positions predominate in the Army in the field, especially in the company grades. There are identifiable requirements for functional specialists through the grade of general officer; however, the need for the broader managerial skills of the logistics generalist become more evident as the level of responsibility increases. While there are many

positions in the Army in the field which require commodity adaptation or application of functional skills, most identifiable requirements for commodity specialists are within the wholesale logistics system. The most notable exception to this is in ammunition service which is handled on an integrated commodity basis throughout.

19. The basic alignment of the branches should provide for the best training and management of officers possessing the functional and commodity skills required. Four alignments were considered. They were:

- a. Alignment of branches on a commodity skill basis.
- b. Establish a Materiel Corps by merging Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps.
- c. Alignment of branches on a functional skill basis. < EUC >
- d. Retain the present alignment.

20. In arriving at a conclusion on how to align branches, the Board considered the AMC needs, finding of previous studies, and the total Army needs. TECSTAR, the Brown Board, and the OPO-SOQ studies all pointed out the need for functional alignment. The preponderance of the Army's logistics officer requirements in today's environment is for functional specialists. This came about by COSTAR II and TASTA-70. In addition, the branch schools and Combat Development Command are generally organized in a functional manner. These conditions lead to the conclusion that functional alignment (course of action c) would be the best alternative for alignment of the STOCQ branches but specific action must be taken to provide for the development of weapon systems and equipment. Having concluded that course of action c was the most acceptable alternative, the next problem was to determine how to assure development of weapons systems and equipment systems managers. The Board considered two methods that could be used in conjunction with the functionally aligned STOCQ branches as follows:



a. Specialist program with a sub-program for each commodity group.

b. Assignment of responsibility for materiel development to functional branches.

The specialist program has the advantage of allowing maximum participation of all branches. It was rejected, however, because of problems involved in having two activities managing the officer's career and competing for his time (the branch and the specialist program). It was concluded that branches should be assigned responsibility for development of weapons systems and equipment as follows:

Signal Corps	Communications and electronics equipment
Transportation Corps	Aircraft, rail and marine equipment
Ordnance Corps	Weapons, vehicles, ammunition, missiles
Chemical Corps	Chemical and biological agents, equipment, ammunition, and weapons systems
Quartermaster Corps	Clothing and textiles, individual equipment, POL, subsistence, aerial delivery equipment.
Corps of Engineers	Construction equipment, bridging and demolitions.
Medical Corps	Medical equipment.

This assignment fixes responsibility for development of these important skills with the branch having the greatest engineering competence for the equipment involved. There should be very little turbulence caused since responsibility is placed with the branch that today possesses the preponderance of technical skills for these items. Retention of the R&D specialist program allows continued use of available skills from other branches to include the necessary user input from the arms branches. This is compatible with functional alignment of branches and permits alternate career patterns within a branch. With this responsibility fixed, special career patterns can be developed that will provide the optimum schooling and experience to qualify

officers for key staff positions involving materiel and weapons development. The branches responsible for materiel development would also be responsible for the development of officers qualified for staff positions primarily concerned with the life-cycle functions of research, development, testing, evaluation, production, quality assurance, product improvement, and technical assistance.

21. Additional recommendations of the Brown Board, summarized below, have been examined in terms of officer skill relationships and in light of other studies:

- a. That repair parts supply should be a function of the Ordnance Corps.
- b. That aircraft maintenance should be a function of the Ordnance Corps.
- c. That OQT officers should staff logistics material (LM) positions and the Logistics Officer Program (LOP) should be eliminated.
- d. Establish a maintenance officer co-equal with the S-4 (Supply Officer) on the battalion staff. Designate these as Ordnance Corps and Quartermaster Corps positions respectively.
- e. Consider abolishment of the Chemical Corps.

22. Findings in the case of the above recommendations were:

- a. The duties of a repair parts supply officer are performed in a maintenance environment and require knowledge of maintenance policies, but the basic skills required are essentially supply skills. As such, these positions should be filled with officers of the Quartermaster Corps, regardless of the type or location of the unit in which he performs these duties. This in no way changes maintenance support concepts or doctrine.

b. Aircraft maintenance officers perform duties that require mechanical maintenance skills. Flight testing of repaired aircraft is essential, however, it is not necessary that the maintenance officer perform the flight test. Consequently, the maintenance officer need not be a qualified aviator. Operations in Southeast Asia are heavily dependent upon Army aircraft. Uninterrupted effective aircraft maintenance support in this area is, therefore, vital. As a mechanical maintenance function, aircraft maintenance should be the responsibility of the Ordnance Corps, however, this change must be properly phased to preclude disruption of Southeast Asia operations.

c. Logistics generalist type positions should be filled by officers trained for and experienced in logistics functions. Officers in the LOP are a select group, but many participate in logistics on a part-time basis and their careers remain oriented on the functions of their basic branch. The OQT officers under the proposed realignment, are career logisticians. Since responsibility for the development of logisticians has been fixed, there no longer is a requirement for a specialist program. Logistics generalist positions should be designated as LM and be filled by officers of the OQT Corps. When the strengths of these corps permit the fill of key (LM) positions, the LOP should be eliminated.

d. The Brown Board recommendation for battalion S-4 staffing was based on reports of below standard performance of supply and maintenance activities in the combat arms battalions which was largely attributed to:

(1) Lack of appropriate experience by the combat arms officers assigned to such duties.

(2) Widespread unpopularity of these assignments among combat arms officers.

(3) Heavy turnover rate among officers so assigned .

(4) Staffing of these positions with lieutenants or failure to staff the positions.

e. This board considered the above factors and weighed them against the following factors favoring retention of combat arms staffing.

(1) Gives commanders flexibility in selection of his staff.

(2) Provides combat arms officers basic logistics experience and appreciation for logistics problems.

(3) The combat arms officer is trained to appreciate the tactical situation he must support logistically.

(4) Permits replacement of combat losses from within the battalion.

(5) An S-4 is coordinating staff position and not a technical position at this level.

f. The Board concluded that performance of supply and maintenance activities at battalion level could best be accomplished by :

(1) Retention of a single S-4, but in the grade of major, with technical expertise provided by the supply and maintenance warrant officers.

(2) Provision of additional S-4 type training at branch advance courses, and;

(3) Staffing with a combat arms officer.

g. The Board found that after the functional realignment of the STOCQ branches, the Chemical Corps:

- (1) Would retain approximate the same officer strength.
- (2) Would perform a vital function as the single reservoir of CBR expertise for all the Armed Forces of the United States.
- (3) Should be retained as a basic branch of the Army and be designated an arm and service.

STOCQ BRANCH ROLES AND MISSIONS:

23. Roles and mission statements for the realigned STOCQ branches are contained in Section V of the study.

IMPACT

24. Impact assessment was made using MOS to identify and segregate officer skills. The Board identified and placed MOS with the appropriate branch under a functional realignment. Based on a report of current duty position fill, the gross impact shown below would result if all personnel currently serving in these positions were reassigned to the appropriate functional branch.

GROSS IMPACT ON DUTY POSITIONS

LOSSES TO ARMS BRANCHES

Infantry	-531
Armor	-235
Artillery	-362
Chemical	-51
Engineer	-519
Signal	-405

OTHER LOSSES (Excluding OQT)	-128
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TOTAL	-2231
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OQT GAINS AND LOSSES

Ordnance	+704
Quartermaster	+1281
Transportation	-558
Log Material (OQT)	+804
Net Gains	+2231

25. Those uni-functional positions realigned from other branches to the OQT branches total 1427, an overall 9% increase for the three branches. The Transportation Corps, however, has a net loss of about 10% based on the loss of aircraft maintenance while Ordnance and Quartermaster have increases of 12% and 28% respectively. The loss to the rest of the Army is 1.5%.

26. The designation of logistics type positions as LM and the elimination of the logistics officer program with the requirement for the OQT branches to fill additional logistics positions, now being filled by officers of other branches, requires adjustments of greater consequence, although fewer in number. This analysis is based upon the most extreme situation. In designating logistics positions as LM, the Board does not intend to exclude officers from other branches from serving with logistical staffs or units. They are required in order to provide user input and serve in other capacities, however, they should be identified as such and not as logisticians. Today, these officers who provide the branch mix are generally carried in logistic MOS. Since a breakout between these officers and the "pure" logisticians is not available. The result there is the most extreme situation. This impact will soften when TDA's are changed to reflect the actual need for logisticians and the mix of other branches. There are 804 LM duty positions now filled by officers other than OQT officers which amount of 5% of the current assigned strength of the OQT branches, but most of these positions are in the field grades, resulting in a 12% increase in field grade officer positions for the OQT branches. The shift of field grade requirements has greater implications than a similar change in the company grades. This problem is illustrated by comparing OQT positions after realignment with a prorata distribution of field grade

authorizations under the officer grade limitation act (OGLA). For a commissioned officer strength of 125,597, the OGLA limits were computed by percentages:

Colonel	4.4%
Lieutenant Colonel	11.7%
Major	16.2%

Applying these percentages to the 18,288 OQT strength after realignment, the OQT branches could support 805 colonels, 2140 lieutenant colonels, 2963 majors and 12,380 company grade officers. In order to support the 990 colonel duty positions which they would be required to fill, the OQT branches would need a total strength of 22,500 officers. Applying the OGLA percentages, the grade structure would consist of 990 colonels, 2633 lieutenant colonels, 3645 majors and 15,232 company grade officers. This reveals that the greatest increase is required in company grade positions. This is not a new problem. It merely adds to an existing imbalance in the force structure, specifically in the logistics base.

27. The Board examined several courses of action which would improve the realigned OQT grade structure. They were:

- a. Establish a separate promotion list for logistics branches.
- b. Leave the logistics generalist positions as branch immaterial (BI) for fill by all branches.
- c. Reduce or eliminate the assignment of senior OQT officers to non-logistics BI positions.
- d. Increase the CONUS logistics base. (This was recommended by the Brown Board. The Chief of Staff directed ACSFOR to initiate a study of the total CONUS "training and rotation base" problem. See Annex G, Section I, Recommendation 21).

- e. Increase the assignment of junior OQT officers to BI positions.

28. The Board concluded that:

- a. Measured in terms of total positions affected, the functional realignment of the STOCQ branches does not have a significant impact on the total Army.

- b. Alignment of LM positions with the OQT branches significantly increases the number of field grade officer positions for those branches without appreciable loss to any other one branch.

- c. Alignment of LM positions with the OQT branches increases the grade imbalance within those branches.

- d. Improvements possible in the performance of Army logistics under functional realignment outweigh the disadvantage of increased grade imbalance for the OQT branches.

- e. The grade imbalance impact can be diminished by the reduction in the assignment of OQT colonels to pure BI positions.

- f. The ACSFOR study on the total CONUS "training and rotation base" problem may provide a structure which will alleviate the imbalance.

SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS:

29. Functions and skills.

- a. The Army requires officers who are functional specialists, commodity specialists, and logistics generalists.

- b. The bulk of the officer positions in Army organizations are identified by the function to be performed.

30. Branch Realignment.

- a. The STOCQ branches should be realigned on a functional basis.

- b. Responsibility for the development and management of weapons systems/equipment system managers, by commodity, should be assigned to the functionally realigned branches.



31. Relative to other Brown Board recommendations:

- a. Repair parts supply functions should be performed by officers of the branch primarily responsible for supply.
- b. Aircraft maintenance functions should be performed by officers of the branch primarily responsible for maintenance.
- c. Multi-functional logistics positions, now designated as Branch Immaterial (BI) should be designated as Logistics Material (LM) and be filled by officers of the OQT branches.
- d. The Logistics Officer Program should be eliminated when OQT branch strengths permit them to fill the key logistics (LM) positions.
- e. The line battalion S-4 should be a single position in the grade of major from the branch with which the unit is identified.
- f. Officers of branches that do not have a primary role in logistics should receive additional logistics training at their branch career courses in order to better prepare them for duty as battalion S-4's.
- g. The retention of the Chemical Corps as the basic branch primarily responsible for CBR functions is in the best interest of the national security.

32. Impact.

- a. Measured in terms of total positions affected, the functional realignment of the STOCQ branches does not have a significant impact on the total Army.
- b. Alignment of LM positions with the OQT branches significantly increases the number of field grade officer positions for those branches without appreciable loss to any one other branch.

c. Alignment of LM positions with the OQT branches increases the grade imbalance within those branches.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

33. That the STOCQ branches be realigned on a functional basis, as follows:

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>PRIMARY FUNCTIONS</u>	<u>EXCEPTIONS</u>
Signal Corps	Communications/Electronics	Plus supply and maintenance of cryptographic equipment
Transportation Corps	Movements	None
Ordnance Corps	Equip Maint/ Ammunition	Less maintenance of medical and cryptographic equipment
Chemical Corps	CBR	None
Quartermaster Corps	Supply	Less supply of medical and cryptographic equipment and ammunition

34. That responsibility for weapons systems and equipment development and career management of weapons systems/equipment system managers be assigned to the functional branches as follows:

Signal	Communications-electronics equipment
Transportation	Aircraft, rail and marine equipment
Ordnance	Missiles, vehicles, weapons, ammunition
Chemical	C-B agents, ammunition, weapons and equipment
Quartermaster	POL, clothing and textiles, individual equipment, aerial delivery equipment and subsistence
Engineer	Construction equipment, bridging and demolitions
Medical	Medical equipment

35. That multi-functional logistics positions not identifiable with a single branch be designated as Logistics Material (LM) and be filled by officers of the OQT branches.

36. That the Logistical Officer Program be eliminated when OQT branch strengths permit them to fill the key logistics (LM) positions.

37. That implementation of the above recommendations be phased to minimize personnel turbulence.

38. That a detailed plan for the phasing of the transfer of aircraft maintenance functions from the Transportation Corps to the Ordnance Corps be prepared in order to insure continuity of operations in SE Asia.

39. That authorized officer strengths of affected branches be adjusted.

40. That branch transfers be encouraged, as appropriate.

41. That forced branch transfers be avoided.

42. That the battalion S-4 position be authorized a major of the branch with which the unit is identified.

43. That the branch career courses of the combat arms provide additional training and emphasis on preparation of their officers for S-4 duties.

44. That, when sufficient time has elapsed, the grade structures of the realigned OQT branches be examined to determine if additional strength adjustment actions are required.

45. That the roles and missions statements for the STOCQ branches (Annex A to Section V) be approved.

46. That the Chemical Corps be retained as a basic branch of the Army and be designated an arm and service.

Effective until 15 February 1968 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
Washington, D. C. 20310 MAJ Ellis/maq/59914

CS 320 (20 Feb 67)

20 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Study of Officer Personnel in Ordnance, Quartermaster,  
Signal, Transportation, and Chemical Corps

1. References:

a. CSM 66-282, subject, "Role of Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Corps Officers," dated 15 June 1966.

b. Volume V, "Personnel, Training, and Organization," Report by Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System, dated January 1967.

c. Briefing for the CofSA, subject as in b above, 9 February 1967.

2. The purpose of the memorandum is to direct actions in regard to related studies of officer personnel concepts.

3. The Chief of Staff has directed that:

a. The study directed by reference 1a be withdrawn from current staffing. The requirement for submission to the CofSA of this study by 28 February 1967 be rescinded.

b. DCSPER:

(1) Prepare a plan for studying, in detail, the total concept and future status of officer personnel of the Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation, and Chemical Corps.

(2) Provide the proposed study plan to the CofSA as soon as possible but no later than 15 March 1967. (Proposed plan should include an estimated date of completion for the study.)

INCLOSURE I, SUMMARY

**SUBJECT:** Study of Officer Personnel in Ordnance, Quartermaster,  
Signal, Transportation, and Chemical Corps.

c. Chairman, DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System,  
and heads of Army staff agencies to include, but not limited to,  
DCSOPS, DCSLOG, ACSFOR, ORB, and CDA support DCSPER in the preparation  
of the study plan.

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/S/FRANK J. SACKTON  
FRANK J. SACKTON  
Major General, GS  
Secretary of the General Staff

**SUSPENSE:**  
DCSPER--15 Mar 67--Study Plan

INCLOSURE I, SUMMARY

XVIII

Effective until 21 February 1968 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
Washington, D.C. 20310

MAJ Ellis/maq/59914

CS 400 (25 Feb 67)

25 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Report of the DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System,  
Volume V "Personnel, Training and Organization," Reports Control  
Symbol CSOCS-92

1. References:

a. CSM 67-1, "Staffing of the Report of the DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System," dated 3 January 1967.

b. Volume V, "Personnel, Training and Organization," Report of DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System, dated January 1967.

c. DCSPER summary sheet, subject, "Volume V, Report of DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System," dated 27 January 1967.

d. Briefing for the CofSA, subject as in b and c above, 9 February 1967.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to announce decisions relative to Volume V of the Report of the DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System.

3. The Chief of Staff, in acting on the summary sheet referenced above, made the decisions on the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry as listed in the inclosure.

4. The following responsibilities are assigned for execution of the Chief of Staff's decisions:

a. DCSPER is assigned overall responsibility for staff supervision of decision execution and will:

(1) Accomplish required actions for recommendations for which he is assigned responsibility.

(2) Coordinate the actions assigned to other staff agencies which have a staff interest in certain recommendations.

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

SUBJECT: Report of the DA Board on Inquiry on the Army Logistics System,  
Volume V, "Personnel, Training and Organization," Reports Control  
Symbol CSOCS-92

(3) Prepare or coordinate preparation of required directives and messages.

(4) Submit to the Chief of Staff a quarterly progress report, Status of Decision Execution on Volume V of Report of DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (RCS CSOCS-92). The first report, as of 28 April 1967, will be submitted not later than 15 May 1967 and will include an overall time-phased plan for accomplishment of the approved recommendations. Subsequent reports will be submitted thereafter by the 15th of the month following the end of each three months until all actions have been completed. Completed actions need be reported only once.

b. Other staff agencies will accomplish actions as assigned in the inclosure and will furnish appropriate input to the DCSPER for inclusion in the report required by paragraph 4a(4) above. The initial report will include an overall plan for accomplishment of the approved recommendations and estimated dates of completion.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl  
as

/S/ FRANK J. SACKTON  
FRANK J. SACKTON  
Major General, GS  
Secretary of the General Staff

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SUSPENSE:

DCSPER--Para 4a(4)--Report

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

XX

CHIEF OF STAFF'S DECISIONS  
ON  
RECOMMENDATIONS OF VOLUME V  
DA BOARD OF INQUIRY ON ARMY LOGISTICS SYSTEM

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

1. The CofSA's decisions are set forth below.
2. The full text of each recommendation is in Volume V of the board report, January 1967. The location in the report is indicated in parentheses following the abbreviated recommendation.
3. Except as indicated the decisions are for immediate execution.
4. The CofSA's comments, where appropriate, are included in the remarks section.

<u>Abbreviated Recommendation</u> (Location in Report)	<u>CofSA Decision</u>		<u>Staff Responsibility</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Other</u>		
1. Designate the QMC for supply (less ammo, med and repair parts supply) and Quartermaster-type svc spt; the OrdC for maintenance (less med but inclusive of aircraft), ammo svc, and repair parts supply; the TC for movements, and simultaneously to relieve the other tech svc branches of these functions. (p. II-28, para g(1))		X	DCSPER	Defer. DCSPER should with draw current study of QMC, OrdC & SigC officers from staffing and then initiate new study directive addressing QMC, OrdC, SigC, TC, QMC roles and missions an officer personnel concepts from an Army-wide viewpoint Directed by CSM 66-71.
2. Modify the training patterns for officers in the OrdC, QMC and TC during the 1970 timeframe to substitute a common Logistics Officer Advanced Course for the branch advanced courses. (p. II-28, para g(3))		X	DCSPER	Defer. pending outcome of overall study.



Abbreviated Recommendation  
(Location in Report)

CofSA Decision  
Approved   Other

Staff  
Responsibility

Remarks

3. Establish a Command and General Staff College (Logistics) course in the 1970 timeframe for attendance by selected officers of the OQT branches. (p. II-28, para g(4))

X      DCSPER

See  
Remarks

Same as #2

4. Identify logistics-oriented positions in TOE or TDA as branch material, consistent with the first recommendation or Logistics Material (LM) or Services Material (SM) for the generalist-type positions. (p. II-32, para g (5))

X      ACSFOR

See  
Remarks

Same as #2.

5. Designate the positions of maintenance and supply officers in battalions as OrdC and OMC, respectively. Assign the Bn Maint Off to the Bn Stf on a co-equal status with the Bn S-4 or Supply Off. (p. II-32, para g (6))

X      ACSFOR  
See  
(coord w/  
DCSPER)

See  
Remarks

Same as #2.

6. Eliminate the present Logistics Officer Specialist Program during the 1970 timeframe. During the interim, a transitional period will exist with the following characteristics:

Continue to assign all officers qualified in logistics and who express an interest to remain in this field. Attendance at the Logistics Course or the Senior Logistics Course should be made a prerequisite, if practicable, to assignment to a key logistics position.

X      DCSPER  
See  
Remarks

DCSLOG  
ACSFOR

Same as #2.

(cont'd)

Abbreviated Recommendation (Location in Report)	CofSA Decision		Staff Responsibility	Remarks
	Approved	Other		
<p>ACSFOR, with the guidance and assistance of DCSLOG, will determine which Army positions are to be designated Branch Material, Logistics Material, or Services Material. DCSLOG should actively participate in the development of career structures, career progression, and management of key logistics personnel. (p. II-32, para g (8))</p>				
<p>7. Make the necessary lateral transfer of officers in accordance with the concept as stated in the first recommendation. (p. II-33, para g (10))</p>	X	See Remarks	DCSPER	Same as #2.
<p>7.1. Realign officer career management policies and procedures to accommodate the changes in branch functions. (p. II-33, para g (11))</p>	X	See Remarks	DCSPER	Same as #2.
<p>8. Eliminate the requirement for detailing newly commissioned Ordc, QMC, and TC RA officers for a period of one year with a combat arm, and, in lieu thereof, assign such officers to appropriate logistics positions within divisions involving direct association with the user combat troops. (p. II-33, para g (12))</p>	X	See Remarks	DCSPER	Same as #2.

ENCLOSURE II. SUMMARY

XXIII

<u>Abbreviated Recommendation</u> (Location in Report)	<u>CofSA Decision</u>		<u>Staff Responsibility</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Other</u>		
<p>9. For further research and study, it is recommended that:</p> <p>Following the removal of the supply and maintenance functions from the CmlC, the need for this branch be reassessed in the 1970 timeframe with a view to its possible abolishment and the consolidation of its remaining functions within the OrdC special weapons area. (p. II-33, para g (14))</p>		X See Remarks	DCSPER (In coord w/ DCSOPS, ACSFOR & ORD)	Same as #1.
<p>10. That the Warrant Officer Corps be reaffirmed as a category of military personnel who provide primarily technical skills, as opposed to tactical skills, and who possess the capability to supervise enlisted personnel qualified in technical specialties similar to those of the warrant officer. (p. II-40, para g(1)(a))</p>	X		DCSPER	
<p>11. That additional courses of instruction in service schools, and in civil schools, where applicable, be instituted for the improvement of technical competence of selected warrant officers in the logistics field. (p. II-41, para g(1)(d))</p>		X See Remarks	DCSPER	Deferred decision. Will address in context of current DCSPER/OPO study of WO Program.

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

Abbreviated Recommendation (Location in Report)	CofSA Decision		Staff Responsibility	Remarks
	Approved	Other		
12. That the branch centers and schools of CONARC (School and Training Command) be assigned promponency by MOS for warrant officer specialties related to their respective functional areas and be given responsibility for guiding and assisting OPO in the development of warrant officer career structures and patterns. (p. II-41, para g(1)(d))	X	See Remarks	DCSPER (Coord w/ DCSLOG)	Should be incorporated in the materiel acquisition management model being developed by Army staff. (Ref: CSM 67-51, para 4a)
13. That a program similar to the Warrant Officer Aviation Program be established for selected logistical specialties. As a minimum, the following technical specialties should be included: Repair parts supply, explosive ordnance disposal, maintenance specialties for mechanical, armament, electronics, aviation, ammunition, and nuclear weapon functions. (p. II-41, para g (1)(g))	X	See Remarks	DCSPER	Defer decision. Will address in context of current DCSPER/OPO study of WD Program.
14. That advanced technical training be instituted for all hard skill logistics MOSS. To accomplish this goal, the following actions should be taken:  Institute a research program to determine requirements having the following characteristics: (cont'd)	X	See Remarks	DCSPER (Coord w/ CRD)	

Abbreviated Recommendation  
(Location in Report)

CofSA Decision  
Approved Other

Staff  
Responsibility

Remarks

Advanced technical training.  
Limited entry level training.

A systematic allocation of tasks to entry and career personnel based upon: (1) requirements of the tasks (2) the pattern of skill requirements as determined by materiel deployment, and (3) authorized and available manpower at each level.

A means of assuring that eligible career personnel will be permitted to attend appropriate advanced technical training courses be provided.  
(p. II-61, para g(1))

15. Improve the quality of OJT by requiring the structuring of this training, using programed texts and other training support from USCONARC schools. (p. II-61, para g(2))

X

DCSPER

16. Initiate a research and development program to expand the information utilized in personnel assignment, as a means of achieving the best possible distribution of available technical skills. The program should be oriented toward producing, by 1970, an assignment control system which will utilize a wide range of information concerning prior training, experience, and tested ability; permit field commanders to requisition personnel for the specific needs of their own unique job situations; and

X

DCSPER  
(Coord w/  
CRD)

DCSPER initiate planning for actions beyond FY 68.

(cont'd)

CofSA Decision Staff  
Approved Other Responsibility

Abbreviated Recommendation  
 (Location in Report)

Remarks

provide a computerized system of matching requisitions against qualifications to allow the enlisted personnel distribution program to identify the most qualified among personnel meeting general prerequisites. (p. II-62, para g(3))

17. During the 1970 timeframe, actions should be taken as follows:

1. Direct CONARC School and Training Command or its successor, the Army Personnel Command, to prepare and begin administering programs for designated logistics MOSs in accordance with guidance developed from the experimental implementation.

2. Develop a procedure for selecting current career personnel for assignment to appropriate schools to receive advanced technical training.

3. Direct overseas commands to pattern training and instructional material after the programs developed by CONARC to insure equitable award

18. That the Department of the Army establish an Army-wide civilian career field for Logistics Management to be fed from current ammunition inspection, equipment specialist,

(cont'd)

DCSPER

X  
 See  
 Remarks

Approve the development, by USCONARC, of advanced and entry training programs for designated logistics MOS only to the extent required after review of all job skill identifications, MOS revisions, and the completed experimental implementation.

DCSPER

X

DCSPER

X

Should be accomplished for all MOSs and not restricted to logistical-type MOSs.

DCSPER

X  
 See

Already in-being. Impetus should be given to already established Executive Career Program.

	<u>Cofsa Decision</u>	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
1. <u>Approval</u>					
2. <u>Disapproval</u>					
3. <u>Referral</u>					
4. <u>Other</u>					
5. <u>Comments</u>					

procurement, quality control and inspection, supply management, and other appropriate functional fields. (p. II-72, para g(1))

19. That the ALMC be directed to establish a Logistics Course and a Senior Logistics Course as part of the training pattern to prepare military and civilian personnel for mid and top-level logistics management assignments. (v. II-72; para g(2))

20. That consideration be given to the establishment of additional top-level civilian Logistics Management positions in classified grades GS-16 - GS-18, to provide an incentive and a goal for civilian personnel in mid-level Logistics Management positions. (p. II-72, para g(3))

21. That the rotation base control efforts now in effect be continued.

That additional training positions be established (both authorized and TT&P) within AMC and the AMC Commodity Commands, in Post, Camp, and Station supply, maintenance and transportation activities, and in the proposed theater-oriented Supply Support Centers. (p. III-15, para h(1))

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(cont'd)
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Defer decision. Should be addressed in new study (see remark for #1) and in Career Executive Program

DCSPER

..X	See	Remarks
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DCSPER

X	See	Remarks
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X	ACSFOR
See	(Coord w/DCSPER
Remarks	& DCSOPS)

ACSFOR should initiate studies of total CONUS "training and rotation base" problem to determine number of personnel required in base. ACSFOR should then make appropriate recommendations.

<u>Abbreviated Recommendation.</u> (Location in Report)	<u>CofSA Decision</u> <u>Approved</u> <u>Other</u>	<u>Staff</u> <u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
22. That a review and analysis of contingency plans be made to determine numbers and types of active Army TOE logistics units required to support these plans and to serve as a rotation base in CONUS for career logistics personnel. (p. III-15, para b(2)(a))	Y See Remarks for #21	ACSFOR. (Coord w/DCSLOG)	
23. That such logistics-type TOE units be established and used either in a direct training role or as a military-manned interface between the using units and the civilian-manned supply, maintenance, and transportation activities at CONUS installations. (p. III-15, para h(2)(b))	X See Remarks for #21	ACSFOR	
24. CONARC be directed to organize the proponent centers and schools as proposed in Chapter IV; then, in coordination with other interested agencies, establish responsibilities for revising and extending the proposed occupational information system. The responsibility for collection of data should be borne primarily by the CONARC centers and schools as part of its training development responsibility. OPO should provide guidance. A detailed plan for collection, processing and dissemination of task data should be submitted to DCSPER	X See Remarks	DCSPER (Coord w/DCSLOG)	OPO will retain propriety for MOSSs. However, action should be taken by DCSLOG to insure that MOS considerations are incorporated into the development of the material acquisition management model. (See CSM 67-51, para 4a)

(cont'd)



Abbreviated Recommendation  
(Location in Report)

by 30 June 1967. This activity should not be permitted to interfere with the current collection of task level information under the Military Occupational Information Data Bank project. (p. III-23, para g (1))

25. Withdrawn by Board.

26. That DCSPER undertake the following actions:

1. Direct CONARC to have centers and schools conducting courses for enlisted logistics MOSS develop and administer end-of-course performance tests. These tests should be based upon job tasks and standards as described in section 3 and should be developed concurrently with the determination of tasks and standards.

2. Direct the Enlisted Evaluation Center to use school performance tests as criteria to: (a) develop valid written items, (b) determine the need for performance subtests in order to evaluate aspects of job performance which cannot be measured by written tests, and (c) develop Evaluation Test minimum qualification and promotion scores which are directly related to specific job standards. (p. III-31, para g(1))

(cont'd)

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

Approved Other  
CofSA Decision

Staff  
Responsibility

Remarks

DCSPER

X

Abbreviated Recommendation (Location in Report)	CofSA Decision Approved Other	Staff Responsibility	Remarks
27. Reassign the EEC as a subordinate agency of APC. (p. III-31, para g(2))	X See Remarks		No action to be taken at this time.
28. The Board recommends that the Department of the Army publish an Army regulation, essentially as proposed in Appendix N, as soon as practicable.  A. (1) This would reaffirm that within his scope of responsibility the DCSLOG guides and assists the DCSPER in selection of individuals for assignment to key logistics personnel management positions, and in the training of logistics personnel.  (2) Similarly, the DCSLOG guides and assists the ACSFOR in the logistical doctrinal area, development of operational logistics concepts, and preparation of logistical manpower documents (TOE/TDA).  B. Transfer the individual training functions of the General Military Training Support Branch of ACSFOR to DCSPER.  C. Realign functions among major Army commands as follows:  (1) Translation of the personnel/training aspects of approved doctrinal (near-term) concepts into doctrinal publications from CDC to USCONARC (S&TC) (cont'd)	X See Remarks	DCSLOG (Coord w/DCSPER)	Defer decision. Staff should address the subject in Nov 67.
	X See Remarks	DCSLOG (Coord w/ACSFOR)	Same as above.
	X See Remarks	DCSPER & ACSFOR	Defer decision. Should be addressed separately by DCSPER and ACSFOR.
	X See Remarks		No action to be taken at this time.

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

XXXI

Abbreviated Recommendation (Location in Report)	CofSA Decision Approved Other	Staff Responsibility	Remarks
(2) Formulation and publication of approved organizational changes (TOE) - from CDC to USCONARC (S&TC).	X See Remarks		No action to be taken at this time.
(3) Plan, program and supervise the execution of the New Equipment Training Program - from USAMC/USASCC to USCONARC (S&TC)	X See Remarks	ACSFOT	ACSFOT will revise AR 350-12.
D. Provide for review and approval of POI for formal logistics school courses conducted in overseas commands by USCONARC (S&TC) or other proponent agencies. (p. IV-25, para 7a as changed)	X	DCSPTK	Should be performed for all courses and not be restricted to "logistics" school courses. See remarks in #17(3).
29. Establishment of USCONARC School and Training Command. Consolidate responsibility for the personnel, training, and organizational functions, and assign responsibilities therefor to CONARC. (p. IV-25, para 7(1)(f))	X See Remarks		No action to be taken at this time.
30. During 1970 timeframe, it is recommended that the School & Training Command be transferred from CONARC, be renamed the Army Personnel Command, and be established as a major command, reporting directly to Hq DA. (p. IV-26, para 7b(1))	X See Remarks		No action to be taken at this time.

INCLOSURE II, SUMMARY

XXXII

Effective until 21 March 1968 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
Washington, D. C. 20310

MAJ Ellis/maq/20014

CS 320 (24 Mar 67)

24 March 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Study of Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps

## 1. REFERENCES:

- a. CSM 66-282, subject, "Role of Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Corps Officers," dated 15 June 1966.
- b. Volume V, "Personnel, Training, and Organization, Report by Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System," dated January 1967.
- c. Briefing for the CofSA, subject as in b above, 9 Feb 67.
- d. CSM 67-71, subject, "Study of Officer Personnel in OrdC, QMC, SigC, TC and CmlC," dated 20 February 1967.
- e. CSM 67-78, subject as in b above, dated 25 February 1967.
- f. DCSPER summary sheet, subject as in d above, dated 8 March 1967.

2. PURPOSE: A special study will be conducted to develop roles and missions and officer training and career patterns of the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps.

3. STUDY SPONSOR: DCSPER

4. OCoFA STUDY MONITOR: OAVCoFA (Director of Studies).

## 5. TERMS OF REFERENCE:

a. Problem. Reference b made recommendations concerning revised branch roles and training patterns for logistics managers. In reference e the Chief of Staff deferred decision on these recommendations directing that they be addressed in a separate study by DCSPER.

INCLOSURE III, SUMMARY

XXXIII

**SUBJECT:** Study of Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps

**b. Objectives.** The objectives of this study are to:

(1) Determine the officer logistics skill requirements of the Army from the present time (1967) through 1975. This will include the requirements for weapons systems/materiel managers, commodity specialists, functional specialists and logistics generalists.

(2) In light of 5b(1) findings, develop Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps roles and missions.

(3) In light of 5b(1) findings, develop Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps officer personnel management programs which identify skills required and provide career patterns that include appropriate educational programs and command and staff assignments.

**c. Limits.** Except as study findings impact on other branches of the officer corps, only officer personnel of the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps will be considered.

**d. Scope.** The study will examine the following:

(1) The Army's requirements for Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical, and Quartermaster Corps officer skills, to include requirements for weapons systems managers, materiel managers, commodity specialists, functional specialists, and logistics generalists.

(2) Functions to be performed by the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps, leading to revised mission statements for these branches.

(3) Existing technical officer skills, identification of additional skills required and adjustment of existing skill inventories between branches in light of revised branch roles and missions.

(4) The types of command and staff positions at battalion and higher levels which should be filled by officers of the five branches.

(5) Revised 30-year career patterns for officers of the five branches.

(6) Revisions of technical and logistics officer educational programs required at all levels, to include consideration of the findings of the Brown Board, Haines Board and other pertinent studies.

**e. Time Frame.** Current through the end of FY 1975.

**f. EEA.**

INCLOSURE III, SUMMARY

XXXIV

**SUBJECT:** Study of Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps

(1) The technical and logistics officer skills required by and existing in the Army.

(2) The roles and missions of the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps.

(3) Technical and logistics officer career patterns and educational programs.

(4) The impact of indicated revisions in technical and logistics officer personnel concepts on other branches of the officer corps.

g. Environment. The current world environment, projected through 1975, will be used.

6. **SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:** Heads of Army staff agencies and major commands will assist DCSPER as required.

7. **ADMINISTRATION:**

a. Study Title. "Study of Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical, and Quartermaster Corps (STOCQ)."

b. Study Schedule. See Inclosure.

c. Action Documents. The study should produce the action documents required to enact recommendations.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl  
Study Schedule

/s/ FRANK J. SACKTON  
FRANK J. SACKTON  
Major General, GS  
Secretary of the General Staff

**DISTRIBUTION**  
"A"

**SUSPENSE:**

DCSPER--10 Jun 67--Part I  
--45 days after approval  
of Part I--Entire Study

INCLOSURE III, SUMMARY

## STUDY SCHEDULE

### PART I - ROLES AND MISSIONS

1. Further study of areas of duplication and extent of overlap in the functional realignment of the branches.
2. Define and determine requirements for weapons systems/materiel managers, commodity specialists, functional specialists and logistics generalists.
3. Determine appropriate role and missions for each branch and the officer skill realignment required.
4. Identify types of positions that should be filled by officers of the branches studied and assess impact on all branches concerned.
5. Submission of Part I to the Chief of Staff for approval - 10 June 1967.

### PART II - TRAINING AND CAREER PROGRESSION

1. Develop appropriate officer career patterns.
2. Consider changes required in the educational program of the officers concerned.
3. Complete draft study for staff coordination.
4. Staffing and revision.
5. Publication.
6. Submission to Chief of Staff for approval - 45 days after approval of Part I.

INCLOSURE III. SUMMARY

## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

#### BASIS FOR STUDY

1. Chief of Staff Memorandum (CSM) 67-120, 24 March 1967, directed the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) to develop roles and missions and officer training and career patterns for the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps .

2. A Board of officers was appointed to study the problem and submit a report of findings and recommendations. The composition of the Board is attached as Annex A .

#### BACKGROUND

3. The composition of Army branches has undergone evolutionary changes which must be reviewed before proceeding with a study of any of these branches. Prior to 1920, the composition of the branches was closely controlled by Congress, and as a result the branches, which combined to form the overall Army organization, were largely independent of War Department control. Congress approved the organization of specific units for each branch to include the numbers and grades of all officers and enlisted men. The units, the officers and the enlisted men so authorized belonged to the branches. Branches received separate funding for and conducted their own internal training, logistical, and personnel functions. The War Department had to go to Congress for authority to add one private to any Army organization, or to change the strengths or organization of the branches in any way.

4. The reorganization of the Army in 1920 increased War Department control of the branches by authorizing internal organization of the branches



without Congressional approval. Congress continued to authorize the number of officers and enlisted men by grade for each branch, but left their organization in the hands of the War Department.

5. Branches continued to be organized and to function in this fashion until World War II. Using wartime powers, many changes in the branches were accomplished without the requirement for Congressional approval.

6. Following the war, a number of bills that had an affect on the branches were approved by Congress. The Army reorganization bill of 1950 resulted in changes to Title 10, US Code, which gave the Secretary of the Army authority to establish new basic branches and to discontinue or consolidate basic branches of the Army for the duration of any war or of any national emergency declared by Congress. Army witnesses, appearing before Congress in support of this bill made statements to the effect that:

- a. Branches have no inherent or statutory powers.
- b. Statutes passed by Congress assign duties and powers to branch chiefs, not branches.
- c. As the term "branch" was used in the bill, it had the connotation of being a career branch; a field of specialization that an officer follows throughout his Army career.

7. In 1951, The Quartermaster General submitted a draft AR 10-330, titled "Organization and Functions, Quartermaster Corps" to the Comptroller of the Army. Paragraph e of the proposed AR contained a paragraph titled, "Composition" which read: "The Quartermaster Corps consists of the Office of The Quartermaster General and such field installations, activities and units as are prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. Personnel comprising

SECTION I

C the Quartermaster Corps are The Quartermaster General, his Deputy and Assistants, and such commissioned and warrant officers and other members as shall be assigned thereto by the Secretary of the Army."

8. The Comptroller of the Army stated that he felt that this conflicted with the provisions of the Army Organization Act of 1950. Specifically, he considered that the branches or corps of the Army are composed solely of personnel and that the office of the "chief", installations, activities, and units are not an integral part of such corps. The Judge Advocate General wrote an opinion which corroborated the Army Comptroller's position in this matter.

C 9. Since 1951, two major changes affecting the branches have taken place. First, in 1962, the Secretary of Defense, acting on recommendations by the Secretary of the Army, and using broad powers provided by the National Defense Act of 1949, as modified in 1958, eliminated most of the technical service branch chiefs and divided their duties among several commands and agencies. Second, enlisted personnel ceased to be assigned to a branch. They are now assigned by MOS to units, and although many of these units are still identified with branches, the enlisted personnel are not an actual part of a branch. As a result of these evolutionary changes in branch composition, the officer remains as the only identifiable element of a branch of the Army today.

C 10. Since this study concerns technical branches, a more detailed review of the effects of the 1962 reorganization of these branches is necessary. Prior to the functional reorganization of the Army in 1962, based on the Hoelscher Committee Report (Project 80), the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps existed as technical services.

#### SECTION I

Each Corps had the specific mission of providing to the Army branch-related commodities and services. Each Corps was headed by a Chief of Service, with an Office of the Chief located at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQ, DA) at the special staff level. Each Chief performed a dual function.

a. He served as principal advisor to the Chief of Staff through the Army Staff on those commodities and services included in his mission. The scope of his responsibilities included but was not limited to the organization and doctrine of units providing branch services and supply and maintenance of his assigned commodities.

b. He commanded a CONUS Class II complex of installations and activities which performed those multi-functional tasks associated with the forecasting, development and provision to the Army of all major items, assemblies, sub-assemblies and repair parts pertinent to his assigned commodities. He also was responsible for the management of the Corps of Officers which did this work for him.

11. The mission of each Technical Service, under the command of its Chief and the staff surveillance of his principal assistants, was accomplished in the field under the command/management of a Corps of Officers (Ordnance, Quartermaster, et al). Each Chief of Service was responsible, under the policy guidance of DCSPER and DCSLOG, to procure and manage his Corps of Officers, and to assign them against validated requisitions of using commanders. The commodity orientation of each technical service mission required each technical Corps of Officers to include a broad inventory of technical skills. The included commodity-oriented skills were research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, operations, production, distribution, storage, maintenance in storage, and skills required to

#### SECTION I

develop supply, maintenance and operations doctrine for support of the Army in the field. Skills, common to all technical services, included both the general and limited management of men, money, materiel, and organizations.

12. The Chiefs of Technical Services were abolished in 1962. Their prime materiel missions were assigned to the Commander of the new Army Materiel Command (USAMC). Their training functions were assigned to the Commander, Continental Army Command (USCONARC). Their combat development functions were assigned to the Commander of the new Combat Developments Command (USACDC). Their officer personnel management functions were assigned to the Chief of the new Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), an element of the Special Staff, HQ DA.

13. Each Corps of officers, with its technical and multi-functional skill inventory unchanged, became the management responsibility of Chief, OPO. All colonels are now managed by the Colonels Division, Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD), OPO. All other officers, lieutenant colonels through warrant officers, are managed by a Career Branch of OPD; for example, Ordnance Branch, Quartermaster Branch and Signal Branch.

14. Each Career Branch is an operational element of OPD. Its major function is the personnel management of officers which includes assignment, military and civilian schooling, career management, and those ancillary tasks relating to personnel management.

15. Implementation of the functional concept in providing combat service support to the Army in the field is proceeding rapidly. Branch material, commodity-oriented maintenance and supply organizations are being superseded by others that are function-oriented. Combat service support Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and Tables of Distribution and

## SECTION I

C Allowances (TDA), which formerly identified officer positions by branch, now reflect many positions labeled service material (SM) or branch immaterial (NO or BI). These labels mean that the positions can be filled by an officer of any one of several branches who is otherwise considered qualified to do the job. This device continues the emphasis on function and de-emphasizes the branch-material expertise formerly identified in such manning tables. Implementation of the ROAD and COSTAR concepts, and approval of the TASTA-70 concept, represent logical progression toward maximum functionalization of combat service support to the Army.

16. In this context it becomes logical and important to consider whether the skill inventories of certain technical branches should be realigned so as to make each Branch responsible for managing and providing officer skills which relate to a single prime function. The Board must determine whether such a realignment of skill inventories will better serve present and planned organizational concepts.

#### GUIDANCE

17. By CSM 65-576, "Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development (Project TECSTAR)," (Annex B) the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) was directed to "... Re-examine the scope of functions performed by Quartermaster and Ordnance officers and prepare a statement of functions for each." DCSLOG reported by Summary Sheet, "Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development (Project TECSTAR)," 12 April 1966, with 12 Inclosures. Inclosures 8 and 9 to the DCSLOG Summary Sheet are a statement of the functions (tasks-MOS) then being performed by Quartermaster and Ordnance officers (Appendices 1 and 2, Annex C). This statement of functions simply

#### SECTION I

reported the status quo; it did not recommend functions which should be performed by those officers. By paragraphs 3b and 5a of CSM 66-282 (Annex D), the Chief of Staff approved the DCSLOG submission and directed that it be used as a base point from which to proceed with this study.

18. By CSM 65-576, the Chief of Communications-Electronics (CC-E), HQ DA, was directed to ". . . Re-examine the scope of functions performed by Signal officers and prepare a statement of functions." CC-E reported by Summary Sheet, "Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development (Project TECSTAR)", 3 May 1966, with two inclosures. Inclosure 2 to the CC-E Summary Sheet contained a statement of recommended functions which should be performed by Signal officers (Appendix 3, Annex C). It is noteworthy that the recommended function did not include either supply or maintenance of Signal equipment except at the user level, not did it include meteorology. By paragraphs 3b and 5a of CSM 66-282 (Annex D), the Chief of Staff approved the CC-E submission and directed that it too, be used as a base point from which to proceed with this study.

19. The Board was guided by the conclusions of the Chief of Staff as announced in paragraph 3 of CSM 65-576, which follow:

- a. "The present overall officer career structure is sound."
- b. "Examination of the Army's officer requirements, current officer distribution by branch and grade, and the patterns of opportunity for promotion and advanced military and civilian schooling, indicates that certain administrative actions can be taken which will improve the officer career structure, and no major revision of the structure is required."
- c. "The examination further shows the need for continuous, detailed study and analysis of the actual and projected conditions within

SECTION I

C the officer corps in order to detect both favorable and adverse trends, and determine what impact these trends may have. This will enable the Department of the Army to act promptly to correct any undesirable conditions which occur, prevent other undesirable conditions from developing, or alternatively, exploit favorable trends which appear."

20. Decisions of the Chief of Staff, also announced in paragraph 3 of the same CSM 65-576, were:

a. "The present procedure of using the branch system, the specialist programs and the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designation for classification and control of officer positions and assignments will be retained."

b. "The branch system and specialist programs will continue to be used as the structure for career development and opportunity."

C 21. The following additional guidance was derived from records of meetings on Volume V, DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board) and on officer logistics training at which the CofS, Army discussed problems that this study must address:

a. Realizing the long term effects of changes in personnel policies, a conservative approach is preferred.

b. Actions taken should result in a closer integration of officers of the arms and services.

22. The Board reviewed thoroughly authoritative data produced to support such prior related studies as Project 80, TECSTAR, TASTA-70, and the DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board). In several instances the Board was briefed by action officers who either had

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SECTION I

participated in or were completely knowledgeable about those studies. Where past reports had thoroughly developed data pertinent to this study, these data were considered and used in evaluating courses of action. A recapitulation of pertinent elements of prior studies is inclosed as Annex A, Section II

23. In addition to the documented guidance cited above, it was recognized that certain fundamental precepts bear directly upon the organization and operation of any executive level personnel management system. The Board identified and adopted the following precepts as further guidance in its deliberations.

a. The Army mission is paramount. Any realignment of skill inventories or policy or procedural changes which may evolve in the Officer Personnel Management System must result in positive and demonstrable improvement to support of the Army mission.

b. Technological changes, improved management devices and evolutionary organizational changes must be consistently exploited to improve the Army's ability to accomplish its mission.

c. Maximum use must be made of officer talents, present capabilities and demonstrated professional potential. Any administrative or procedural barriers to such use must be eliminated. While uniformity of procedures and competitive equity are proper and essential objectives of any personnel system, exceptional ability deserves exceptional opportunity and authority should exist to permit it.

d. Each individual officer must be able to discern a logical and credible pattern of progression in professional training and education,

## SECTION I



grade, and levels of responsibility. The system must engender confidence that competitive opportunity is consistent with demonstrated ability.

e. The system must be designed to attract and retain the talent required by the Army.

f. The system should be designed to provide reasonable stability and continuity of operations in peace and war.

24. Information available to the board was considered adequate for development of conclusions and recommendations without the use of assumptions.

SECTION I

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

S T U D Y

O F

SIGNAL, TRANSPORTATION, ORDNANCE, CHEMICAL AND QUARTERMASTER CORPS

(STOCQ)

BOARD COMPOSITION

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Major Gerald G. Watson, Chemical Corps

Effective until 15 November 1966 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
Washington, D. C. 20310

LTC Graham/maq/59914

CS 320 (22 Nov 65)

22 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development  
(Project TECSTAR)

1. References:

a. Project TECSTAR Detailed Plan (Parts I, II and III),  
Department of the Army, dated June 1965.

b. Summary Sheet, Comptroller of the Army, subject: TECSTAR  
Detailed Plan, dated 17 August 1965.

c. A study of Army Manpower and Personnel Management, ODC&A,  
OCofSA, May 1965.

2. The purpose of this CSM is to announce certain decisions based  
on consideration of references above, and to assign responsibilities for  
follow-on actions as a result of these decisions.

3. References 1a, 1b and 1c have been reviewed and it is concluded  
that the present overall officer career structure is sound. Examination  
of the Army's officer requirements, current officer distribution by branch  
and grade, and the patterns of opportunity for promotion and advanced  
military and civilian schooling indicates that certain administrative  
actions can be taken which will improve the officer career structure, and  
no major revision of the structure is required. The examination further  
shows the need for continuous, detailed study and analysis of the actual  
and projected conditions within the officer corps in order to detect  
both favorable and adverse trends, and determine what impact these trends  
may have. This will enable the Department of the Army to act promptly to  
correct any undesirable conditions which occur, prevent other undesirable  
conditions from developing, or alternatively, exploit favorable trends  
which appear. Thus the resulting improvements in the officer career  
system should further assure equitable opportunities for promotion and  
advanced schooling for both combat arms officers and technical and adminis-  
trative service officers consistent with the needs of the Army in

**SUBJECT: Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development  
(Project TECSTAR)**

accomplishing its basic mission to fight. In addition, it appears that the officer corps' faith in its career system would be strengthened if the secrecy which prevails concerning the selection criteria for promotion, advanced school assignment, and retention was eliminated and the selection criteria made known throughout the Army. Accordingly, the following decisions are announced:

a. The present procedure of using the branch system, the specialist programs and the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designation for classification and control of officer positions and assignments will be retained. The branch system and specialist programs will continue to be used as the structure for career development and opportunity.

b. Explicit selection criteria for promotion, school assignment and retention of officers will be published, and the information will be disseminated to all interested individuals.

c. Reference 1a, as a Department of the Army study, is approved for information only. The study will not be construed as DA policy nor are its conclusions or recommendations to be considered as approved.

4. The following staff agencies will accomplish the actions designated and, by summary sheet, submit recommendations to the Chief of Staff for approval:

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Staff Agency</u>
a. Re-examine the scope of functions performed by Quartermaster and Ordnance officers and prepare a statement of functions for each.	DCSLOG
b. Re-examine the scope of functions performed by Signal officers and prepare a statement of functions.	CC-E
c. Upon completion of the statements of functions of a and b above, re-examine the functional areas of the Quartermaster, Ordnance and Signal Corps to determine if these branches should be realigned to become the supply, the equipment maintenance/ammunition and the communications/electronics branches respectively.	DCSPER

ANNEX B, SECTION I

**SUBJECT: Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development  
(Project TECSTAR)**

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Staff Agency</u>
d. Develop the capability and procedure to identify each position in the Army as being appropriately allotted to an officer, warrant officer, enlisted man, or civilian; and to produce total Army requirements for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men in terms of grade and MOS and for civilians in terms of occupational series and code.	ACSPOR
e. Examine the feasibility and desirability of assigning the responsibility for preparation of job descriptions for MOS to the same agency responsible for the preparation of TOE and TD.	DCSPER
f. Designate an identifiable staff element charged with the functions of:	DCSPER
(1) Compiling statistical data of officer requirements, inputs, assets, and losses.	
(2) Analyzing the statistical data to detect trends and determine the impact such trends may have on the officer corps.	
(3) Developing and recommending to the CofSA any changes to selection criteria for promotion, attendance at senior service college level schools, continuance of active duty, statutory selection, involuntary release from active duty, and flight status review based on the overall requirements of the Army and the analysis of trends and the determined impact of those trends.	
(4) Developing, maintaining and publishing an SOP in accordance with selection policies established by the SA and CofSA.	
(5) Monitoring and assisting board members in the performance of their duties, developing reports of board activities, and serving as a central point of contact and information source for board actions.	
(6) Providing information to career management offices indicating the collective nature of reasons personnel were not considered as qualified.	

**SUBJECT: Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development  
(Project TECSTAR)**

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Staff Agency</u>
g. Provide for making public the contents of Letters of Instruction to promotion selection boards, senior Service school selection boards and retention boards together with the composition of such boards when selection lists are published.	DCSPER
h. Examine the procedures presently used to determine the requirements for officers with advanced degrees and recommend what actions, if any, are necessary to bring assets and project input into line with present and future requirements, both for the overall Army and individual branches.	DCSPER
i. Develop an information program which announces the decisions in paragraph 3 above, informs all officers of the Army's overall requirements for officers in each branch and the philosophy used to determine this branch distribution, and provides facts concerning inequities which allegedly exist between the combat arms officers and the technical and administrative service officers.	CINFO

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

**DISTRIBUTION:**

"C"

/S/CHARLES A. CORCORAN  
CHARLES A. CORCORAN  
Brigadier General, GS  
Secretary of the General Staff

**SUSPENSE:**

1 Dec 65 - DCSPER, DCSLOG, ACSFOR, CC-E  
Report EDC (para 4a - h above)  
15 Dec 65 - CINFO  
Completed Program (para 4i above)

ANNEX C

EXCERPT FROM CSM 65-576, 22 NOVEMBER 1965

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE STAFF AGENCY</u>
a. Re-examine the scope of functions performed by Quartermaster and Ordnance officers and prepare a statement of functions for each.	DCSLOG
b. Re-examine the scope of functions performed by Signal officers and prepare a statement of functions.	CC-E

APPENDICES

- 1 - Ordnance Statement prepared by DCSLOG
- 2 - Quartermaster Statement prepared by DCSLOG
- 3 - Signal statement prepared by CC-E

## STATEMENT OF FUNCTIONS

### ORDNANCE COMMISSIONED OFFICER

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE OFFICER. Prepares plans and policies for maintenance support and directs activities of various sections of ordnance organization engaged in maintenance or reclamation of ordnance materiel. (MOS 4800, 424 officers, 9.4% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE OFFICER. Prepares policies and directs arrangements for receipt, storage, maintenance and issue of ordnance equipment, supplies and ammunition. (MOS 4512, 411 officers, 9.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE SUPPLY OFFICER. Directs requisitioning, receipt, storage and issue of, and accounting for, ordnance supplies and equipment. (MOS 4530, 332 officers, 7.4% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS AMMUNITION OFFICER. Directs receipt, storage, inspection, surveillance, assembly, maintenance, modification, distribution, and emergency destruction of conventional ammunition and missile explosive components. (MOS 4514, 302 officers, 6.7% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS MAINTENANCE OFFICER. Commands or serves as staff maintenance officer of units engaged in direct support, general support, or depot maintenance of all types of materiel except large missile systems and ammunition. (MOS 4803, 275 officers, 6.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS LOGISTICS OFFICER. Formulates plans, policies, and directives on logistics and other related administrative matters at logistical command, field army, and higher echelon headquarters. (MOS 2625, 223 officers, 5.0% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE GUIDED MISSILE AND SPECIAL WEAPONS STAFF OFFICER. Plans, coordinates, directs, and supervises ordnance logistical operations pertaining to guided missiles and special weapons and develops policy and doctrine relative to support of guided missile weapons systems. (MOS 4513, 217 officers, 4.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS OFFICER. Prepares and coordinates plans and policies, and directs receipt, storage, inspection, surveillance, assembly, maintenance, modification, distribution, and emergency destruction of special ammunition materiel. (MOS 1723, 188 officers, 4.2% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE MISSILE OFFICER (ADM). Directs inspection, assembly, supply, and field and depot maintenance, and performs related staff functions pertaining to air defense missiles and associated equipment. (MOS 4802, 152 officers, 3.4% of branch duty strength).

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C, SECTION I



PERFORMS DUTY AS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR. Coordinates planning and supervisory activities relative to research and development projects. (MOS 2167, 146 officers, 3.2% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OFFICER. Commands or serves as staff officer of an explosive ordnance disposal unit. (MOS 9224, 142 officers, 3.2% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUPPLY STAFF OFFICER (G4, S4). Plans, coordinates and supervises all activities concerned with arrangements for supply, maintenance, evacuation, transportation services, and other related logistical matters. Assists commanders on logistical matters, serves as supply officer on battalion, brigade, division, and corps staffs, or assists logistics officer on logistical command, field army or higher headquarters staffs. (MOS 4010, 121 officers, 2.7% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS OPERATIONS AND TRAINING STAFF OFFICER (G3, S3). Directs and coordinates functions of staff relative to organization, training, and combat operations. (MOS 2162, 114 officers, 2.5% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE MISSILE OFFICER (FAM). Directs inspection, assembly, supply and field and depot maintenance, and performs related staff functions pertaining to field artillery missiles and associated equipment. (MOS 4801, 94 officers, 2.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS MAJOR DEPARTMENTAL UNIT CHIEF OR DIRECTOR. Plans, organizes, and administers operations of major departmental branch or division of overhead or field installation. (MOS 2025, 72 officers, 1.6% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PROCUREMENT OFFICER. Plans, directs, supervises, and conducts procurement of supplies, services, and equipment. (MOS 4320, 60 officers, 1.3% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS HEADQUARTERS UNIT COMMANDER. Directs technical and tactical training, discipline, and coordination of internal administration and security of headquarters company, detachment, or battery. (MOS 2900, 58 officers, 1.3% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PROCUREMENT CONTROL AND PRODUCTION OFFICER. Plans and controls production program to integrate variable features relating to production, procurement, and distribution of materiel. (MOS 4319, 55 officers, 1.2% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE OFFICER. Commands or serves as staff maintenance officer of unit engaged in providing direct support, general support, or depot maintenance of all mechanical and associated non-mechanical equipment, except aircraft, medical, and aerial delivery materiel. (MOS 4815, 51 officers, 1.1% of branch duty strength).

#### APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C, SECTION I

PERFORMS DUTY AS PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE. Directs military instruction program and drill of ROTC students. (MOS 2517, 49 officers, 1.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ADJUTANT. Directs activities of headquarters pertaining to personnel operations and general administration. Advises commander and staff on personnel and administrative matters, and exercises technical staff supervision of such functions throughout command. (MOS 2210, 48 officers, 1.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ARMAMENT MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OFFICER. Directs and supervises field and depot maintenance of field and anti-aircraft artillery, small arms, and fire control equipment. (MOS 4808, 46 officers, 1.0% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS POST COMMANDER. Directs and supervises operations and administration of installation. (MOS 2019, 45 officers, 1.0% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS AMMUNITION AND MISSILE MAINTENANCE OFFICER. Commands unit engaged in missile system, nuclear, and ammunition supply and maintenance, or serves as ammunition and missile staff officer in the headquarters of a support battalion or higher level logistical unit. (MOS 4515, 43 officers, 1.0% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS NONTACTICAL UNIT OFFICER. Directs unit charged with temporary administration of regularly organized Army units or other military personnel, or directs operations of unit organized to assist various operating units in performance of their duties. (MOS 2136, 36 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS INSPECTOR GENERAL. Makes inspections, investigations, surveys, or studies of any matters pertaining to affairs of Army establishment pursuant to law, regulation, or directive and with strict impartiality, (MOS 8310, 35 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS TECHNICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER. Plans, initiates, and coordinates special, technical, or engineering activities of unit to insure conformity to prescribed command instructions and policies. (MOS 2170, 34 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS MECHANICAL ENGINEER. Directs mechanical engineering activities concerned with mechanical or industrial equipment for military use. (MOS 7500, 32 officers, 0.7% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS TRAINING OFFICER. Assists operations and training staff officer or school commandant by supervising instruction and training of military and civilian personnel, or directs training of National Guard and Army Reserve units. (MOS 2520, 31 officers, 0.7% of branch duty strength).

#### APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C, SECTION I

C  
PERFORMS DUTY AS ADPS PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFFICER. Plans and directs installation and operation of automatic data processing systems, (MOS 2402, 30 officers, 0.7% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS GENERAL SUPPLY OFFICER. Directs requisitioning, receipt, storage, inventory and issue of general supplies in military unit. (MOS 4000, 30 officers, 0.7% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Directs operations to provide administrative services for operating, technical or tactical units. (MOS 2120, 28 officers, 0.6% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ELECTRONICS ENGINEER. Directs and engages in electronics engineering activities involving design, development, testing, and military application of electronic devices, such as radar, television, detection, countermeasure, computing, and communications equipment. (MOS 7601, 27 officers, 0.6% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUPPLY AND SERVICE OFFICER. Commands or serves as staff officer of unit engaged in supply, service or supply and service operations at divisional, direct support, general support, or depot level. (MOS 4200, 25 officers, 0.6% of branch duty strength).

C  
PERFORMS DUTY AS MANAGEMENT ANALYST. Studies, surveys, and analyzes objectives, policies, methods, procedures, organization, and administrative work flow in Army organization and makes recommendations to improve effectiveness and efficiency. (MOS 2610, 25 officers, 0.6% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ORDNANCE PROOF OFFICER. Directs testing of ordnance material to determine quality and effectiveness for military use. (MOS 7539, 24 officers, 0.5% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS LOGISTICAL COMMANDER. Commands and supervises operations and administration of logistical area or installation. Commands Support Brigade, Logistical Commands, Division Support Commands, and Inventory Control Centers. (MOS 2624, 22 officers, 0.5% of branch duty strength).

Also performs duty as:

Personnel Management Officer  
Personnel Staff Officer  
Supply Depot Officer  
Missile Maintenance Officer  
Engineer Equipment Maintenance & Repair Officer  
Physicist  
Production Engineer  
Aeronautical Engineer  
Combat Intelligence Officer  
Communications Officer  
Motor Transport Officer

C  
APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C, SECTION I

C

- Chief of Staff
- Secretary of the General Staff
- Technical and Tactical Board Member
- Comptroller
- Supply Management Officer
- Purchasing and Contracting Officer
- Signal Equipment Maintenance and Repair Officer
- Tire Maintenance and Repair Officer
- Aircraft Maintenance Officer
- Special Services Officer
- Statistician
- Chemist
- Military Intelligence Officer

A summary of the supporting statistical data of duty functions, arrayed in order of distribution, is attached as Inclosure 10.

Where the words "ordnance materiel/equipment supplies" appear, officers may be performing functions with commodities other than those traditionally associated with ordnance. New functional MOS were published in C9, AR 611-101, 20 Oct 64, and are currently being implemented in DE/TD's. With full implementation of COSTAR and functional concepts in TD's, it is expected that reference to ordnance commodities will disappear.

## STATEMENT OF FUNCTIONS

### QUARTERMASTER COMMISSIONED OFFICER

PERFORMS DUTY AS QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY OFFICER. Directs requisitioning, receipt, storage, and issue of, and accounting for, quartermaster supplies and equipment. (MOS 4419, 391 officers, 12.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUPPLY STAFF OFFICER (G4, S4) and commands division supply and transport battalion. Plans, coordinates and supervises all activities concerned with arrangements for supply, maintenance, evacuation, transportation services, and other related logistical matters. Assists commands on logistical matters, serves as supply officer on battalion, brigade, division, and corps staffs, or assists logistics officer on logistical command, field army or higher headquarters staffs. (MOS 4010, 331 officers, 10.3% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS LOGISTICS OFFICER. Formulates plans, policies, and directives on logistics and other related administrative matters at logistical command, field army, and higher echelon headquarters. (MOS 2625, 271 officers, 8.4% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS QUARTERMASTER STAFF OFFICER. Formulates and directs implementation of policies for receipt, storage, issue, and distribution of quartermaster supplies, and directs other quartermaster functions and related administrative matters. (MOS 4015, 212 officers, 6.6% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SUPPLY OFFICER. Directs procurement, storage, inspection, testing, issue and distribution of petroleum products. (MOS 4960, 172 officers, 5.3% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS GENERAL SUPPLY OFFICER. Directs requisitioning, receipt, storage, inventory, and issue of general supplies in military unit. (MOS 4000, 168 officers, 5.2% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS COMMISSARY OFFICER. Directs operations of installation commissary or commissary store. (MOS 4223, 98 officers, 3.0% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ARMY EXCHANGE OFFICER. Supervises and directs operation of an exchange, and coordinates exchange activities with commanders. (MOS 4210, 87 officers, 2.7% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PARACHUTE MAINTENANCE & AERIAL SUPPLY OFFICER. Directs aerial delivery of supplies and equipment and inspection, cleaning, repair, testing, supply, packing, rigging, and storage of parachute canopies, allied assemblies, aerial delivery containers, heavy-drop kits, cargo parachutes, and other retardation devices. (MOS 4820, 81 officers, 2.5% of branch duty strength).

APPENDIX 2, ANNEX C, SECTION I

PERFORMS DUTY AS HEADQUARTERS UNIT COMMANDER. Directs technical and tactical training, discipline, and coordination of internal administration and security of headquarters company, detachment, or battery. (MOS 2900, 77 officers, 2.4% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS OPERATIONS & TRAINING STAFF OFFICER (G3, S3). Directs and coordinates functions of staff relative to organization, training and combat operations. (MOS 2162, 74 officers, 2.3% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS OPEN MISS SECRETARY. Directs operation of an officers' open mess. (MOS 4112, 73 officers, 2.3% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS MAJOR DEPARTMENTAL UNIT CHIEF OR DIRECTOR. Plans, organizes, and administers operations of major departmental branch or division of overhead of field installation. (MOS 2025, 67 officers, 2.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS POST QUARTERMASTER. Directs and supervises clothing, equipping and feeding of troops and coordinates post quartermaster supply, service, and other activities. (MOS 4220, 64 officers, 2.0% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PROCUREMENT OFFICER. Plans, directs, supervises, and conducts procurement of supplies, services, and equipment. (MOS 4320, 62 officers, 1.9% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE. Directs military instruction program and drill of ROTC students. (MOS 2517, 61 officers, 1.9% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUBSISTENCE OFFICER. Directs and coordinates procurement, storage, and distribution of subsistence stores, rations, forage, grain, and subsistence supplies for major command or depot. (MOS 4130, 59 officers, 1.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUPPLY AND SERVICE OFFICER. Commands or serves as staff officer of unit engaged in supply, service or supply and service operations at divisional, direct support, general support, or depot level. (MOS 4200, 51 officers, 1.6%).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ADJUTANT. Directs activities of headquarters pertaining to personnel operations and general administration. Advises commander and staff on personnel and administrative matters, and exercises technical staff supervision of such functions throughout command. (MOS 2110, 51 officers, 1.6% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Directs operations to provide administrative services for operating, technical, or tactical units. (MOS 2120, 51 officers, 1.6% of branch duty strength).

## APPENDIX 2, ANNEX C, SECTION I

PERFORMS DUTY AS TRAINING OFFICER. Assists operations and training staff officer or school commandant by supervising instruction and training of military and civilian personnel, or directs training of National Guard and Army Reserve units. (MOS 2520, 47 officers, 1.5% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS QUARTERMASTER REPAIR OFFICER. Directs repair and reclamation for reissue of shoes, clothing, office equipment, canvas textiles, rubber, materials handling equipment, and other metal and nonmetal quartermaster equipment items. (MOS 4606, 38 officers, 1.2% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS FOOD ADVISOR. Exercises technical supervision over food service activities within command, and develops and supervises measures for execution of programs for improvement of service of food and elimination of food waste. (MOS 4114, 37 officers, 1.1% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUPPLY DEPOT OFFICER. Commands general supply depot. Directs procurement, inspection, storage, maintenance, and distribution of general supplies and equipment. (MOS 4450, 36 officers, 1.1% of branch duty strength.)

PERFORMS DUTY AS ADPS PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFFICER. Plans and directs installation and operation of automatic data processing systems. (MOS 2402, 28 officers, 0.9% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS NONTACTICAL UNIT OFFICER. Directs unit charged with temporary administration of regularly organized Army units or other military personnel, or directs operations of unit organized to assist various operating units in performance of their duties. (MOS 2136, 27 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS LOGISTICAL COMMANDER. Commands and supervises operations and administration of logistical area or installation. Commands Support Brigades, Logistical Commands, Division Support Commands, and Inventory Control Centers. (MOS 2624, 26 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS SUPPLY MANAGEMENT OFFICER. Formulates plans, policies, and directives for control of supplies and assembles all data pertaining to supply items required for definitive supply action, including procurement, disposal, or allocation. (MOS 4201, 26 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS PURCHASING AND CONTRACTING OFFICER. Directs purchasing and contracting of supplies, equipment, and services, and initiates or reviews renegotiation activities regarding price readjustments, curtailments, and cancellations. (MOS 4310, 25 officers, 0.8% of branch duty strength).

PERFORMS DUTY AS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR. Coordinates planning and supervisory activities relative to research and development projects. (MOS 2167, 22 officers, 0.7% of branch duty strength).

Also performs duty as:

Personnel Management Officer  
Personnel Staff Officer

APPENDIX 2, ANNEX C, SECTION 1

C  
Comptroller  
Laundry and Fumigation Officer  
Special Services Officer  
Civil Affairs Agricultural Officer  
Inspector General  
Communications Officer  
Motor Transport Officer  
Highway Transport Officer  
Chief of Staff  
Post Commander  
Technical Operations Officer  
Graves Registration Officer  
Management Analyst  
Organization and Equipment Planning Officer  
Procurement Control and Production Officer  
Signal Supply Officer  
Ordnance Supply Officer  
Refrigeration Officer

A summary of the supporting statistical data of duty functions, arrayed in order of distribution, is attached as Inclosure 10.

C  
Where the words "quartermaster supplies/equipment/items" appear, officers may be performing functions dealing with commodities other than those traditionally associated with quartermaster. New functional MOS were published in C9 AR 611-101, 20 Oct 64, and are currently being implemented in TOE/TDs. With full implementation of COSTAR and functional concepts in TD's, it is expected that reference to quartermaster commodities will disappear.



## STATEMENT OF FUNCTIONS

### SIGNAL CORPS OFFICERS

RECOMMENDED FUNCTIONS: Signal officers have primary interest and responsibility for the following communications-electronics functions:

a. Command organizational elements whose primary mission is to provide communications-electronics capabilities or support. This includes communications-electronics support at the battalion level in organizations where this support is required.

b. Serves as a commander of Signal units or as a communications-electronics staff officer furnishing advice and assistance to commanders and their staffs, and coordinating assigned aspects of the planning and staff supervision of the installation, and operation of communications and electronics systems in support of military plans and operations, to include:

(1) Communications systems employing wire, cable, radio, sound, visual signal, messenger, laser, radar, switching and other integral analog and digital devices.

(2) Communications security applications.

(3) Organizational maintenance of Communications-Electronics systems and equipment.

(4) Training of communications and electronics personnel.

(5) Preparation of communications and electronics orders, records, reports and instructions.

(6) Participating in planning, preparation and execution of combat orders in support of military operations.

(7) Installation and operation of avionics equipment including traffic control and navigational aids.

(8) Engineering, installing and where appropriate, operating integrated communications/computer/display (ADP) systems, centers and complexes in support of interested commanders both within the field Army and higher commands.

(9) Management of the radio frequency spectrum. Allocation and assignment of call signs, and radio propagation prediction and analysis.

(10) Communications-electronics aspects of surveillance, air defense systems, and electronic warfare.

APPENDIX 3. ANNEX C, SECTION 1

(11) Ground terminals for the satellite communications systems.

(12) Planning and supervision of the accomplishment of pictorial and audio-visual services (still and motion picture photographic service, television service, Army aerial photography and facsimile transmission).

(13) Logistics of communications security equipment.

(14) Serving as commandant, staff and faculty members of Service schools for communications-electronics, supervising and conducting instruction in the installation, operation, and user maintenance of communications-electronics equipment and devices. At other schools, serve on the faculty conducting similar instruction as required.

(15) Supervising and participating in combat development, R&D, testing and operations analysis activities.

(16) Serving a proportionate share of his time in command and staff positions that are designated branch-immaterial in the same manner as other arms such as the Infantry, Artillery and Engineers.

Effective until 14 June 1967 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
Washington D. C. 20310

LTC Graham/em/59914

CS 320 (15 June 66)

15 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Role of Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Corps Officers

## 1. References:

a. DCSLOG summary sheet, subject, "Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development (Project TECSTAR)," dated 12 April 1966, with addendum dated 22 April 1966.

b. CC-E summary sheet, subject, "Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development (Project TECSTAR)," dated 3 May 1966, with addendum dated 25 May 1966.

c. CSM 65-576, subject, "Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development (Project TECSTAR)," dated 22 November 1965.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to announce decisions made relative to the roles of Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Corps officers and to direct follow-on actions as a result of these decisions.

3. The Chief of Staff, in acting on the summary sheets referenced above, made the following decisions:

a. The approved definition of communications-electronics is:

"Communications-electronics embraces design, development, installation, operations and maintenance of electronics and electro-mechanical systems associated with the collecting, transmitting, storing, processing, recording, and displaying of data and information associated with all forms of military communications excluding the responsibility for information and data systems and equipment which has been otherwise assigned."

ANNEX D, SECTION I

**SUBJECT: Role of Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Corps Officers**

b. The functional statements for Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Corps officers, as stated in references 1a and b, are approved to include the definition of communications-electronics stated above.

c. Communications officer positions in nonsignal units will be designated as Signal Corps positions.

4. ACSFOR will take necessary action to redesignate communications officer positions in nonsignal units as Signal Corps positions.

5. DCSPER will:

a. Using the functional statements for Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Corps officers as modified by the decisions stated in paragraph 3 above, re-examine the functional areas of the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Corps to determine if these branches should be realigned to become the equipment maintenance/ammunition, the supply and the communications-electronics branches respectively.

b. Prepare a plan for filling communication officer positions in nonsignal units with Signal Corps officers. The future status of non-Signal Corps officers filling nonsignal unit communication officer positions and non-Signal Corps officers having primarily communication officer background will be addressed. The plan should identify the manpower implications and the problems which will result, actions required to eliminate the identified problems, and a time schedule for completion of actions stated in the plan.

6. The requirement stated in paragraph 5a above supersedes the DCSPER requirement in paragraph 4c of reference 1c.

**BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:**

**DISTRIBUTION:**  
"B"

/S/ CHARLES A. CORCORAN  
CHARLES A. CORCORAN  
Brigadier General, GS  
Secretary of the General Staff

**SUSPENSE:**  
DCSPER and ACSFOR--21 Jun 56--Report EDC

**ANNEX D, SECTION I**

## ANNEX E

### DEFINITIONS

1. Several terms which are used throughout this study are defined here to aid in a common interpretation. Some definitions are direct extracts from Army regulations, while others are not. All are intended to clarify their meaning as used in this study.

2. The following terms and definitions are listed in a sequence intended to reflect inter-relationships:

Functions:	The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office or organization.
Uni-functional:	Consisting of or pertaining to one function.
Multi-functional:	Consisting of or pertaining to two or more functions.
Functional Specialist:	An individual qualified in the application of skills associated with a single function.
Materiel:	All items necessary for the equipment, maintenance, operation, and support of military activities without distinction as to their application for administrative or combat purposes.
Commodity:	An item or grouping of related items of materiel.
Weapons Systems/ Equipment Systems Manager	An individual qualified through education, experience, and training to manage activities across several or all of the life-cycle functions for a single commodity.

### ANNEX E, SECTION I

**Commodity Specialist:** A weapons system/equipment system manager.

**Logistics Generalist:** An individual qualified through education, experience, and training to manage activities across both functional and commodity lines.

**Mission:** The task, together with the purpose which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor.

**Role:** The function(s) with which a person or an organizational element is primarily concerned in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

**Corps:** A branch of the Army.

**Branch:** An arm or service of the Army.

**Arms:** The arms are those branches consisting of officers who are primarily concerned with combat and combat support.

**Services:** The services are those branches consisting of officers who are primarily concerned with combat service support and/or administration to the Army as a whole.

## SECTION II

### ANALYSIS OF PRESENT SYSTEM

#### GENERAL

1. In this section the Board reports its analysis of current branch skill inventories. The present officer career management system is assessed in terms of its effect upon the Army mission, the commanders with the mission, the personnel managers and the individual officers.

2. The present officer personnel management system has been studied in the recent past from several points of view. Those studies include TECSTAR, the Baker Board of Inquiry on Material Readiness, COSTAR II, TASTA-70, Project AIM, and Report by Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board). A recapitulation of the findings of these prior studies, which are pertinent to this study, is inclosed at Annex A.

3. A decision has been made (CSM 66-282) to designate all communications officer positions in non-Signal units as branch-material Signal positions. This means that all communications officer positions are to be Signal branch-material. Implementation of this decision on a time-phased basis has been approved.

#### MISSION

4. The Army mission includes five basic land battle tasks. These tasks are fire, maneuver, intelligence, communications and logistics. Three broad categories of organizations perform these tasks; they are combat, combat support and combat service support. The Officer Personnel Management System must supply officer skills to all three categories of organizations. A skill void in any one category could severely limit or destroy the Army's ability to conduct successful sustained combat. This study is concerned principally with the provision of officer skills to

## SECTION II

C the support of communications, movement, supply, maintenance, and chemical functions.

5. The Army mission can be supported from the present branch alignment of officer skill inventories. This is being done now on a worldwide basis, to include one major combat involvement. While there are distinct advantages in maintaining the status quo, these may be attained at the expense of optimum utilization of personnel assets. The Board recognizes and appreciates that the present system is workable; however, there is strong evidence that the current alignment of skills is outdated and is in need of modification to eliminate problems which adversely affect the performance of the overall Army mission. Although the Army is well down the road of functional reorganization, career branches are aligned substantially as they were before the new organizational concept was initiated. With the exception of the initial steps taken to functionalize personnel operations by establishment of OPO, there has been a noticeable lag in changing career management organization and procedures to keep pace with functional changes. There is duplication of functional skills among branches. This duplication was necessary and logical when each branch was a separate entity which was largely self-supporting and which managed personnel and skills necessary to perform missions assigned to the Chief of the Technical Service.

6. While the duplication referred to above is undesirable in the current functional organization, it must be recognized that many positions necessary to the command and management of men, money, organizations and materiel require officers possessing several functional skills. This is particularly true of senior command and staff positions.

C SECTION II



## MANAGER OF PERSONNEL

7. The officer personnel system for the U.S. Army is characterized by centralized procurement, promotions, assignments and career management. In such a large organization, centralization is the only means of obtaining the desired uniform application of policy and equity in personnel matters. Centralization also provides for better control and more efficient utilization of personnel resources according to priorities. The major disadvantages of this centralization are those which stem from the size of the officer corps which consists of approximately 125,000 commissioned officers. If for no other reason, the magnitude demands that officers be divided into groups of manageable size. The Army has always grouped officers following the same or related career patterns. The branches as reflected in AR 10-5 constitute the present groupings for career management purposes. The purpose of the following discussion is to examine how well the present alignment responds to the requirements of DCSPER, OPO and OPD in performing their tasks of providing personnel to the Army and managing officers' careers.

8. Today there are approximately 400 officer skill areas identified and used by the Army to accomplish its assigned mission. These are called Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Historically, responsibility for developing and training officers has been assigned to one or more of the branches of the Army. This, undoubtedly, was dictated by the magnitude of the job. In any case, precedent has established the basic fact that certain skills are the foundation upon which the career branch has been guided in the procurement, training and professional development of its officers.

9. While the foregoing is true, many MOS are not the exclusive responsibility of any one branch. For example, comptrollers and logistics

C staff officers are included in officer special career programs; consequently opportunity is given to officers of any branch for assignment in these and other MOS areas. While this offers participating officers the opportunity for a broader career, in many instances their initial broadening experience is acquired at the senior grades and, consequently in responsible positions. Performance in such positions suffers when the incumbent's career pattern has not provided prior training and experience in the field of endeavor for which he now becomes responsible.

C 10. The MOS alone does not precisely define the skills possessed by an individual or required for a position. It does not indicate the level of skill attained. Designation of grade and branch aids in a clearer definition of skills. Other factors such as the type unit further clarify the scope of tasks to be performed. MOS descriptions in AR 611-101 are purposely broad and comprehensive so as to cover a maximum number of existing positions in Army organizations. It is not intended that the MOS serve as a "tailor made" job description for the position it describes. It is intended as a general description of qualifications desired of an officer who could be assigned to a variety of positions in a particular skill area. The TECSTAR study endeavored to develop a new codification system that could more exactly define qualifications. This proved to be complicated and too difficult to apply. Although the MOS, branch and grade are not precise tools for defining an individual's skills, they do provide personnel managers with adequate skill groupings.

11. Some existing MOS descriptions were prepared prior to the functional organization of the Army and are now out of date. They combine into a single MOS qualifications which are companion qualifications in Technical Service organizations but are no longer companions in functional

units of COSTAR and TASTA. These MOS are perpetuated by the present branch alignment in which the functional areas overlap. Some still have validity in describing skills possessed by individuals groomed in technical service units even though they do not exactly conform to the requirements of the present functional units. This is a transition problem that needs correcting. It should diminish as time passes and MOS descriptions are revised.

12. There are characteristics of the present branch alignment that detract from the benefits of a centralized personnel management system. As stated above, grade, branch and MOS are the basic tools used by personnel managers to identify skills required in Army organizations. The career branches control and manage these skills. These tools are adequate to do the job if responsibility is fixed. The primary management problem resulting from the existing alignment is the loss of the ability to control because of a duplication of skills in several branches. No single branch has the responsibility of managing each skill area (MOS) or determining the adequacy of the number of qualified personnel available to meet the Army's total needs in the skill. This violates a fundamental management principle.

13. Determination of requirements is a major responsibility of DCSPER, OPO and OPD. The accuracy with which this can be done, to a large degree, determines the efficiency of the entire personnel program. Inability to determine realistic requirements by skill area increases the incidence of unprogrammed requirements and causes unnecessary turbulence and crash actions. It also weakens the Army's readiness posture in terms of personnel mobilization. There should be a positive procedure for inventorying personnel assets by skill area (grade, branch and MOS) and for comparing these assets with existing and future requirements in order that positive action

C can be taken to insure that the necessary numbers of qualified officers are available at the time and place required. The current career branches are unable to analyze their strength posture by skill area due to the present practice of identifying many TOE and TD positions that clearly fall into a functional area as service material or branch immaterial. With the existing duplication of skills among the branches, and the lack of specific proponency for either MOS or positions, it is difficult to manage skills efficiently.

14. The use of SM, BI and NO designations causes other problems in efficient management of personnel assets and complicates the task of placing the best qualified man in the position. Extensive coordination of requisitions for SM, BI and NO positions between several branches is required.

C 15. The reluctance of officers to accept assignment of a primary MOS that is not considered career enhancing in his branch, causes the Army to lose the ability to identify and apply available skills. For example, most Signal officers prefer communicator MOS and many hesitate to accept supply or logistics MOS. Conversely a QM officer will avoid a communicator MOS in favor of a logistics MOS. An officer may carry a duty MOS while he is in the position, but once he changes jobs he is no longer carried on the MOS listings unless it has been assigned as his primary, secondary or tertiary MOS.

16. The present procedures permit frequent change of branch designation of commissioned officer positions in TDA. This complicates the task of forecasting requirements and fixing responsibility with a branch for filling the requirements.

17. The existing concept that career patterns provide for maximum development consistent with an officer's capabilities and continued

preparation for positions of great responsibility is valid. There are factors that detract from the merits of this concept however. So many officers can be assigned for purposes of diversification and development that nearly everyone is an "on-the-job trainee" and only a few are assigned because they are proficient. The present system, with its emphasis on broad development, together with the available number of branch immaterial positions and civilian and military education programs, provides an excellent means of grooming junior officers for senior positions requiring generalized talents.

18. On the other hand, there is evidence from other studies that the current system is not providing officer personnel with sufficient technical proficiency in the logistical functions of movements, supply and maintenance (Annex A). There is a conflict between the present philosophy that all commissioned officers must be generalists and the needs of the Army for greater numbers of commissioned officers with a high degree of technical proficiency.

#### COMMANDERS

19. This part of the analysis examines the responsiveness of the present branch alignment to the personnel needs of commanders. They must be provided with personnel who possess the requisite qualifications to perform their assigned duties, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

20. Commissioned officers of all branches possess a good general education. This provides a foundation for a wide choice of specific training and assignments in management positions. Present career patterns in most branches place officers in many types of jobs in a variety of units, thus providing for a relatively broad background of experience. This

diversification is beneficial and is needed to ready young officers for more responsible positions. There is, however, evidence that so much diversification in assignments is taking place that officers in supply and maintenance positions are not able to develop the necessary degree of proficiency needed in these technical areas. This is further magnified by the lack of military positions in the CONUS logistics system to provide for continued development and a rotation base.

21. The commander is provided only that number of personnel needed to accomplish his mission. Authorization documents are based upon the assumption that all personnel authorized are proficient at the level of skill indicated by the MOS, branch and grade. The commander has a right to expect personnel reasonably qualified for these positions. The TECSTAR Study, Baker Board, Project AIM, and the Brown Board all concluded that a major source of supply and maintenance problems is that personnel assigned to key positions in these areas do not have adequate training and experience in these areas. Therefore, the present system is not as responsive to the needs of the user as it should be in these technical areas.

22. The lack of fixed responsibility with a branch for monitoring a functional skill weakens the ability of the Army to efficiently manage personnel qualified in that functional area. The task of matching the best man available for the job could be done better if a single career branch has responsibility for filling all the personnel requirements in that skill area. The existence of identical functional skills throughout the branches complicates evaluations of personnel assets and requirements by skill area.

23. Comments submitted by major commanders on the TECSTAR study indicate that a realignment of skills is desirable. The organization for

C career management should be closely related to the organization of the Army for mission accomplishment and officer career patterns should be in consonance with the structure of the Army. USAMC expressed a need for commodity specialization rather than a functional orientation. An extract of command and staff comments is contained in Annex B.

24. Commanders at all echelons have career management responsibilities. There is the obligation to counsel officers and to urge the most competent to seek a career in the Army. Commanders find it difficult to explain the opportunities offered by a career in a technical branch, since the role of officers in these branches is not clear. He is also at a loss to explain the apparent inequities in school selections, strength allocations of Regular Army and opportunity to serve in key logistics positions.

#### INDIVIDUAL

C 25. In the business world, an axiom of long standing is the observation that "the key to a successful organization lies in the competence of its personnel." This recognition of the importance of quality personnel has led to the present-day recruiting practices of business. Never before has American commerce devoted so much effort and money to attracting and selecting competent employees. The U.S. Army is no different in this respect. In order to successfully accomplish the many requirements associated with performing the Army mission, it is mandatory that the Army attract and retain capable and dedicated people. This recruiting effort is, of course, in direct competition with American business. It therefore is essential that the Army's "career package" contain sufficient inducements to be competitive. The present officer career package contains a multitude of elements designed to appeal to both the officer and his family. It is recognized that many

facets of the present package can be improved; however, this portion of the analysis will be confined to those factors that are directly associated with the current method of personnel management by the career branch.

26. The missions of the former Chiefs of Technical Services were the bases for the current organization for career management for technical service officers. This basis no longer exists, a fact which creates a feeling of uncertainty among these officers and suggests an instability of the present alignment. This feeling of uncertainty grows as newly organized COSTAR units replace units previously identified with these officer's branches. They can no longer see the clear path of opportunity throughout the Army structure in the form of branch-identified command and key staff positions as is present in other branches.

27. Key assignments, such as command assignments, are necessary for professional development. The requirement for competent logisticians is evident throughout the Army structure from the lowest to the highest echelons, to include essential command positions. Many of the command positions that were previously designed as branch material are now branch immaterial. They are often staffed with non-logisticians from arms branches. An analysis by the DCSLOG revealed that 84 percent of the logistics command positions at the colonel level (group and brigade level) are held by officers with an arms background. Officers pursuing supply and maintenance careers fail to understand this rationale when they know that there are so many competent officers with both command and logistical experience who have groomed for years to hold these key positions. They



feel that this is not sound, is not in the Army's best interest, is grossly unfair to their career groups and constitutes a breach of faith since command positions traditionally filled by arms officers are not open to them. There is no longer a clearly discernible pattern of assignment opportunity for supply and maintenance officers as existed prior to functionalization.

28. The present alignment of skills for career management purposes has not kept pace with the functional reorganization of the Army. As a result, in the supply and maintenance fields, an officer cannot clearly define the role of his career group (branch). This adversely affects his ability to set realistic goals with confidence.

29. There is ample opportunity today for professional development in the Army. Few other organizations place the same degree of emphasis on the development of their management (officer) personnel. The Army normally uses the latest techniques and often pioneers new developments. Officers from all branches of the Army are afforded opportunities for military schooling and many are sent to civilian universities and colleges for post-graduate study. Throughout his career, each officer is offered and encouraged to accept the maximum amount of responsibility commensurate with his abilities. To achieve the desired level of professional development, it is normally necessary for officers to serve in other than branch material positions. Officers of all branches now serve in Army General Staff, DOD and specialist program positions.

30. Existing policy governing branch quotas for attendance at the U.S. Command and General Staff College favors certain branches. Since

attendance at USCGSC is a prerequisite for assignment to the general staff and equivalent positions, any policies which favor certain branches place officers from those branches in a better competitive position based on Army policy rather than on ability and needs of the Army. This fosters discontent among those not favored and weakens their confidence in the system. It also creates a doubt in the minds of all officers that opportunity is truly equated to ability.

31. There are other conditions about the present personnel management system and existing policies that concern the technical service officers and weakens their confidence in the equity of the system. For example, the allocation of Regular Army strengths to branches is not equitable. Severe limits are placed on the number of U.S. Military Academy graduates allocated to technical branches. The number of general officers appointed from the logistical branches has declined since the Army reorganization of 1962 even though the number of general officer positions authorized the Army has increased during this period.

#### SUMMARY

32. In summary, the following major strengths and weaknesses of the present system were identified:

##### a. Strengths

(1) The present branch structure is a working personnel management system. It does provide trained officers and the mission to organize, train, and equip Army forces for land combat is being accomplished.

(2) It develops an officer who is broadly qualified with knowledge and skills in more than one area. This provides flexibility to

the user for local assignment and utilization. It increases the flexibility of the Department of the Army to meet field requirements, particularly where there is an imbalance in skill requirements between CONUS and overseas. It also increases the individual's opportunity for assignment to a variety of positions.

(3) It avoids personnel turbulence which would probably result from a major realignment of skills among branches.

b. Weaknesses

(1) The branch structure is based upon the old technical service organization and does not conform to current and proposed organizational concepts. While the Army was and is being organized functionally, beginning with Project 80 and now with COSTAR and TASTA-70, the career branches remain substantially the same.

(2) There is duplication of skills among the branches due to the former technical services having duplicating functions, such as supply and maintenance.

(3) As TOE's were changed from branch units to COSTAR units it became more difficult to identify positions with a single branch. There followed a proliferation of branch immaterial and service material positions. This causes difficulty in precisely forecasting requirements. No single branch has the responsibility for managing each skill area or determining the adequacy of the number of qualified personnel to meet the Army's total needs.

(4) Individuals can no longer identify branch material positions at all levels, and as a result there is a consciousness of uncertainty of opportunities among the officers.

(5) The present system does not provide clear roles and missions for the branches and, consequently, does not clearly fix responsibility for management of skill inventories by branch.

## RECAPITULATION OF OTHER STUDIES

### PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this Annex is to present the conclusions drawn by previous studies concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the present career management system and present branch alignment. Not all of these studies were primarily interested in this area but each made observations concerning the career management structure and its influence on the area that the study was principally interested in.

2. USAMC Study on Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development, 1964.

a. The Commanding General, USAMC, directed this study. He fully supported its conclusions which are presented below:

(1) "The 1962 reorganization of the Army and the continuing trend throughout the Army toward functionalization in the logistics organization have resulted in the development of major functional areas of Research and Development, Production and Procurement, Material, Construction, Communications, Transportation, and Medical. Each of these major functional areas contains subdivisions that, in turn, require the use of basic technical skills.

(2) "The existing technical branch structure is without meaning or usefulness in the areas of career management and functional performance of the Army logistics mission. The identifying branch insignia is no longer meaningful and should be eliminated. The dispersion of identical functional skills throughout the branches is detrimental to centralized career management and actually inhibits the assignment of skilled personnel.

ANNEX A, SECTION II

(3) "The existing MOS structure does not adequately support the functional areas which have evolved in the Army's logistics system nor is the MOS structure designed to satisfy the requirements of career development in the functional areas. The present technical branch structure, together with its segregation of skills by that structure, actually retards and confuses the assignment and application of skilled personnel to jobs in the functional areas.

(4) "A definitive MOS system, strongly controlled to satisfy both the personnel needs of top-level logistics management and the functional areas, is required in order to effectively manage personnel and assure that:

(a) "Positions in TD and TOE units are earmarked by MOS for the appropriate logistics specialists and are filled only by individuals so qualified.

(b) "A 'capstone MOS' is assigned to each qualified logistician. Only those officers who have qualified for that MOS should be assigned to fill top-level logistics command and staff positions.

(c) "A 'capstone MOS' for the major functional areas is assigned to each officer qualified in the broad requirements of his functional area. Key command and staff positions in the functional areas should be filled only by personnel so qualified.

(d) "The MOS structure provides for the identification of commodity and systems managers.

(5) "Technical service schools, as now constituted, do not satisfy the skill requirements by major functional areas.

ANNEX A, SECTION II

(6) "Career patterns in consonance with the newly evolved functional structure must be developed and published on a priority basis, with provision for commodity specialization.

(7) "Even though AMC has no assigned responsibility for development of the careers of military personnel, it does have a vital interest in and must play an active advisory role in the procurement, training, education, and assignment of personnel in order to assure successful accomplishment of jobs in the various functional areas and the concomitant development of career patterns.

(8) "The CONUS training and rotation base to support overseas requirements for trained personnel in the major functional areas of logistics has not been disseminated.

(9) "To assure effective development of technical officers, the initial assignment of all company grade officers should be with combat, combat support, and troop training units only.

(10) "Personnel currently on duty in the logistics area are concerned that, in the evaluation of an officer's career performance, high level staff and management duties are not receiving credit equivalent to that now extended to command duty.

(11) "The operating functions of procuring, educating, and assigning personnel should be separated from the policy formulating function and consolidated and place on comparable footing with the material, doctrine, and training functions."

3. USCONARC Functional Career Development and Training Study.

a. This study was conducted in 1964 to provide the TECSTAR Committee with the views of experts in the Army school system regarding

ten functional areas. This study resulted in ten separate studies each covering a different functional area and emanating from a different school. Presented below is a summarization of the conclusions drawn pertaining to the functional areas of supply and maintenance. Others pertaining to other functional areas are not germane to realignment of supply and maintenance and are omitted.

b. Maintenance. (Study conducted by the U. S. Army Ordnance School)

(1) The study places Army materiel into three categories: repairables, nonrepairables, and ammunition items.

(2) The study proposes the establishment of a Director of Maintenance at DA level. Functions would include responsibility for Army maintenance policies and plans, with the exception of personnel, to include: development, coordination, and supervision.

(3) The study proposes the establishment of a Maintenance Center. The Maintenance Center would assist in developing, excluding explosive munitions, the following areas:

- (a) Maintenance doctrine
- (b) Policies
- (c) Tactics
- (d) Techniques
- (e) Conduct training
- (f) Evaluate maintenance operations
- (g) Monitor all maintenance

(4) The study establishes a Maintenance Officer career field with possible duty positions ranging as follows:

ANNEX A, SECTION II



- (a) Combat unit
- (b) Maintenance units
- (c) Assistant Division Commander (for Materiel

Readiness)

- (d) Maintenance Officer of a major command
- (e) Director of Maintenance, DA staff

(5) This study re-emphasized the need for four commodity-oriented maintenance areas, as developed by the USACDCOA Agency, with minor modifications. They are as follows:

- (a) Mechanical Maintenance Officer
- (b) Armament Maintenance Officer
- (c) Electronics Maintenance Officer
- (d) Aircraft Maintenance Officer
- (e) Materiel Officer

(6) The following areas were excluded from this study: medical maintenance, missile maintenance, and ammunition maintenance.

(7) The study recommended a joint effort be instituted between the Transportation School and the Ordnance School to satisfy marine and railway maintenance requirements.

c. Supply and Services. (Study conducted by the U. S. Army Quartermaster School)

(1) The Quartermaster School Report addressed itself to the area of Supply and Service except for Munitions, Maps, Water and Aircraft. These items were specifically excluded from the report in guidance furnished by USCONARC.

ANNEX A, SECTION II

(2) The school concluded that a well defined, progressive career pattern in Supply and Service will exist under current and future concepts. The skills required of individuals are identifiable and trainable within the school system.

(3) All currently identifiable Quartermaster functions excluding maintenance are covered in the report. These include:

(a) Supply Management

1. Commodities

a. Class II and IV

b. Class I

c. Class III

2. Procurement

3. Disposal

(b) Service

1. Food Service

2. Exchange

3. Open Messes

4. Commissary

5. Laundry and Bath

6. Graves Registration

7. Air Delivery

(4) Two areas were challenged by the U. S. Army Transportation School:

(a) Air Delivery

(b) Pipeline Operations

The Transportation School feels that these are modes of movement. The Quartermaster School feels that these are supply functions.

d. Munitions. (Study conducted by the U. S. Army Ordnance and Guided Missile School)

(1) This study considered munitions (missiles and ammunition) support from Research and Development through disposal, in accordance with COSTAR II "complete round" concept. At the lower echelons, the total function can be supported by four technical specialties which provide technical specialist fields for junior officers.

These are:

- (a) Missile Maintenance Officer
- (b) Ammunition Officer
- (c) Disposal Officer
- (d) Chemical and Special Effects Officer

The study concluded that these specialties can be combined at the higher command or managerial level but some technical specialists should be retained at all levels. To accomplish this, MOS-controlled assignments will be required.

(2) Based on the 36 officer MOS selected for consideration in this study, approximately 2,461 officers are currently performing duties related to those included in the Munitions Officer Career Program. The proposed career pattern is stated to be manageable and coupled with the proposed Munitions Career Field Training Plan provided a guide for the development and training of officers which will enable them to advance to higher grades and assume increased responsibilities and is applicable under current Army organizational structure and the projected COSTAR II and TASTA-70 structures.

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(3) The study proposes five new or modified MOS codes to replace ten current codes. The five new MOS codes are:

- (a) Ammunition Officer
- (b) Ammunition Disposal Officer
- (c) Missile Systems Maintenance Officer
- (d) Chemical and Special Effects Officer
- (e) Munitions Officer

e. These studies were forwarded to the Department of the Army as elements of a USCONARC staff study which delineated the rationale and discussed the areas of incompatibility between the various school efforts. The forwarding comment indicated that all facets of the studies had not been completely analyzed by USCONARC and, therefore, should not be construed as representing an unequivocal USCONARC recommendation. Significant points contained in the USCONARC cover study are presented below:

(1) "The maintenance study included in its 'philosophy of maintenance' a doctrinal aspect with which exception was taken (by USCONARC) namely, the furnishing (supply) of repairable items through maintenance channels rather than supply channels. This study professes that because maintenance of repairable items depends upon a balance of tools, repair parts, skills, location, and organization, it is imperative that repair parts be furnished (i.e., supplied) through maintenance channels forward of Army rear area boundaries. The Signal School representatives, during coordination, supported the philosophy stated in the maintenance study, while the Quartermaster School took exception to it. A decision to support the COSTAR II doctrine was made by USCONARC in May 1964.

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(2) "Level of Assignment of Functionally Trained Officers.

(a) "The major effort of these studies has been directed to the functional areas of combat support such as maintenance, supply, and communications. A corollary action is the training and assignment of certain functional jobs within combat arms TOE. There are two schools of thought on the degree of functionalization of such duties as the S1, S2, S4, the Communications Officer, and the Maintenance Officer in combat arms TOE. One view is that the assignment of functionally trained officers in a combat arms TOE would be detrimental to the unit in that it would result in a loss of combat flexibility and proficiency of the unit. It was generally agreed that functional assignment above the combat battalion would be amenable to the combat arms mission.

(b) "In regard to the utilization of functionally trained officers in combat arms units, it is the USCONARC position that the S4 positions at and below battalion level should be combat arms officers. (It should also be noted that the training provided for functionally assigned officers is available to combat arms officers.) In the area of communications and maintenance, it is the USCONARC position that functionally trained branch immaterial officers should be included in combat arms TOE down to and including battalion level units."

4. USACDC Position Briefing on Technical Missions, Structure and Career Development.

The USACDC approach to the TECTAR problem considered missions and functions of the seven technical services only; the combat arms and the administrative services were not included. However, USACDC did consider MOS and individual training, branch designation, and heraldic

C insignia. Significant points are summarized below:

a. Missions and Functions

(1) USAC&GSC and the Hoelscher and Traub Committee studies were reviewed and the views of USACDC major commanders regarding missions and functions were obtained. These were evaluated in relation to the problem of functionalization, the 1962 reorganization, and total impact on the Army.

(2) Two criteria were considered with respect to the problem of functionalization:

(a) Combining similar or closely related skills, activities, procedures, etc., into a major functional grouping; and

(b) Combining skills, activities, or procedures which have a similarity of purpose into major functional groupings.

( Using these criteria, the following 13 major means of service support were isolated:

1. Supply
2. Maintenance
3. Movements
4. Communication
5. Construction
6. Medical Services
7. CBR Activities
8. Personnel Administration
9. Finance Services
10. Legal Services
11. Religion

12. Discipline

13. Civil Affairs

Only the first seven areas received further consideration. As indicated above, USACDC attention was directed to the technical services only.

(3) USACDC considered the alignment of supply and maintenance functions to provide training and staff patterns consistent with proposed organizational concepts in COSTAR II and TASTA-70 to be of particular and pressing importance at this time. These new organizational concepts "eliminate the technical service oriented supply and maintenance units by combining skills and operations into functional supply and maintenance units from brigade down to and including company-sized units. Command and control headquarters include technical service personnel in general or director staff sections, thus permitting elimination of separate technical service staff sections. In addition to these concepts for field organizations, consideration must be given to the actual operating units and headquarters found in the CONUS units of the TD type. The several headquarters of USACDC are organized functionally as also are the headquarters and various commodity commands of USAMC. These commands as well as the DA Staff have requirements for personnel trained in supply and maintenance activities and other functions related to them."

(4) In view of these functional type organizations, USACDC concludes that it is important that the supply and maintenance functions be aligned as soon as possible, perhaps without awaiting the results of the overall study of missions and functions. Analysis of the supply function reveals that there are currently eight branches which train personnel to perform the supply function including that of publications supply.

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C The similarity of skills required for procurement, storage, issue, and supply administration provides a firm basis for assigning the supply function to a limited number of branches and thus eliminate duplication of skills and fragmentation of personnel resources to perform the mission. In view of USACDC, the Quartermaster Corps with its long and varied experience in general supply operations seems best suited to assume responsibility for the supply function with the exception of medical supply and Class V items. The professional nature of the items involved and the fact that the medical service is practically the sole user of medical equipment and supplies presents rationale for retaining medical supply and maintenance under that service similar to the method of handling medical supplies at DOD level by the Defense Medical Materiel Supply Agency.

( (5) The specialized requirements for handling, storage, maintenance, issue, and distribution of Class V items plus the expenditure control exercised through command allocation to meet combat needs provides a basis for retaining Class V items under the Ordnance Corps. The function of disposing of explosive materiel should also remain under the Ordnance Corps since it complements the Class V supply mission. This recommendation takes advantage of the specialized training and experience gained by Ordnance personnel over the years in meeting the trained personnel requirements to perform the function.

( (6) A consideration of maintenance activities also indicates fragmented responsibilities, yet many of the skills required to perform the function are common or closely related. Consolidation of resources in this area promises some savings in personnel, facilities, and equipment. In view of this, it is the USACDC position that maintenance



should be assigned to the Ordnance Corps which has had considerable experience in this function. Medical maintenance is exempted because of the close relationship to medical supply, professional use of the end items, and the peculiarities of the equipment.

(7) USACDC recommends the following assignment of major functions to the seven (7) technical services:

(a) OM - Supply (includes Classes I, II, III, IV, and publications, but excludes Class V and Medical Supply).

(b) Ord - Maintenance and Class V Supply (excludes Medical Maintenance).

(c) TC - Movements

(d) Sig - Communications

(e) Engr - Construction

(f) Chem - Chemical, Biological, and Radiological activities.

(g) Med - Medical activities (including Medical Supply and Maintenance).

b. Individual Training.

A major problem in connection with functionalizing activities is that of developing adequately trained personnel. The career development of personnel has in the past been oriented to multi-functional branches with specialization designated by MOS peculiar to the particular branch. This is so even in common fields such as supply which has separate MOS for branch supply officers. Any realignment of functions as well as the organization of functional units will require some revision in MOS as indicated by the problems previously mentioned. Likewise training,

particularly school training, must be oriented to functional concepts to provide career progression through specialization and is a functional area up to and including the ability to assume command and staff positions in headquarters designed to control many functions such as in a support command.

5. Project AIM.

a. This study was primarily interested in installation management. The report was dated 1 December 1964. Many of the conclusions relate to the present personnel management problems. Those most closely related to realignment are listed below.

(1) "There is no unanimity of opinion among installation personnel as to what an optimum pattern of military/civilian positions should be.

(2) "A better balance of skills between CONUS and overseas would serve to provide both areas with better qualified personnel.

(3) "Procedures should be established for identifying key positions in support activities particularly in short tour overseas areas and improve means be established for selecting and placing qualified personnel in these positions.

(4) "Standardized TD's would facilitate computation of training requirements inasmuch as uniformity would permit a composite review of both TD's and TOE's.

(5) "Considerable effort is currently being directed to retention of military personnel. However, expansion of HQ DA's personalization capabilities and improvement of counselling facilities will serve to further these efforts.

(6) "Although there exists a capability in the military

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C school system to train military and civilian personnel in the administrative and logistics fields, there is a need for additional provisions (including assignments in CONUS installations and on-the-job training) to fulfill the management needs in overseas commands and, to a lesser degree, CONUS installations.

(7) "The importance of assignments to installations is lacking in the Army since few officers assigned to key positions at installations are trained for such a position and, accordingly, are not responsive to the leadership and supervisory roles associated therewith.

(8) "There is an obvious, far-reaching need for training officers for successive levels of installation assignments in the military school system commencing with the career courses and continuing through the Army colleges.

C (9) "Staffing of an installation by either military or civilian personnel should not be done without giving due consideration to the training and rational base requirements of the Army on a worldwide basis.

(10) "So long as the local commander retains the degree of flexibility which he now has to determine which TD positions will be military and which will be civilian, the achievement and maintenance of an optimum mix will be extremely difficult.

#### 6. Baker Board.

The Board of Inquiry on Materiel Readiness investigated factors affecting materiel readiness. The report dated 23 September 1964 concluded that there is a shortage of officers trained in the supply and maintenance fields and that this acts as a deterrent to materiel readiness.

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## **7. TECSTAR**

a. Analysis of the current officer career system indicates the following principal areas of weakness which hinder the ability of the Army to provide properly trained and motivated officers to perform technical missions, activities and functions Army-wide:

(1) Neither active nor Regular officer strength distribution is directly related to functional requirements.

(2) Approximately half of all officers in company grade and in field grade are not trained primarily to perform the technical functions for which their assignments make them responsible.

(3) Neither the present branches nor MOS structure describe the qualifications needed by officers clearly enough to permit proper training.

(4) The instability of the officer structure of TD organizations is damaging to performance of technical functions as well as to ability to provide officers to perform such functions in TD units.

(5) The diverging requirements and the absence of relationship among branch material positions, branch immaterial positions, and specialist program positions contribute to confusion, inefficiency, and duplication of effort in officer personnel management.

(6) There is no way of verifying that the qualitative distribution of officers among branches and among technical areas is appropriate to the functional areas.

(7) Specialist program requirements and policy on selection for higher military schooling are detrimental to quality improvement in the technical area.

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(8) The opportunities open to officers of different branches to occupy important positions for which their experience and ability should qualify them, are unbalanced.

b. Following are improvements needed in the present system:

(1) Officer Distribution. Adjustment in active and Regular Army strength distribution between officer career groups is necessary to increase the number of officers trained primarily to perform technical functions. This adjustment should match the officer strength in each career group to the Army-wide needs for officers trained primarily to discharge the functions on which the career group is based.

(2) Requirements Procedure. Methods used to determine the strength authorizations of officer career groups should be revised. The method used should insure that officer position requirements are developed for the same future period as force plans and identified clearly with functional requirements.

(3) Training Objective. Officer training should be concentrated on the primary functional area of intended use at each stage of an officer's development. Each stage of officer training should have as its primary objective the development of complete competence to perform in a specific group of positions requiring the same basic skill.

(4) Training Requirements. An increase in the number of officers trained primarily to perform technical functions, in both company and field grades, is necessary to improve operational readiness in the Army. The numbers of officers trained in each functional area should be based on projected future position requirements, with annual training programs adjusted to compensate for unprogrammed changes.

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(5) Officer Assignments. Assignment of officers to positions based on their primary functional training, rather than on organizational designation is necessary. Broadening of officer experience should be gradual and based on expansion from thorough specialized qualifications.

(6) Specialist Program Functions. Reconciliation of the areas of functional emphasis and the key positions in specialist programs with career groups is necessary. This reconciliation should have the objective of eliminating specialist programs as development and assignment agencies separate from the basic career structure, and assigning specialist program positions and development responsibilities to primary officer career groups.

(7) Qualitative Balance. Reconciliation of qualitative needs of the type represented by specialist programs, and "branch material" needs, is necessary. A qualitative balance should be established in each grade to prevent damage to performance of technical functions.

(8) Military College Selection. In addition to the education and training changes above, it is necessary to eliminate the barrier on further development and use of technical officers caused by the present Leavenworth quota. This change should allow selection to attend senior service colleges on the basis of demonstrated performance and evaluated potential to perform in the grade of colonel in top level headquarters.

(9) Functional Coverage of College. An increase in the scope of officer training at the Leavenworth level is necessary to provide coverage of technical functions in other than combat commands of the Army in the field. This training should qualify officers in technical functions and organizations to the same degree that the present Leavenworth course does in tactical functions and organizations.

(10) Officer/Civilian Functional Identification. Use of the codification system to describe the functional responsibilities of officer and civilian positions, and of the personnel, is necessary to allow decision on military/civilian mix and establishment of an officer rotation base. The descriptions of officer and civilian positions and personnel which are established in the classification system should provide the same basic coverage for each in order to allow determination of appropriate grades and qualifications.

(11) Officer Classification Basis. Adjustment of the officer classification (MOS) system to relate it directly to functional career areas is necessary. The adjustment should identify all positions and officers within a specific career function area on the primary basis of position functions and officer qualifications to correspond to scope of functional responsibility and type of organization.

(12) Position Classification Procedure. Acceleration in the process of changing officer position classifications is needed to improve evaluation of the personnel and training implications of changes in organization. This acceleration should be based on use of ADP and functional coding of positions to ascertain changes rapidly.

(13) Functional Description of Positions and Personnel. Use of a functional codification as a standard Army-wide means of identifying organizational functions is needed to determine personnel and training requirements. This should allow a determination of functional similarities between different types of organizations with varying missions and locations.

(14) Branch Immaterial Positions. Identification of present BI positions with a career group is necessary. This identification should be

based on the relation between the primary functional qualification needed in the position and the career functional area with which it corresponds most closely.

(15) Officer Classification Control. Stabilization in career group identification of officer positions is necessary for adequate training and personnel support. Change in career group identification of officer positions should not be permitted unless there is a change in functional responsibility which justifies it.

8. Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board).

a. Volume V, Personnel, Training, and Organization, recommended personnel management changes which that study determined were necessary to improve the Army logistics system. The study dealt with Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps (OQT). The primary personnel recommendations were:

(1) Designate the OMC for supply (less ammo, med and repair parts supply) and Quartermaster-type service support; the Ordnance Corps for maintenance (less med but inclusive of aircraft), ammunition service and repair parts supply; the Transportation Corps for movements, and simultaneously to relieve the other technical service branches of these functions.

(2) Modify the training patterns for officers in the Ordnance Corps, Quartermaster Corps and Transportation Corps during the 1970 timeframe to substitute a common Logistics Officer Advanced Course for the branch advanced courses.

(3) Establish a C&GS (Logistics) course in the 1970 timeframe for attendance by selected officers of the OQT branches.

(4) Identify logistics-oriented positions in TOE or TDA as branch material, consistent with the first recommendation or Logistics

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Material (LM) or Services Material (SM) for the generalist-type positions.

(5) Designate the positions of maintenance and supply officers in battalions as Ordnance Corps and Quartermaster Corps, respectively.

Assign the Bn Maint Officer to the Bn Staff on a coequal status with the Bn S-4 or Supply Officer.

(6) Eliminate the present Logistics Officer Specialist Program during the 1970 timeframe. During the interim, a transitional period will exist with the following characteristics: Continue to assign all officers qualified in logistics and who express an interest to remain in this field. Attendance at the Logistics Course or the Senior Logistics Course should be made a prerequisite, if practicable, to assignment to a key logistics position. ACSFOR, with the guidance and assistance of DCSLOG, will determine which Army positions are to be designated Branch Material, Logistics Material, or Services Material. DCSLOG should actively participate in the development of career structures, career progression, and management of key logistics personnel.

(7) Make the necessary lateral transfer of officers in accordance with the concept as stated in the first recommendation.

(8) Realign officer career management policies and procedures to accommodate the changes in branch functions.

(9) Eliminate the requirement for detailing newly commissioned Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation Corps RA officers for a period of one year with a combat arm, and, in lieu thereof, assign such officers to appropriate logistics positions within divisions involving direct association with the user combat troops.

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(10) ALMC be directed to establish a Logistics Course and a Senior Logistics Course as part of the training pattern to prepare military and civilian personnel for mid and top-level logistics management assignments.

b. The Chief of Staff, Army, deferred his decision on these recommendations and established this Board to study the problems further.

## IMPACT OF COMMENTS ON TECSTAR

The "Realignment" proposal of the TECSTAR Plan, with certain exceptions, is considered highly desirable. Exceptions are: Functional assignment of officers down to and including battalion level limits commanders flexibility; and staff officers (S1, S2, S3) may find themselves thrust into command responsibility. (USCONARC)

It is absolutely essential to provide, establish and maintain within the senior logistics career group, a solid segment of officers who are commodity or service oriented as contrasted to functionally oriented; e. g., maintain a hard core of specialists like engineer, signal and transportation officers who are more oriented toward operation in their specialties than they are toward emphasis on selected functional areas like supply, maintenance and procurement. (USANMC)

The proposed alternative is too revolutionary and abrupt. Realignment is a better first step toward developing functionalized branch structure with some modification (USACIDC)

The realignment proposal, modified, should be approved for implementation. (USCONARC)

Changes in the officer career system should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary as proposed in the TECSTAR Detailed Plan. Major upheaval involving the officer career structure is undesirable at this time and could be excessively disruptive in view of US Forces current commitments to combat operations. (USCONARC, DCSPER, DCSOPS) Resulting turbulence could be harmful. (DCSOPS, DCSLOG)

The proposed time phasing for implementing any course of action is unrealistic. There is no known requirement for any "crash actions" in the area of officer career systems. (DCSPER) The time scheduling should be such as to allow a smooth transition from current career patterns to future patterns. (DCSPER)

With exception of the "Realignment" alternative, the career branch structures set forth in Section D, Chapter IV, Part I, Project TECSTAR Detailed Plan contain proposals which, if adopted, would conflict with statutory laws. Adoption of any such proposal without approval of Congress would be legally objectionable. (TJAG)

SECTION III  
FUNCTIONS AND SKILLS

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this section is to determine the officer logistics skill requirements of the Army from the present time (1967) through 1975. This will include the requirements for weapons systems managers/materiel managers, commodity specialists, functional specialists, and logistics generalists. The skills identified will form the basis for branch alignment of logistics officers to be considered in the following section.

2. Several recommendations of the Brown Board on which the Chief of Staff deferred decision are directly related to officer logistics skill requirements. These issues will be considered specifically in this discussion.

DISCUSSION

3. In terms of the overall Army mission, logistics is a single function; however, the diversity of goods and services involved and the corresponding diversity of tasks to be performed make it necessary to divide logistics into smaller segments for analysis of officer skills required. For this purpose, the following functions, all a part of logistics in the broadest sense will be examined.

- a. Maintenance
- b. Supply
- c. Movement
- d. Research and Development (R&D)
- e. Materiel evacuation and disposition

f. Acquisition, construction, operation, maintenance, and disposition of facilities and real property.

g. Hospitalization and evacuation

h. Acquisition of materiel

i. Logistics services

4. There is no basis in current doctrine for associating any of the above logistic functions with specific branches. However, as a carryover from the missions of the technical services prior to 1962, the STOCQ branches are the primary sources of officers for all these functions except medical logistics and real property logistics.

5. Medical services to include hospitalization, evacuation, and maintenance and supply, are elements of the overall logistics function as listed above. As such, they are subject to examination and analysis for possible realignment. Examination, however, indicates that medical service is managed on an integrated basis. The medical team concept is established and proven effective. Although medical and medical service corps officers are managed separately from other officers, there is no reason to expect that a realignment of officer skills would improve the management utilization of these officers or that a functionally trained and experienced officer would perform these tasks better. Therefore, the Board concludes that a detailed analysis of the area is neither implied nor necessary. The roles and missions of the medical service need not be affected by those of the STOCQ branches.

6. The functions associated with the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities and real property

typically are performed by Engineer officers. A review of these functions does not indicate a close inter-relationship with other logistics functions. It appears to the Board that no inclusion of these activities within the roles of the STOCQ branches is indicated. This observation is in keeping with the scope of the study which did not include the Engineer Corps. Hence, the Board concludes that a more detailed analysis of these activities is not pertinent to a determination of STOCQ roles, missions, and logistics skill requirements.

7. Although many factors bear on the officer skills required to perform these logistics functions, organization directly determines the individual tasks and responsibilities and, hence, the skills required. Doctrine, mission, and other factors must be reflected in job descriptions and TOE or TDA positions to influence identifiable skill requirements. This relationship between organization and skill requirements is evidenced by the changes in officer skill requirements brought about by the reorganization of the Army in the field under ROAD, COSTAR II, and TASTA-70.

8. Before these reorganizations, most logistics officer positions had a direct materiel or commodity relationship. In this environment, an officer developed an expertise in depth in a given commodity field by serving in various functional positions within that field. Throughout, logistics organizations were so organized that operations focused on specified materiel with the various functions subordinate to the overall management of the commodity. With the reorganizations, the nature of most logistics positions within the Army in the field was altered to focus on functions with commodity considerations subordinate to the overall management of the

function, e.g., supply and maintenance. Thus, where there had been requirements for Ordnance maintenance officers, Ordnance supply officers, and Ordnance staff officers, there are now requirements for maintenance officers, supply officers, materiel officers, and logistics staff officers.

9. In contrast to the Army in the field, changes in the wholesale logistics organization - AMC - have not increased functional positions significantly. Project 80 in 1962 brought about revolutionary changes, but a general commodity orientation has remained throughout. Thus, while by no means true for all activities, in general terms logistics is managed by system or commodity in AMC and by function in the Army in the field. Other activities such as DCSLOG, CDC, CONARC, and DOD have varying mixes of both functional and commodity oriented positions.

10. Army-wide officer logistic positions may be categorized on the basis of tasks and responsibilities included. On this basis, the following four categories are indicated:

- a. Single function - single commodity
- b. Single function - multi-commodity
- c. Multi-function - single commodity
- d. Multi-function - multi-commodity

11. Officer skills required in these positions are normally described in terms of branch, grade, and military occupational specialty code (MOS). However, there is no doctrinal basis for associating specific skills with branches. Such association as does exist is a carryover from traditional roles of the technical services prior to Project 80 in 1962 and the resulting reservoir of skills in these branches. Hence, branch designation is of

uncertain value in identifying officer skills. Grade as an element of skill description has served to establish general levels of experience and training; however, it too is imprecise at best and is further limited by wide fluctuations in time in grade for promotion. The final element, MOS, is not intended to be a precise description of officer skill. This it certainly is not. The suitability of the MOS as a tool in this study is further diminished by an evident lag between organizational and doctrinal changes and MOS adjustments. It is seen, then, that there is no precise means within the present personnel system for identification and quantitative determination of officer skill requirements.

12. The TECSTAR group recognized the shortcoming of the branch, grade, and MOS descriptors and developed a special codification system for identifying officer skills. This Board reviewed the procedure employed by TECSTAR, but found it to be unsuited to this study. Alternate means for identifying and categorizing officer skills were also explored, but no practical alternative to the MOS system was found. Therefore, the MOS with its recognized weaknesses was used as the fundamental basis for identifying officer skills. Grade was used only to distinguish between general levels of experience and responsibility such as company grade and field grade. MOS codes which still carry branch designation, are generally obsolescent and should be changed; however, they will be considered to describe commodity oriented skills applicable to the group of commodities formerly associated with that branch.

13. Officer logistics skills, identified by MOS, for each type logistics position are shown at Annex A. The distinction is not completely



clear for many MOS. These have been grouped according to what is judged to be the primary characteristic of the skill described.

14. The officer skills required in the single function - single commodity type positions may be either function or commodity oriented; hence, either a functional specialist or a commodity specialist may be required. For example, a mechanical maintenance officer, MOS 4815, in a COSTAR maintenance company would be considered a functional specialist while an officer serving in the same MOS on a tank project management staff in the Army Tank and Automotive Command might be considered a commodity specialist. The categorization of these skills primarily depends on organizational orientation.

15. The second group of positions, single function -- multi-commodity calls for functional specialist skills. Here the officer has responsibility for one function across two or more commodities. For example, the commander of a COSTAR maintenance company may be responsible for the maintenance of a variety of commodities from avionics to canvas. Responsibility exclusively within one of the functional areas of logistics does not necessarily indicate that functional specialist skills are required, however. For example, the functional area of Production and Procurement includes the purchasing, contracting, and production activities associated with the procurement of materiel for the military forces. Officer skills required in the acquisition of materiel are categorized within three codes in the present MOS structure. The first, MOS 4310, identifies a purchasing and contracting officer whose orientation is primarily procedural. He must have a thorough knowledge of purchasing and contracting methods and procedures, Armed Service Procurement

Regulations, and contract law. He should also be able to evaluate manufacturer's capabilities and analyze profit factors. It is noteworthy, however, that an officer engaged in these duties is not required to have a detailed technical knowledge relative to the characteristics of the materiel being procured or of the manufacturing processes involved in the production; hence, this MOS is considered a functional skill.

16. By contrast, a Procurement Control and Production Officer, MOS 4319, is concerned primarily with the technical aspects of the material and its production. He must know the manufacturing processes and the supply sources for critical materials required in production. He is required to determine production capabilities of various industrial facilities and to correlate the many variables in production, procurement, and distribution. This MOS is grouped with the commodity oriented skills in group three.

17. The final MOS code is for Procurement Officer, MOS 4320. This code identifies somewhat of a "capstone" skill wherein a knowledge of both purchasing and contracting and the technical aspects of producing particular commodities is required. It seems evident that the relative importance of each type knowledge/skill will vary from commodity to commodity and in different situations for the same commodity. Hence, it is not practical to give more precise definition to the skill requirements for this function. While grouped with the functional skills, it is recognized that these positions incorporate elements of both functional and commodity expertise.

18. The third type position, multi-function -- single commodity requires officer skills and knowledge related to a specific commodity--a commodity specialist. Functional responsibilities may vary greatly among

positions. The common thread running through these positions is the relationship of each of the functions in the overall management of the commodity. As with single function -- multi-commodity positions responsibility exclusively within one of the commodity areas does not necessarily indicate that commodity specialist skills are required. These positions are found primarily in the wholesale logistics organization, with but few in the Army in the field.

19. Officers required in filling the final group of positions, multi-function -- multi-commodity, are aptly called logistics generalists. These officers need to be proficient in several functional areas as applicable to several commodities. By far the greatest numbers of identifiable skills correlate to the single function, single commodity type position. For these positions, it is not readily evident whether function or commodity oriented skills are more appropriate. However, since the bulk of these positions are found in functional logistics organizations in the Army in the field, it logically follows that most of these positions require functional oriented skills.

20. Functional specialists are required in maintenance, supply, services (or supply and services), movements, research and development, procurement and production and materiel disposal. MOS's for these skills are included in groups one and two above. Missile maintenance skills (MOS 4516, 4801, and 4802), although grouped as single function - single commodity, are generally employed in commodity oriented organizations and activities. Hence, these skills are considered commodity specialist instead of functional specialist.

21. Certain of the functional specialist skills are pertinent to consideration of the Brown Board recommendations. The first of these deal with the supply of repair parts. At the present time, repair parts supply officers at the DS level normally are Ordnance supply officers in MOS 4530. There is no technical training for MOS 4530 however, so officers being assigned to these positions attend the Army Supply Officers Course which is qualifying training for MOS 4201. The Brown Board recommended that repair parts supply be a function of Ordnance or maintenance officers under a functionally aligned branch structure. A separate analysis, Annex B, indicates that both maintenance and supply skill and knowledge are required but that the task is primarily one of supply, not maintenance.

22. An examination was also made of the function of aircraft maintenance (MOS 4823). This Board's considerations are discussed in Annex C. In essence this examination shows that aircraft maintenance is closely related, in doctrine, skills, and organization, to other types of maintenance. In a functional alignment of skills, aircraft maintenance may be grouped appropriately with other maintenance skills. Two MOS's which encompass logistic functional skills are not included in this grouping--MOS 0600, Motor Transport Officer, and MOS 4510, Unit Ammunition Officer. These skills are omitted for the following reasons.

23. Battalion motor transport officer (MOS 0600) is a manager of transportation service with maintenance management an included function. His functions include planning employment of vehicles, directing, controlling vehicle assignment and use, and dispatching, as well as directing organizational maintenance and related supply operations. Hence, his functions are

as much a part of the tactical and administrative operations of the organization as either transportation or maintenance operations. The Board does not consider this position to be a logistics position. Although MOS 0600 is not grouped with the logistics MOS's in Annex A, this is not to infer that all positions now designated for that MOS are not logistics positions. There are many non-battalion positions, notably in transportation motor pools, which are now designated for this same MOS. These are considered to be logistics positions. Ultimately, MOS distinction between these positions should be provided.

24. In field artillery battalions, the Unit Ammunition Officer is normally the chief of the ammunition train. His duties are concerned primarily with the delivery of ammunition from the ammunition supply point to the firing batteries. He does not require formal school training in the design, maintenance, or functioning of ammunition; rather, the MOS is awarded on the basis of assignment to, and performance on the job. It appears to the Board that a knowledge of the procedures and techniques for employment of field artillery are vital to the successful performance of this duty whereas a technical knowledge of ammunition is not.

25. Although there are requirements for commodity-oriented officers throughout the Army, the principal requirements are within the wholesale logistics system. Based upon the manner in which AMC is organized, their principal need is for commodity oriented officers. This is not to say, however, that AMC does not require functional specialists. Many of the positions with their organizations are functional in nature, even though performed in a "commodity environment." There are general officer positions

which are functional, such as the Director of Supply, and Director of Maintenance at AMC headquarters. An estimated 3,000 officers are required for commodity related positions. (See Appendix 1 to Annex A.) MOS's which have distinct commodity orientation are listed in group three. MOS 4300 - Project Manager - does not identify a specific commodity association, rather, this same MOS is used for systems manager positions for many different systems. Similarly, there is no specific commodity relationship identified in MOS 4319. Except for the missile-munitions field, the current MOS system does not identify skills for multi-function -- single commodity positions.

26. As used in this study, the term "weapons system/equipment systems manager" includes those officers whose military education, training, and experience are oriented toward the development of an expertise in the several life-cycle functions relative to a single end item or group of end items.

27. While a weapons system/equipment systems manager may also fit the general definition of a logistics generalist, a distinction exists in the materiel orientation. The duties of a logistics generalist normally embrace designated functions for a broad range of commodities whereas the duties of a weapons system/equipment systems manager normally embrace a broad range of functions for a designated commodity. Hence, even though the broadening of both types could be across various commodity and functional lines, one develops depth in a function while the other develops depth in a commodity.

28. It is desirable for these officers to be completely proficient in all the life-cycle functions for his commodity. While development of complete proficiency is possible, it is not reasonable to expect that the

### SECTION III

III-11

future conditions will make such development any more practical than it is today or was in the past. The need to achieve economical utilization of always limited personnel resources virtually precludes the formal and on-the-job training that would be required to develop complete proficiency within the span of a normal career. The functional structure for logistics in the field also detracts from the development of commodity expertise in that a majority of the logistics positions are oriented on a function rather than a commodity. It is not practical to provide repetitive commodity oriented assignments in today's environment since to do so would create gross imbalances in overseas assignments and would greatly narrow the utility of a substantial group of officers. To give a group of officers repetitive commodity oriented assignments would, in effect, create a wholesale logistics corps and a retail logistics corps--an unacceptable division. Thus it seems evident that the development and management of weapons system/equipment systems manager must be oriented on providing maximum commodity proficiency consistent with the time available and the economical use of all personnel. It is altogether probable that the commodity oriented officer's service with the Army in the field--even though functionally oriented--will be of benefit in his total development. He should receive commodity-related assignments in the field where practical but he must gain first-hand experience in the field, whatever the capacity.

29. The Board of Inquiry in the Army Logistic System has made several recommendations centered on the establishment of vertical control by item throughout both the wholesale and retail logistics system. If approved,

these recommendations would result in some increase in requirements for commodity oriented officers within the Army in the field. Such an increase would provide a better balance between CONUS and overseas requirements for these officers.

30. For the purposes of this study, logistics generalist is defined as an officer qualified through education, training, experience, and general aptitude to command, manage, or exercise staff supervision over activities related to two or more logistical functions. MOS's shown in group four are generally, although by no means universally or exclusively, generalist skills.

31. No specific relationship to grade or level of responsibility is inherent in the definition of a logistics generalist. However, organizational and operational concepts for functionalized logistical support create an environment wherein a majority of such positions are at the higher levels. This is especially true for the Army in the field and to a lesser degree for AMC and other CONUS activities.

32. The Board examined the entire spectrum of logistics functions now being performed as shown by duty MOS by grade. It is recognized that this analysis is not wholly accurate since the existing MOS's do not in all cases accurately portray the nature of duties involved. Further inaccuracy is introduced by current personnel shortages with resultant vacancies and grade substitutions. Despite these weaknesses, an order of magnitude is indicated by an analysis of duty positions.

33. This examination reveals that a significant majority of the duty positions in the grades of lieutenant are accurately identifiable in terms



of a single logistics function, e.g., supply, maintenance, etc. This same relationship continues for a lesser number of captain positions, although a majority can be so identified. At the grade of major, however, increases in generalist positions become evident. This trend continues until at the grade of colonel only a small part of all logistics duty positions are relatable to a single function. It appears that the dual-level concept derived in the TECSTAR study is based on a valid assessment of the nature of logistics officer requirements. The grade of major seems to designate the median point. Positions below that grade are predominately unifunctional while those at the higher grades are predominately multi-functional or logistics generalist positions.

34. Efforts to define and categorize logistics generalist positions are frustrated by the wide variations of duties involved. This creates a virtually limitless number of combinations of training and experience desirable for optimum performance. These variances tend to increase with the levels of responsibility--in some cases to the extent that the nature of the position is altered to conform to the background and experience of the incumbent.

35. Probably the largest and certainly the most readily identifiable group centers on the functions of maintenance and supply. These are the core functions in a wide range of logistics generalist positions ranging from battalion staff all the way to DA and DOD staff. These positions entail responsibilities in both maintenance and supply in which neither function can, nor should be identified as predominate. The inter-relationship between maintenance and supply makes the need for bi-functional or

C multi-functional positions, centered on maintenance and supply, inevitable in a functionalized logistics support structure. To qualify fully for these positions, an officer must have a thorough knowledge of both maintenance and supply gained through progressive training and experience in both functional areas. The level of experience must be commensurate with the grade (experience) level established for the position. Providing experience and training across functional lines with a functionally aligned branch structure presents one of the major problems for consideration in part two of this study. It is sufficient here to point out the need for such experience in developing the skill and knowledge required.

( 36. As mentioned earlier, there are many combinations of functional duties within various logistics generalist positions. Elements of responsibility for ammunition, construction, movements, hospitalization and evacuation, and a wide range of services in addition to maintenance and supply are commonplace. However, it does not appear necessary in this study to attempt to develop more definitive categorization than simply logistics generalists for these positions and skills.

37. The Brown Board recommended that the combat arms battalions be staffed with an Ordnance maintenance officer and a Quartermaster Supply officer in lieu of the S-4 officer who is normally an arms officer. The battalion S-4 has duties encompassing a great deal of the logistics spectrum and, hence could be considered a logistics generalist. The maintenance and supply staff officers proposed by the Brown Board would be functional specialists. A separate study considering both structure and skills is included at Annex D. Briefly, this Board finds that, in order to provide

logistics training and experience for arms officers and to give commanders flexibility in replacing combat losses, the battalion S-4 position should be filled by arms officers. Retention of a single S-4 position is also considered preferable to splitting logistics staff responsibilities along functional lines.

38. The Brown Board recommendation to eliminate the logistics officer program in the 1970 time-frame also has a bearing on the logistics skill requirements. Program members are exclusively field grade officers and serve mostly in logistics generalist positions. The implication of this action on skill requirements and officer qualifications are considered in detail in Appendix E. The findings of this study generally corroborate those of the Brown Board. The skills required are not provided by part time participation in logistics. This Board agrees with the Brown Board that the logistics officers program as it now exists should be eliminated. The number of logistics generalist positions to be filled exceeds the number of qualified officers available in the logistics oriented branches, however. Thus, we find that the program should not be eliminated until sufficient Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps officers are available to fill those logistics positions now filled by officers of other branches.

#### SUMMARY

39. The Army requires officers trained and experienced in logistics to fill four general type of positions. These are positions which encompass responsibilities for (1) a single function for a single commodity; (2) a single function for several commodities; (3) several functions for a single commodity; and (4) several functions for several commodities. Although

C the lines of distinction are not always clear, officer skills can be categorized in broad terms as function oriented, commodity oriented, or logistics generalist.

40. Skill requirements for officers in the lower grades usually can be identified by either function or commodity orientation. The greatest requirements for officers in these grades are for positions in the functional organizations of the Army in the field; hence, most require functional orientation. There are, however, requirements for commodity oriented officers in all grades within the wholesale logistics system.

41. In the field organizations, logistics functions typically merge at the higher operational and staff levels. Centralized responsibility for materiel (supply and maintenance), transportation, and services above battalion level and, at the top, for all logistics are common. Officers in these positions need have a broad knowledge of the several functional areas for which they are responsible. In the words of this study, these officers are logistics generalists.

42. The greatest number of requirements army-wide is for functional specialists. Functional positions predominate in the Army in the field, especially in the company grades. There are identifiable requirements for functional specialists through the grade of general officer; however, the need for the broader managerial skills of the logistics generalist become more evident as the level of responsibility increases. While there are many positions in the Army in the field which require commodity adaptation or application of functional skills, most identifiable requirements for commodity specialists are within the wholesale logistics system. The most

notable exception to this is in ammunition service which is handled on an integrated commodity basis throughout.

43. Specific recommendations of the Brown Board have been examined in terms of officer skill relationships and in light of other studies. These separate examinations are contained in Annex B through Annex E to this section.

#### CONCLUSIONS

44. Management of the Army's logistics systems requires officers with three general types of skills: Functional oriented, commodity oriented, and broad logistics management.

45. Officer logistics skills required depend on organization and, usually, on level of responsibility within organizations.

46. Requirements for functional oriented officers predominate in the logistics organizations projected through 1975.

47. Current MOS codes generally do not identify specific commodity oriented skills.

48. Officer skills required in repair parts supply are closely related to skills required for the supply of other types of materiel.

49. Officer skills required in aircraft maintenance are closely related to skills required in the maintenance of other types of materiel.

50. Shortcomings in performance of the logistics staff function in arms battalions are due primarily to deficiencies in training and experience of officers assigned battalion S-4 duties.

51. The S-4 in arms battalions should be an arms officer in the grade of major.

52. All arms officers should receive training in the advanced course to qualify them for battalion S-4 duties.

53. Management of logistics at the higher levels requires officers with logistics training and experience in depth. Officers to fill these positions should be developed through progressive training and experience in logistics through their career. Logistics should be the center line of their career, not a secondary skill.

54. Due to the logistics officer program first consideration for logistics assignments frequently goes to officers for whom logistics is a secondary qualification. This program does not insure development of fully qualified logisticians and ultimately should be eliminated.

55. In the future, primary responsibility for meeting the Army's needs for logistics officers at all levels should rest with those branches primarily oriented toward logistics. When these branches are able to fill all logistics positions, there will no longer be a need for the logistics officer program.

## ANNEX A TO SECTION III

The purpose of this annex is to show, where possible, officer MOS's which identify skills required for performance of the various logistics functions. These skills are correlated to each of the general type positions in the Army's logistical activities.

### Group 1:

#### Single Function - Single Commodity

0609 - Highway Transport Planning Officer  
0615 - Highway Traffic Engineer  
0660 - Highway Transport Officer  
0668 - Amphibious Craft Officer  
0706 - Trainmaster  
0715 - Railway Maintenance-of-way Superintendent  
0716 - Railway Bridge and Building Supervisor  
0717 - Railway Track Supervisor  
0718 - Railway Signal Maintenance Supervisor  
0720 - Road Foreman, Railroad Engines  
0730 - Yardmaster  
0735 - Railway Master Mechanic  
0736 - Railway Car Foreman  
0737 - Enginehouse Foreman  
0740 - Railway Dispatcher  
0750 - Railway Operations Superintendent

0753 - Railway Car Service Superintendent  
0754 - Railway Equipment Superintendent  
0801 - Harbor Master  
0804 - Cargo Officer  
0815 - Port Operations Officer  
0820 - Master or Mate  
0823 - Harbor Craft Engineer Officer  
0825 - Harbor Craft Unit Commander  
2430 - Graves Registration Officer  
4112 - Open Mess Secretary  
4114 - Food Adviser  
4120 - Bakery Officer  
4130 - Subsistence Officer  
4400 - Signal Supply Officer  
4415 - Signal Equipment Maintenance and Repair Officer  
4419 - Quartermaster Supply Officer  
4470 - Engineer Supply and Spare Parts Officer  
4474 - Transportation Supply Officer  
4475 - Railway Supply Officer  
4500 - Chemical Supply Officer  
4516 - Missile Maintenance Officer  
4530 - Ordnance Supply Officer  
4606 - Quartermaster Repair Officer



4620 - Ordnance Materiel Distribution and Evacuation Officer  
4714 - Refrigeration Officer  
4800 - Ordnance Maintenance Officer  
4801 - Ordnance Guided Missile Officer (FAM)  
4802 - Ordnance Guided Missile Officer (ADM)  
4808 - Armament Maintenance and Repair Officer  
4815 - Mechanical Maintenance Officer  
4818 - Tire Maintenance and Repair Officer  
4823 - Aircraft Maintenance Officer  
4825 - Electronics Maintenance Officer  
4830 - Laundry and Fumigation Officer  
4850 - Railway Shop Superintendent  
4851 - Car Repair Shop Superintendent  
4852 - Boiler and Smith Shop Superintendent  
4854 - Blacksmith Shop Superintendent  
4855 - Erecting and Machine Shop Superintendent  
4856 - Locomotive Erecting Shop Superintendent  
4857 - Railway Machine Shop Superintendent  
4860 - Airbrake Shop Superintendent  
4861 - Electric Locomotive Repair Shop Superintendent  
4862 - Diesel Locomotive Shop Superintendent  
4880 - Engineer Equipment Maintenance and Repair Officer  
4960 - Petroleum Products Supply Officer  
7210 - Marine Hull and Engine Maintenance Officer

C  
7211 - Marine Hull Maintenance Officer  
7221 - Marine Engine Maintenance Officer  
9224 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer

Group 2:

Single Function - Multiple Commodity

0612 - Field Transportation Officer  
0692 - Transportation Staff Officer  
0693 - Transportation Traffic Management Officer  
0694 - Transportation Movements Officer  
2167 - Research and Development Coordinator  
4000 - General Supply Officer  
4200 - Supply and Services Officer  
4201 - Supply Management Officer  
4210 - Army Exchange Officer  
4220 - Post Quartermaster  
4222 - Sales Officer  
4223 - Commissary Officer  
4310 - Purchasing and Contracting Officer  
4320 - Procurement Officer  
4403 - Foreign Aid Supply Officer  
4404 - Packing Officer  
4450 - Supply Depot Officer  
4600 - Property Disposal Officer

4601 - Salvage Collecting Officer

4803 - Maintenance Officer

Group 3:

Multi-Function - Single Commodity

1723 - Nuclear Weapons Officer

4300 - Project Manager

4319 - Procurement Control and Production Officer

4513 - Ordnance Guided Missile and Special Weapons Staff Officer

4514 - Ammunition Officer

4515 - Ammunition and Missile Maintenance Officer

Group 4:

Multi-Function - Multi-Commodity

2624 - Logistical Commander

2625 - Logistics Officer

4010 - Supply Staff Officer (G4, S4)

4015 - Quartermaster Staff Officer

4512 - Ordnance Officer

AMCPT-MO (31 Mar 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Officer Logistic Skill Requirements

HQ, US Army Materiel Command, Washington, D. C. 20315, 12 May 1967

TO: Chief of Personnel Operations, ATTN: OPD(STOCQ),  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Rather than attempt to define specifically the terms weapons systems manager, materiel manager and commodity specialist, I will give a general appreciation of the way in which I think our top level managers in AMC should be developed and suggest that after you have read my comments, you arrange to visit me and discuss specifics.

2. The fundamental thrust of my position in developing officer personnel derives from my conviction that what the Army is interested in is effective weapons systems in the hands of the troops, and it has only a secondary interest in R&D specialists, procurement specialists and inventory specialists. Consequently, we need to develop personnel so that they understand a weapons system and all interrelated actions that go into the development, procurement and support of that weapons system. We then broaden them into the top-level managers we need in various AMC personnel assignments.

3. Basically, we need a strong body of commodity oriented people. The Brown Board does not go far enough. It aims at supply and maintenance in the field. I do not want the management of lieutenants, captains, majors and lieutenant colonels, per se; I want management of aircraft officers, ammunition officers and missile officers. I do not believe that

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX A, SECTION III III-25

an officer can interchange from ammunition to aircraft to missiles and know what has to be known.

4. Moreover, a combat arms officer does not go from Infantry to Artillery to Armor. He studies, practices and masters the tactics and techniques of his basic arm and at the same time gains staff and combined arms expertise. Through successively higher level positions, both within and without his basic arm, he qualifies for high level staff assignments and command of combined arms formations. I submit that the commodity oriented officer should be developed and broadened following a similar pattern.

5. My hesitation in defining specific terms derives largely from not knowing just what a materiel manager in your terms is supposed to be. I have no problem with defining a commodity manager and system manager. At Inclosure 2 are my views on a commodity manager who grows into a system manager and eventually the most able system managers have the perspective to provide top management and staff supervision for any element of AMC to include the CG himself.

6. With respect to paragraph 3a of the basic correspondence, a chart indicating the commodities and life-cycle functions thereof is attached as Inclosure 1. This chart identifies the commodities and life-cycle functions involved in the development of the commodity oriented officer for the Army Materiel Command.

7. Identification of officer skills required in terms of branch and

MOS is generally possible for any given combination of life-cycle function and commodity. However, as managerial responsibilities increase with grade and experience, MOS and branch identification become less precise as a means of determining skills required. Therefore, in order to provide the information requested in paragraph 3a of the basic correspondence, a study to determine the skills required for acceptable performance by an AMC commodity oriented officer is scheduled for completion in approximately one week.

8. Concurrent with this study, statistics are being compiled as to the number of commodity oriented officers now serving with AMC, as requested in paragraph 3c of the basic correspondence. However, a survey of officers now serving will not account for this command's recognized officer requirements since the command is currently understrength approximately 1300 officers. Therefore the statistics being compiled also will include total recognized officer requirements.

9. Further response to the requirements of paragraphs 3b and 3c of the basic correspondence will be submitted by 18 May 1967. It is suggested that a review of job descriptions of representative senior officer positions in this command would be of benefit to your study. They will be furnished separately.

2 Incls  
as

/s/t/ F. S. BESSON, JR.  
General, USA  
Commanding

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX A, SECTION III III-27

COMMODITIES

AIRCRAFT  
AMMUNITION  
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL  
ELECTRONICS  
INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT  
MISSILES  
MOBILITY EQUIPMENT  
    (Engineer & Transportation)  
POL  
TANK/AUTOMOTIVE  
WEAPONS

LIFE-CYCLE FUNCTIONS

RESEARCH  
DEVELOPMENT  
TESTING  
MAINTENANCE ENGR  
PRODUCTION ENGR  
PROCUREMENT  
PRODUCTION  
QUALITY ASSURANCE  
PRODUCT IMPROV  
DISTRIBUTION  
STORAGE  
SUPPLY MANAGEMENT  
    END ITEM  
    SPARE PARTS  
MAINTENANCE  
TECH ASSIST  
MOVEMENT

## COMMODITY MANAGER

A commodity manager is an individual who by repetitive assignments in a given commodity area becomes progressively familiar with the various functional management elements for that commodity. His undergraduate education should be basically in a hard technical science related to his commodity specialty and he should have a master's degree either in a hard science or in general managerial areas (e.g., MBA, Statistical Analysis, Operations Research).

His early assignments should be largely hardware oriented and accordingly directed toward the utilization, maintenance and design of the equipment. With service, his background should be broadened in the more general software functional areas of procurement and resource management.

By the time he finished one or two assignments as a lieutenant colonel he should be sufficiently rounded to cope with and interrelate any of the functional aspects of his commodity. He should have begun to establish a reputation, both in the military and in the industrial community as an expert in his field.

At that time, by virtue of his rounded knowledge of his commodity field, he is fully qualified to head a major system development, or serve as a high echelon staff officer, and has laid the ground work for eventual assignment as an AMC commodity commander.



AMCPT-MO

25 May 1967

SUBJECT: Officer Logistic Skill Requirements

TO: Chief of Personnel Operations  
ATTN: OPD (STOCQ)  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C., 20310

1. Reference letter, OPD (STOCQ), 31 March 1967, subject as above and 1st Indorsement thereto, this headquarters, 12 May 1967.

2. Attached as Inclosure No. 1 is a chart which provides an outline of examples of career patterns for development of commodity managers, consistent with the discussion held on the subject during the conference with General Besson on 16 May 1967.

3. Attached as Inclosure No. 2 is a compilation of the numbers of officers within this command who are assigned and pro rata authorized in commodity-oriented MOS's together with charts setting forth in detail that and other information including grade and branch.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl  
as

/s/t/ WILLIAM S. CHARIN  
Acting Director  
Personnel & Training

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX A, SECTION III III-30

# OUTLINED EXAMPLES OF CAREER PATTERNS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF COMMODITY MANAGERS

YEARS OF SERVICE:	0 - 5	5 - 10	10 - 15	15 - 20	20 -
Example for Commodity Manager (General Require- ments)	Bachelor's Degree (Engr, Phys Sci, Indus Mgmt or Bus Adm) Branch Basic Crse Civil Schooling (Master's Degree) Tour in R&D MOS Crse Plt Ldr & Co CO in Field Army Unit (Commodity-oriented)	Branch Advance Crse En ExO Functional duty (Commodity oriented)* Dev, Qual Assur, Sup or Maint Tour w/industry	C&GSC Sr Log Crse (ALMC) Duty in AMC as asst mgr; in Proc & Prod, or Maint Tour w/industry	Sr Svc College CO Gp or Cmd Commodity Manager	
Example for Commodity Manager (Ammunition)	B.S. Degree (Phys Sci) Branch Basic Crse Civil Schooling (Physics) Tour in R&D(Munitions) MOS Crse Plt Ldr & Co CO in Field Army Unit (Commodity-oriented)	Branch Advance Crse ExO Ammo En Ammo Staff O	C&GSC Tour in Arsenal Sr Log Crse (ALMC) Tour in AMC (Prod & Proc) Asst Commodity Mgr (Ammo)	Sr Svc College CO Ammo Gp Commodity Manager (Ammo)	
Example for Commodity Manager (Aircraft)	B.S. Degree (Aero Engr) Basic Branch Crse Civil Schooling (Indus Engr) Tour in R&D(Aircraft) Acft Maint MOS Crse Plt Ldr & Co CO in Field Army Unit (Aircraft Maint)	Br Advance Crse ExO Acft Maint En	C&GSC Tour w/Systems Mgr Ofc Tour w/Industry Sr Log Crse (ALMC) Asst Commodity Mgr (Aircraft)	Sr Svc College Commodity Manager (Aircraft)	

\*Examples: R&D Distribution  
Procurement Maintenance  
Production

NUMBER OF OFFICERS CURRENTLY SERVING IN AMC COMMODITY-ORIENTED ASSIGNMENTS

1. For 75 MOS's, which were considered appropriate in the study of commodity-oriented officers, the attached charts indicate the number of officers currently assigned to AMC by grade and branch.

2. The last column of each chart indicates a pro rata authorized figure which is based on a pro rata share of total officer TDA authorization for AMC by grade and branch.

3. MOS's included are as follows:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PRO RATA AUTH</u>
0140	Radar Officer	2	3
0200	Communications Officer	2	2
0210	Signal Officer	45	80
0600	Motor Transport Officer	8	15
0663	Engineer Equipment Officer	2	3
0692	Transportation Officer	6	9
0694	Transportation Movements Officer	6	9
1177	Air Defense Missile Staff Officer, Nike Hercules	5	8
1181	Guided Missile Systems Officer	26	52
1723	Nuclear Weapons Officer	21	29
1980	Fixed Wing Aviator	12	33
1981	Rotary Wing Aviator	12	33
1982	Airfield Operations Officer	4	4
1983	Aviation Unit Commander	9	18

<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PRO RATA AUTH</u>
2025	Major Departmental Unit Chief or Director	126	211
62025	Aviator Major Departmental Unit Chief or Director	10	15
2042	Technical and Tactical Board Member	82	124
62042	Aviator Technical and Tactical Board Member	15	24
2167	Research and Development Coordinator	270	393
62167	Aviator Research and Development Coordinator	39	57
2170	Technical Operations Officer	94	132
62170	Aviator Technical Operations Officer	1	1
2402	ADPS Plans and Operations Officer	55	91
2518	Aviation Staff Officer	10	15
62518	Aviator, Aviation Staff Officer	1	2
2624	Logistical Commander	31	58
2625	Logistics Officer	212	334
62625	Aviator Logistics Officer	10	18
3307	Bacteriologist	15	22
3309	Biochemist	8	11
4300	Materiel Project Manager	51	50
4319	Procurement Control and Production Officer	39	54
64319	Aviator Procurement Control and Production Officer	2	4
4320	Procurement Officer	74	111
4400	Signal Supply Officer	11	16
4415	Signal Equipment Maintenance and Repair Officer	9	12

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX A, SECTION III III-33

<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PRO RATA AUTH</u>
4419	Quartermaster Supply Officer	4	5
4450	Supply Depot Officer	13	21
4470	Engineer Supply and Spare Parts	8	10
4500	Chemical Supply Officer	4	6
4512	Ordinance Officer	69	90
4513	Ordinance Guided Missile & Special Weapons Staff Officer	21	33
4514	Ammunition Officer	27	32
4515	Ammunition and Missile Maintenance Officer	2	3
4516	Missile Maintenance Officer	3	3
4530	Ordinance Supply Officer	15	17
4800	Ordinance Maintenance Officer	24	29
4801	Ordinance Guided Missile Officer (FAM)	17	22
4802	Ordinance Guided Missile Officer (ADM)	21	25
4803	Maintenance Officer	12	16
4808	Armament Maintenance and Repair Officer	5	5
74820	Parachutist-Parachute Maintenance & Aerial Supply Officer	16	26
4823	Aircraft Maintenance Officer	5	14
64823	Aviator - Aircraft Maintenance Officer	45	100
4825	Electronics Maintenance Officer	1	1
4880	Engineer Equipment Maintenance and Repair Officer	7	12
4960	Petroleum Products Supply Officer	7	12

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX A, SECTION III XII-34

<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PRO RATA AUTH</u>
7210	Marine Hull and Engine Maintenance Officer	1	2
7300	Chemical Engineer	30	41
7312	Physicist	40	57
7314	Chemical Staff Officer	17	20
7317	Metallurgist	10	10
7318	Organic Chemist	12	12
7319	Chemist	31	35
7320	Munitions Production Officer	4	5
7330	Nuclear Weapons Effects Officer	6	7
7360	Chemical Munitions Development Officer	3	3
7421	Production Engineer	17	17
7500	Mechanical Engineer	42	47
7501	Aeronautical Engineer	10	13
67501	Aviator - Aeronautical Engineer	7	13
7601	Electronics Engineer	111	152
7611	Electrical Engineer	4	10
7860	Radio Engineer	2	3
8204	Meteorologist	10	12
		<hr/>	<hr/>
	TOTAL	2009	2993

S-25 April 1967  
14 April 1967

SUBJECT: Requirements for Commodity Specialists

TO: Commanding General  
Combat Developments Command  
Fort Belvoir VA 22060

1. References:

- a. Study, The Administrative Support of the Army (TASTA 70).
- b. CSM 67-120, dated 24 March 67, subject: Study of Signal,

Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps.

2. This Board is conducting the study directed by CSM 67-120. One task is to develop the officer logistic requirements for weapons systems/materiel managers, commodity specialists, functional specialists and logistics generalists.

3. The revised TASTA-70 organization includes commodity manager positions at TASCOR, FASCOM, and support brigade levels. It appears that the staffing of these positions will require officers who may be classified as commodity specialists.

4. To assist this Board in developing overall requirements, request the following information:

- a. An explanation of the roles of these commodity managers.
- b. Total number of commodity manager positions in a type theater.
- c. Commodity orientation and the relationship of any of these

OPD (STOCQ)

SUBJECT: Requirements for Commodity Specialists

position to the commodity alignment of AMC.

d. Skill requirements for each position. Express in terms of branch, grade and MOS where practicable. Positions which cannot be expressed in terms of branch, grade and existing MOS may be described in terms of education, training and experience.

e. Any officer MOS changes or additions that may be contemplated to accommodate these positions.

5. Any additional information to help define these positions should be included.

FOR THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS:

/t/s/ DON R. HICKMAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Chairman



CDCCD-C (14 Apr 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Requirements for Commodity Specialists

HQ, US Army Combat Developments Command, Ft Belvoir, Va. 22060, 25 April 1967

TO: Chief, Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army,  
ATTN: OPD(STOCQ), Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Information requested in paragraph 4 of basic letter is furnished in inclosures hereto.

2. At inclosure 1 is a discussion of the role of the commodity managers under the TASTA-70 concept within the Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM), Field Army Support Command (FASCOM) and Support Brigades.

3. At inclosure 2 is information extracted from pertinent Tables of Organization and Equipment in response to paragraphs 4b and 4d of basic letter.

4. No officer MOS change or additions are contemplated to accommodate commodity manager related positions in TASTA-70 organization.

5. Additional information on this subject can be found in FM 29-10-1 (Test) - The Field Army Supply Management System, March 1967, and in FM 54-5-1 (Test) - Supply and Maintenance Command TASCOM, and FM 29-21 (Test) Maintenance Support FASCOM, due to be published soon.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl  
as

/s/t/ HENRY A. HUNT  
Major, AGC  
Asst Adj Gen

APPENDIX 2, ANNEX A, SECTION III

III-38

## DISCUSSION OF COMMODITY MANAGER POSITIONS

### WITHIN TASTA-70

#### TASCOM, FASCOM, AND SUPPORT BRIGADE

##### 1. References:

- a. Final Draft Study, TASTA-70, dated 28 February 1966.
- b. Letter, HQ DA (AGAM-P)(M)(7 Jun 66) (FOR DS DM) subject:

The Administrative Support, Theater Army 1965-1970 (TASTA-70) dated 8 June 1966.

2. Reference 1b approved the TASTA-70 final draft study (Ref 1a), subject to specified modifications. Subsequently, the DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board) recommended that "technical commodity-oriented staff sections be established within command headquarters at all levels under a materiel directorate office." This Brown Board recommendation is one of several on which the Chief of Staff, DA, has deferred approval, pending additional study. This discussion of commodity manager positions therefore reflects TASTA-70 concepts as approved, without reference to possible future modifications in line with Brown Board recommendations.

3. TASCOM headquarters consists mainly of functional type staff personnel. Commodity specialist and technical personnel are not provided at this level since TASCOM does not become involved in day-to-day or detailed operations, planning, implementation, or management except as may be required to implement the TASCOM commander's mission. Commodity managers

and technical personnel are located at subordinate operating commands (e.g., Supply and Maintenance Command, Transportation Command, Personnel Command). Theater level commodity managers are located primarily in the Inventory Control Center (ICC) and the Maintenance Management Center (MMC) of the Supply and Maintenance Command. These centers are directed, supervised and controlled by the Supply and Maintenance Command Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply and Assistant Chief of Staff for Maintenance, respectively.

4. At FASCOM level, the ICC and MMC are organic to HQ FASCOM, and the commodity managers in these functional control centers operate under the operational control of the pertinent coordinating staff section of HQ FASCOM.

5. At Support Brigade level, a Stock Control Center (SCC) and a MMC are staffed with commodity managers and operate under the appropriate coordinating staff section as at FASCOM.

6. The Supply and Maintenance Command ICC is the main operating element of the theater supply management system and as such serves as the point of interface between CONUS and the theater system.

a. Within the ICC, each commodity manager performs the following functions with respect to his commodity:

(1) Provides:

(a) Storage and distribution direction.

(b) Receipt and processing of requisitions from supported

commands and other designated activities.

(c) Review and analysis of demands and computations of theater army requirements for supplies and equipment.

(d) Continuous study of the supply system.

(2) Initiates, within policies and directives of Supply and Maintenance Command Headquarters, action to fulfill supply requirements by requisition on CONUS, local procurement, and/or redistribution of supplies.

(3) Approves, within established policies, additions to or deletions from theater army stockage lists and adjustments to requisitioning objectives.

(4) Reports significant supply data to the Supply and Maintenance Command staff.

(5) Determines effects of new or modified supply directives on the theater army supply management system.

(6) Coordinates, within policies and directives of Supply and Maintenance Command Headquarters, with the Maintenance Management Center on repair of materiel to support the supply system and other related matters.

b. Commodity managers in the ICC rely on ADPE for the routine processing of the high volume of daily activity. Despite modernization of ADP hardware and sophistication in software, computer processing cannot replace the human management capability where judgment and practical application are required. Thus, the commodity manager remains a very important element in the theater supply system. Activity that is outside the realm

of the ADPE program, or beyond the variable parameters of the program, is referred to the commodity manager for decision. Examples of the work of a commodity manager are managing major items and their components, review of critical items in the theater, positioning of reserves and special project materiel, timely phasing of new items into the supply system and phasing obsolete items out of the supply system, coordinating with the MMC on command materiel readiness, and determination of requirements. The varied responsibilities of the commodity manager require that he be an experienced competent career logistician. He should have had assignments in GS or DS FASCOM units, command and staff experience at battalion, brigade or FASCOM, have attended career staff and logistics schools, and had CONUS assignments at DSA or AMC installations.

7. The Maintenance Management Center (MMC) of the Supply and Maintenance Command provides integrated maintenance management over maintenance activities of the command. The Commodity Managers in the MMC perform the following functions with respect to their commodities:

- a. Coordinate repair priorities with the ICC.
- b. Maintain continuous evaluation of workload and capability of maintenance units and cross-levels workload or resources to achieve compatibility and highest efficiency.
- c. Maintain materiel readiness status of command based on analyses of statistical data provided through ADP centers.
- d. Determine requirements for maintenance personnel, units, skills,

tools, and test equipment.

8. The roles of the commodity managers within the functional control centers (ICC, MMC) at TASCOC level, as described in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, are generally applicable to the similar control centers at FASCOM and Support Brigade levels. Appropriate consideration must of course be given to the reduced levels of responsibility and the narrower missions at the lower command echelons.

9. The TASTA-70 functionalized supply system groups supplies to coincide with distribution and management requirements rather than their end use. However, commodity groupings in a theater should be compatible with the CONUS supply system to assure easier coordination and follow-up to the source of supply. In organizing the ICC, commodity groupings permit a basis of assignment of items to a commodity manager. AR 711-25, Stockage of Supplies and Maintenance of Authorized Stockage Lists, contains current sources of supply used as the basis for developing the TASTA-70 commodity groups.

10. Commodity orientation within the TASCOC ICC and relationship with commodity alignment of AMC is as indicated below:

ICC Commodity Group

Bulk Petroleum

Major Equipment  
Rail-Marine Mat.  
Construction-Fortification Mat.

AMC Commodity Command

US Army Petrol. Center  
(MECOM for POL Handling  
Equipment)

MECOM  
MECOM

ICC Commodity GroupAMC Commodity Command

Aircraft Materiel	AVCOM
Mobility Materiel (Combat & Gen Purpose Veh; MHE, Weapons, Spec. Purpose Veh.)	( ATAC ( WECON ( MECOM
Repair Parts	ATAC AVCOM WECON MICOM MECOM ECOM
General Materiel Subsistence	
General Equipment (Clothing, Office Supplies & Machines, generators, tools, msl. items)	MECOM
Electronic Materiel	ECOM
Missiles and Munitions	MICOM MICOM

11. Commodity groupings at the FASCOM ICC and Support Brigade SCC are virtually identical to those shown above for the TASCOM ICC.

12. Commodity orientation within the MMC at TASCOM, ASCOM, FASCOM, and the Support Brigades follows a pattern similar to that found in the ICC/SCC. Commodity Groups and relationship to AMC Commodity Commands are indicated below:

MMC Commodity GroupAMC Commodity Command

Electronics Management	ECOM
------------------------	------

**MMC Commodity Group****AMC Commodity Command**

ADPE	ECOM
Cryptographic	ECOM
Teletype	ECOM
Radar	ECOM
Radio	ECOM
Telephone	ECOM
Electrical	( ECOM ( MECOM
<b>Mobility Management</b>	
Aircraft	AVCOM
Automotive	ATAC
Marine	MECOM
Rail	MECOM
<b>Weapons Management</b>	
Ammunition	MUCOM
Artillery	WECOM
Fire Control	WECOM
Missiles	MICOM
Small Arms	WECOM
<b>Special Equipment Management</b>	
Bakery	MECOM
Bath	MECOM
Chemical	WECOM



MMC Commodity GroupAMC Commodity Command

Construction	MECOM
Hvy Textile	MECOM
Laundry	MECOM
MHE	MECOM
Medical	
Office Machines	MECOM
Power Tools	MECOM
Generators	MECOM
Petroleum Handling	MECOM

TASTA-70 COMMODITY MANAGER POSITIONS  
(TASCOM, FASCOM, SUPPORT BRIGADES)  
(TYPE THEATER OF 12 DIVISIONS)

TITLE	GRADE	BRANCH	MOS	QUANTITY				TOTAL	REMARKS
				TASCOM	FASCOM	SPT	BDE		
TOE 29-403T, MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT DET.									
Aircraft Maint Off	MAJ	TC	64823	2	1	4	7		One det. authorized S&M Cnd, TASCOM; FASCOM; TASCOM; TASCOM; Corps Spt Bde (3 ea); Army Spt Bde. Aviator SM means Technical Service Material. See Note 1.
Electronics Maint Off	MAJ	SC	04825	2	1	4	7		
Mechanical Maint Off	MAJ	SM	04815	4	2	8	14		
Missile Maint Off	MAJ	OD	04516	2	1	4	7		
TOE 29-502T, INVENTORY CONTROL AGENCY									
Chief, Petrol Div	COL	QM	94960	1	1	-	2		One agency authorized S&M Cnd, TASCOM; FASCOM. Qualified in Automatic Data Processing (ADP) See Note 2.
Petrol Distr Off	LTC	QM	94960	1	1	-	2		
Petrol Supply Off	MAJ	QM	94960	1	1	-	2		
Chief, Gen Matl Div	COL	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		Notes 1 & 2.
Gen Matl Supply Off	LTC	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		
Stock Mgmt Off	LTC	SM	04201	1	1	-	2		Note 1.
Chief, Subsistence Br	LTC	QM	94130	1	1	-	2		
Subsist Off	MAJ	QM	94130	1	1	-	2		Note 2.
Chief, Gen Supply Br	LTC	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		
Gen Supply Off	MAJ	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		Notes 1 & 2.
Stock Mgmt Off	MAJ	SM	04201	2	2	-	4		
Chief, Gen Equip Br	LTC	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		Notes 1 & 2.
Gen Equip Sup Off	MAJ	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		
Stock Mgmt Off	MAJ	SM	04201	2	2	-	4		Notes 1 & 2.
Chief, Repair Parts Div	COL	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		
Rep Fts Sup Off	LTC	SM	94200	2	2	-	4		Notes 1 & 2.
Stock Mgmt Off	LTC	OD	04201	1	1	-	2		
Rep Fts Sup Off	MAJ	SM	94200	2	2	-	4		Notes 1 & 2.
Asst Stock Mgmt Off	MAJ	EN	04201	1	1	-	2		
Ch, Major Equip Div	COL	SM	94200	1	1	-	2		Notes 1 & 2.
Major Equip Sup Off	LTC	SM	04201	1	1	-	2		
Ch, Mobile Matl Br	LTC	OD	94200	1	1	-	2		Note 2.

TITLE	GRADE	BRANCH	MOS	TASCOM	FASCOM	QUANTITY		REMARKS
						SPT	HDE	
Mobile Matl Off	MAJ	EN	04201	1	1	-	2	Note 1.
Stock Mgmt Off	MAJ	SM	04201	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Ch, Aerft Matl Br	LTC	TC	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Aerft Matl Off	MAJ	TC	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Ch, Const and Ftn	LTC	EN	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Sup Br	MAJ	EN	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Const-Ftn Sup Off	MAJ	SM	94200	1	1	-	2	Notes 1 & 2.
Stock Mgmt Off	LTC	TC	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Ch, Rail-Marine Matl Br	MAJ	TC	04201	1	1	-	2	
Rail Matl Off	MAJ	TC	04201	1	1	-	2	
Marine Matl Off	MAJ	TC	04201	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Electronic Matl Div	COL	SC	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Electronic Mgmt Off	LTC	SC	04201	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Electronic Sup Br	LTC	SC	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Electronic Supply Off	MAJ	SC	94200	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Stock Mgmt Off	MAJ	SC	04201	1	1	-	2	
Comm-El Tech Advisor	WO	-	28640	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Cryptographic	LTC	SC	94400	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Mat Br	MAJ	SC	94400	1	1	-	2	
Cryptologists Off	MAJ	SC	94400	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Cryptologists Tech	WO	-	72140	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Missile & Munitions	COL	OD	94514	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Div	LTC	OD	94514	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Missile & Mun Off	LTC	OD	91723	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Chief, Missile Br	MAJ	OD	04515	1	1	-	2	
Missile Off	LTC	OD	94514	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Ch, Munitions Br	MAJ	OD	04201	1	1	-	2	
Stock Mgmt Off	LTC	OD	91723	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Sp Ammo Br	LTC	OD	91723	1	1	-	2	
Chem Ammo Off	MAJ	CM	94500	1	1	-	2	Note 2.
Nuclear Wpus Off	MAJ	OD	91723	2	2	-	4	Note 2.
Nuclear Wpus Maint Off	MAJ	OD	04515	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Surveillance Br	LTC	OD	04515	1	1	-	2	
Ammo Surveillance Off	MAJ	OD	04514	1	1	-	2	
Ch, Petroleum Br	MAJ	CM	94960	-	-	4	4	One company authorized Corps.
Stock Control Off	CPT	QM	94960	-	-	4	4	Spt Bde (3 ea) and Army Spt Bde
Ch, Gen Matl Br	MAJ	SM	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
								Notes 1 & 2.

TITLE	GRADE	BRANCH	MOS	QUANTITY				REMARKS
				WISCOM	WISCOM	SPT	BDE	TOTAL
Gen Matl Sup Off	CPT	SM	04201	-	-	4	4	Note 1.
Substance Off	LT	QM	04130	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Supply Tech	WO	-	761A0	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Ch, Repair Parts Br	MAJ	OD	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Repair Parts Sup Off	CPT	OD	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 1.
Stock Control Off	CPT	SM	04201	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Asst Rep Prt Sup Off	LT	EN	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Asst Rep Prt Sup Off	LT	SC	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Chief, Maj Equip Br	MAJ	SM	94200	-	-	4	4	Notes 1 & 2.
Maj Equip Matl Sup Off	CPT	SM	94200	-	-	4	4	Notes 1 & 2.
Stock Control Off	CPT	SM	04201	-	-	4	4	Note 1.
Ch, Electronics Matl Br	MAJ	SC	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Electronics Sup Off	CPT	SC	94200	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Crypto Control Off	CPT	SC	94400	-	-	4	4	Note 2.
Ch, Missile-Munitions Br	MAJ	OD	94514	-	-	3	3	Not authorized Army Spt Bde.
Ch, Missile Sec	CPT	OD	91723	-	-	3	3	Note 2
Missile Maint Off	CPT	OD	94515	-	-	3	3	Not authorized Army Spt Bde.
Chief, Munitions Sec	CPT	OD	94514	-	-	3	3	Note 2.
Stock Control Off	CPT	OD	94201	-	-	3	3	"
Chief, Sp Ammo Sec	CPT	OD	91723	-	-	3	3	"
Chemical Ammo Off	CPT	CM	94500	-	-	3	3	"
Nuclear Weapons Off	CPT	OD	91723	-	-	6	6	"
Nuclear Wpns Maint Off	CPT	OD	04515	-	-	3	3	Not authorized Army Spt Bde.
Chief, Surveillance Sec	CPT	OD	04515	-	-	3	3	"
Ammo Surveillance Off	CPT	OD	04514	-	-	3	3	"
GRAND TOTAL						255		

- NOTES:
1. SM means technical service material (CM, EN, OD, QM, TC only). See AR 310-32.
  2. Prefix 9 indicates requirement for qualification in automatic data processing.
  3. See AR 611-101 for detailed MOS descriptions.

## ANNEX B

### REPAIR PARTS SUPPLY

1. The DA Board of Inquiry on the Logistics System (Brown Board) recommended that repair parts supply be a function of the Ordnance Corps. In furtherance of this recommendation, the Brown Board also recommended that the repair parts company in the field army be assigned to the GS maintenance battalion rather than the supply and services battalion. The OPO-SOQ Study did not recommend repair parts be an exception to realignment. Repair parts supply was considered to be a part of the supply function. The location of specific functional units was not within the scope of the SOQ Study. This difference between the Brown Board and the SOQ Study was addressed by the STOCQ Board to determine whether repair parts supply should be a function of Quartermaster or Ordnance Corps officers.

2. The analysis identified two separate problems: (1) organizational structure and command of the repair parts company, and (2) qualifications and skills required to staff repair parts officer positions. The first is a doctrinal matter and the second a personnel matter.

3. With current doctrine repair parts are supplied to using units by the supporting DS maintenance activity or unit. This supports the one-stop concept and places with one commander the total maintenance responsibility. At GS level a repair parts company has been introduced by TASTA-70. This company is organic to one of the GS supply and services battalions. This repair parts company has no supply control or inventory control over its repair parts stocks. It receives, stores, and issues parts only on instructions from the support brigade's stock control center.

The intent of the Brown Board's recommendation to place this repair parts company under one of the GS maintenance battalions was to increase the effectiveness of the maintenance within the brigade. The rationale for this recommendation was (1) that repair parts are an essential element of any maintenance program and should be under the control of the maintenance organizations. (2) Supply and maintenance are indivisible and maintenance units are the sole users of repair parts thus the placing of control of repair parts in the maintenance units should facilitate coordination on all aspects of maintenance decisions.

4. An analysis of organizations and support concepts contained in FM 54-8 (Test), The Administrative Support, Theater Army, TASTA-70, shows one GS Repair parts company supporting four GS maintenance battalions and four DS maintenance battalions. In addition responsibility for levels of supply, stockage lists, authorized stockage levels, determination of requirements, stock records, and direction of supply actions is with the brigade stock control center, not the repair parts company or the supply and services battalion.

5. The STOCQ Board considers that the location of the repair parts company does not affect the staffing of repair parts supply positions. There are advantages to transferring it to one of the GS maintenance battalions as well as advantages to leaving it in the GS supply and services battalion. Placing the repair parts company in either a GS maintenance battalion or in the GS supply and services battalion poses no particular problem. Units organized under TASTA are designed with flexibility as a main feature. There appears to be no overriding benefits or complications

to either alternative. As the focal point on this subject involves doctrine, CDC is considering this problem at the present time and should make a determination as to which unit the repair parts company will be assigned.

6. Qualifications and skills required by officers staffing repair parts positions was the nature of the other problem area. The Brown Board's position was that all commissioned officer positions involving repair parts should be staffed with Ordnance officers. Proponents of this position contend that the skills required are basically maintenance skills involving maintenance decisions which hinge on the availability of repair parts (e.g., whether to repair, replace, fabricate, or use next higher assembly). They reason that maintenance decisions dictate the range of repair parts stock-age requirements and their use at all echelons, therefore, the supply of repair parts must be an integral part of an effective maintenance system.

7. To better determine what experience and training is required to fulfill the responsibilities of a repair parts supply officer, the duties such an officer would have to perform were examined. A representative list of duties and responsibilities follow:

- a. Supervises repair parts supply.
- b. Trouble shooter, focuses on problem areas, identifying causes, coordinating with supported and supporting elements.
- c. Keeps abreast of command policy, plans, and operations, with emphasis on furnishing timely supply support.
- d. Manages his own operation and the responsiveness of his support.
- e. Monitors equipment deadlines for parts.

f. Establishes liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent supply organizations.

g. Detailed knowledge of alternate supply sources.

h. Must be mission oriented.

8. By analyzing the mission of the repair parts company and the qualifications that commissioned officers who staff the unit must have, it was determined that officer positions principally require supply skills. These skills are required to insure the efficient operation of a supply function--that of furnishing repair parts to a user. Under the functional realignment concept the officer positions would be designated as Quartermaster Corps positions. It is recognized that specific training should be given officers staffing these positions to insure an awareness of the maintenance implications involved in their duties. It is also recognized that repair parts supply must be managed so as to complement and support fully the maintenance mission. Close coordination between the two activities and integrated control over both are essential. However, this is provided by staff operations and direction within the brigade, not by a particular branch designation.

9. Based on the STOCQ Board analysis, it is concluded that repair parts positions principally require supply skills. This conclusion does not change any maintenance concepts or of Ordnance manning maintenance units. Repair parts supply constitutes approximately 85% of all supply transactions. To assign responsibility for repair parts supply to the Ordnance Corps under a functional alignment would effectively nullify a functional alignment of supply personnel. The assignment of the repair



parts companies is doctrinal and does not alter this conclusion regardless of what type parent organization commands it. Repair parts commissioned officer positions should be staffed by Quartermaster Corps officers.

## ANNEX C

### AVIATION MAINTENANCE

1. Aviation maintenance is currently a function associated primarily with the Transportation Corps. The STOCQ Board considered this problem in light of recent Brown Board recommendations to realign this function to the Ordnance Corps. The Board approach was to examine the transfer of responsibilities, taking into account special considerations which could impact on the problem. Three principal considerations emerged and were in evidence throughout the discussions on this subject. These were: (1) Aviation qualification of a maintenance officer, (2) operations in SE Asia, and (3) expansion of aviation in the U.S. Army.

2. The first of these considerations concerns the aviator qualification of aircraft maintenance officers. The Transportation Corps is one of the seven branches authorized Army aviators, while the proposed gaining branch, Ordnance, is not. No Army policy could be found that states a requirement for aircraft maintenance officers to be aviation qualified. Inquiries were made to other Armed Services, and U.S. governmental agencies, as well as several commercial airlines to get their professional views. None of the contacted agencies stated that flight qualification was a prerequisite or even necessary for their aircraft maintenance officers or supervisors. In addition to these external organizations, inquiries were directed to six U.S. Army offices having both a maintenance and an aviation responsibility.

3. The responses received from these staffs and commands were varied, ranging from a strong position favoring all aircraft maintenance officers

be qualified aviators to positions stating that it was not mandatory that all aircraft maintenance officers be aviation qualified. All responses did indicate a strong need for a flight capability in aircraft maintenance units. This capability exists more in line with a test pilot function than a pure maintenance function. MOS 4823, as stated in change nine, AR 611-101 appears to adequately state the requirements of an aircraft maintenance officer with the exception that no mention is made of test flying the aircraft.

4. Aviator MOS, both fixed wing and rotary wing describe the duties, skills, and qualifications necessary to function as pilot of an aircraft. The STOCQ Board only addressed the pilot qualification as it pertains to a skill requirement for aircraft maintenance officers. From this, it appears that the three MOS's, 4823 for aircraft maintenance officers; 1980 for fixed wing aviator; and 1981 for rotary wing aviator, adequately describe the duties and qualifications of the respective officer positions. Other Armed Forces positions on this subject, plus past, current, and projected civilian commercial practice, tend to question the validity of requiring aviator skill as a prerequisite for aircraft maintenance officers. No written DA policy or regulation was found to either substantiate or refute such a skill requirement. Increasing numbers of non-aviator officers are attending the Aircraft Maintenance Officers Course at the Transportation School, Ft Eustis, Virginia. This is due to a shortage of qualified aviators as a result of requirements in Vietnam. Aviators are needed for cockpit assignments.

5. A special report (COPO-OT-240), dated 5 May 1967 lists the number of non-aviator qualified aircraft maintenance officers as 599, while the number of prefix 06, aviation qualified aircraft maintenance officers was 446. A total of ten aircraft maintenance officers are listed under other prefixes. With this in mind, the STOCQ Board determined that the aviator qualification and skill was not necessary for an aircraft maintenance officer; but recognized that a flight capability must be available for test flight purposes. The source of the capability was not addressed in this study.

6. Several detailed studies made recently have recommended that equipment maintenance be the primary responsibility of one branch--the Ordnance Corps. In these studies, aircraft maintenance was considered as a part of the overall maintenance function to be aligned with the Ordnance Corps. Major U.S. Army commands concurred in these study recommendations, however one of the major commands (AMC) voiced concern about transferring this responsibility during the conflict in SE Asia. The appendix to this annex gives recommendations and command positions on the subject of transfer of the function of aircraft maintenance. The aviation qualification was also mentioned by several major commands, notably AMC. It is interesting to note that CDC, the principal DA command responsible for future concepts and doctrine, recommended an immediate transfer of the aircraft maintenance function to the Ordnance Corps.

7. In view of these prior recommendations for the transfer to Ordnance, it was felt that further study of the rationale for transfer would be unnecessary. The STOCQ Board agrees with the previous studies

on this subject. No new facts were uncovered during the conduct of this study to warrant a re-evaluation of the basic problem of whether to transfer the responsibility from the Transportation Corps to Ordnance. Staffing of these studies indicate that major U.S. Army commands are unanimous in their concurrences of the study proposals. Therefore, the STOCQ Board devoted its maximum effort to determining when this function should be transferred, rather than if it should be transferred.

8. Several transfer alternatives were discussed in detail. Among these were:

- a. Transfer now
- b. Transfer in 1975
- c. Time-phased transfer

9. The "transfer now" and the "transfer in 1975" alternatives were developed simply because these times represented the soonest possible and the latest possible times consistent with this Board's charter. The current conflict in SEA weighed heavily in all discussions as a special consideration. The Army Materiel Command recommended the transfer of this function to Ordnance be held in abeyance until after operations in Vietnam cease. The third alternative, that of phasing the transfer keyed to Vietnam operations was then developed. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these alternatives were thoroughly investigated and weighed.

10. Past turbulence in the careers of TC aviators, including those maintenance qualified, coupled with the critical role these officers are performing in Vietnam are major factors in evaluating these alternatives. Transferring the maintenance function now would result in uncertainty for

TC aviator maintenance officers regarding their future status and careers. This uncertainty could be overcome by proper education and information provided the affected officers, however, under this alternative there would be insufficient time for such information to be effective. In addition to the personnel implications, the gaining of a new role by the Ordnance officers could lead to a temporary reduction of effectiveness in: (1) Career management activities; (2) command and control of the current aircraft maintenance training facility at the Transportation School, Ft Eustis, Virginia; and (3) organizations where a change of command and unit designations are required. The temporary loss of effectiveness would have an impact on SE Asia operations, but the extent and duration cannot be accurately forecast.

11. Transferring the function in 1975 was explored, as this time represented the limits of the study charter. By deferring the transfer until this time, the functionalization of a prime commodity - aircraft lags far behind the other commodities. The Army has been moving gradually, through the implementation of ROAD, COSTAR, Project 80, and TASTA, away from commodity oriented structures to a functional structure, particularly in maintenance. The functionalization concept will be complete in all areas with the possible exception of medical service. 1975 is sufficiently far in the future that all details involving the transfer could be worked out in advance, thoroughly examined, and possibly tested before implementation. A smoother, more orderly transition could be expected with ample time for information on all aspects to be disseminated to officers of the

affected branches. Less turbulence would result from such a plan. An unknown factor that needs to be pointed out is the uncertainty of the world situation in 1975, and the role for Army aviation that may have evolved by that date. Aviation is expanding rapidly due mainly to its importance in conflicts such as that in Vietnam. An exact role for the Army, and an exact role for the USAF, would make much clearer the support responsibilities required for Army aviation.

12. The third alternative, that of phasing the transfer considering Vietnam operations was the next alternative considered. All actions taken must be considered for their effect on the war effort. The principal advantage of this alternative is that the transfer is keyed to the war effort thereby insuring that all areas of aviation support are thoroughly analyzed for their possible impact. The impact of the transfer thus can be held to the absolute minimum. This one advantage far outweighed the most apparent disadvantage, that of "dragging out the transfer" over a period of time.

13. The following conclusions were reached with respect to the three stated alternatives:

a. Since Army aviation is critical in the war in SE Asia, no effort should be taken that might prove disruptive to aviation support at this time. The transfer now course of action was therefore considered the least attractive of the three alternatives due to a possible adverse impact on the war effort.

b. Alternative two was considered preferable to alternative one, but not considered as the most desirable course of action. The date of

1975 is too far in the future to defer any contemplated action.

c. Alternative three, phasing the transfer keyed to the situation, emerged as the most desirable of the three alternatives. By considering every action required in the transfer based on its probable impact on Vietnam operations, any adverse effect on this war effort would be eliminated. This feature is considered vital.

14. The STOCQ Board considers a phase-in plan as the most feasible method of transferring the function of aircraft maintenance. A possible method of phasing this function was explored. Under this method, the gaining branch could, on a set date, begin training its own officers in maintaining aircraft. After sufficient numbers of junior officers were trained in the new role, the gaining branch would assign such officers to duty positions. Simultaneous with this assumption of full responsibility for company grade positions, the losing branch would lose this responsibility. The losing branch would continue to fill officer requisitions for field grade aircraft maintenance officers. During this "phase-in" the officers in the losing branch who have the needed maintenance skills would be encouraged and allowed the opportunity for a branch transfer. As the maintenance officers of the gaining branch reach field grade rank, the new branch would assume the total mission of training and supplying officers to perform the aircraft maintenance functions at all levels. Qualified aircraft maintenance officers in the Transportation Corps could remain in the Transportation Corps but would be reoriented toward the main function of flying aircraft, or other non-maintenance related positions involving air transport. It is anticipated that the non-aviator aircraft maintenance



officers will either branch transfer to Ordnance or be retrained in a TC movements area. As of 26 April 1967, there were 86 TC officers, non-aviators, serving in duty positions as aircraft maintenance officers.

15. The advantages of this transfer methodology approximate those of the 1975 transfer. Among these are the advance planning feature which would be initiated immediately to insure a smooth transfer of responsibilities. Time is available for pure and concentrated planning as no action would be taken until its result could be assessed for its impact on Vietnam operations. An information-education program could be developed to inform all affected personnel of both branches of the reason for such a transfer of responsibilities. This would go a long way toward minimizing personnel uncertainty and consequent turbulence. The gaining branch, Ordnance, will have time to develop its own expertise which would result in a more efficient assumption of responsibilities. The losing branch, Transportation Corps, will have time to devote to its remaining primary role, movements.

# REALIGNMENT OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMAND POSITIONS

	STUDIES			COMMANDS		
	TECHSTAR STUDY	BROWN BOARD	SOQ STUDY*	AMC	CDC	CONARC
REALIGN TO ORD	X	X	X	X	X	X
DEFER TRANSFER			X	X		
TRANSFER NOW					X	
REMAIN TC						
STUDY AVIATOR QUALIFICATION			X	X		X

- \* - AN OPO STUDY OF SIGNAL, ORDNANCE AND QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS CONDUCTED 1966, WITHDRAWN FROM DA STAFFING UPON DIRECTION CSA PER CSM 67 - 71, DATED 20 FEB 1967.

ANNEX D  
BATTALION S-4 STAFFING

PROBLEM:

To improve logistics staff performance at battalion level.

ASSUMPTIONS:

That a functional realignment of the STOCQ branches will be approved.

FACTS:

1. Several DA studies have found that the supply and maintenance staff activities in Armor, Artillery, Engineer, Infantry, and Signal battalions are being performed at less than desired standards.

2. The Brown Board found that "This is largely attributed to the lack of appropriate experience by the combat arms officers assigned to such duties and the widespread unpopularity of these assignments among these officers." This was found to be further aggravated by the short tenure of officers in S-4 positions (average 6+ months).

3. The CofSA directed by CSM 66-282 dated 15 June 1966, that battalion communications officers be from Signal Corps.

4. The Brown Board recommended establishment of a battalion maintenance officer staff position co-equal with the battalion S-4 and that these positions be designated as Ordnance Corps and Quartermaster respectively.

DISCUSSION:

5. The first question seems to revolve around what the job requirements are, not who does the job. Organizational structure depends on the nature and scope of officer/knowledge/skills required. Officer training and experience prerequisites are in turn dependent on organizational structure. Only after these decisions are made can a logical and objective determination be made of who (in terms of branch and grade) should fill the position.

6. The logistics staff functions at battalion level include the following:

a. Staff supervision of all supply, maintenance, transportation, evacuation, and related logistic activities.

b. Initiation, coordination, authentication and distribution of administrative orders.

c. Coordination with S-3 and S-1 to insure that logistical plans support and complement tactical plans.

d. Direction of organizational maintenance plans and programs.

e. Direction of activities related to property responsibility, funds, records, supply economy, etc.

f. Direction of activities concerned with salvage, protection of trains and supply routes and location of rear boundaries.

g. Planning and coordination of all logistics training.

7. What knowledge/skill is required?

a. Must know the organization, role, mission, and tactical and

administrative employment of unit.

b. Must have a working knowledge of the Army supply system, TAERS, ARM, organizational maintenance and supply procedures.

c. Must have a working knowledge of Army staff procedures and responsibilities.

d. Must possess basic officer skills and experience commensurate with grade.

8. The staff responsibility of a logistics staff officer (S-4) at battalion level covers a wide scope and requires knowledge of both tactical and technical operations; however, there is no overriding requirement for knowledge and expertise in depth in either field. Rather, breadth of experience and knowledge is the principal qualification needed. Certainly it would be advantageous if the S-4 could be completely proficient.

Realistically, however, complete proficiency is seldom attained; hence, we must look for that minimum proficiency essential to effective and efficient performance. It appears that the knowledge/skills required for effective performance of the battalion logistics staff officer functions are within the capabilities of a single officer; however, if the function is divided among two or more officers, the narrower scope should mean less training and experience required to develop the requisite level of expertise.

9. There is no Army course specifically for training S-4's. An analysis of the functions to be performed and of the knowledge and skill required for effective performance indicates that neither an arms officer

nor a service officer in the junior grade could reasonably be expected to possess all the qualifications at this time. The significance of the duties and the wide scope of knowledge required, particularly since it encompasses both tactical and logistical aspects, point to a need for special qualifying training. Even if separate, co-equal supply and maintenance staff positions are created, some training for these officers oriented specifically on logistics in the arms battalion, is indicated. Accordingly, all courses of action considered are predicated on the staff officer(s) receiving qualifying training.

10. The following organizational alternatives are considered feasible:

a. C/A 1

Single logistics staff officer (S-4). Battalion organization to include a motor officer, a supply warrant officer and a maintenance warrant officer (present structure).

<u>Advantages</u>	<u>Disadvantages</u>
1. Integrates entire logistics function.	1. Wide scope of knowledge and training required.
2. Promotes recognition of inter-relationship between maintenance and supply.	2. Subordinates role of both maintenance and supply.
3. Provides a "recognizably challenging" position.	
4. No change in personnel strength.	
5. Provides warrant officers for technical expertise.	
6. Accrues advantages of an established system.	

b. C/A 2

Co-equal battalion staff officers for maintenance and supply.

Battalion organization to include a motor officer and warrant officers in maintenance and supply.

Advantages

1. Promotes distinct staff cognizance of maintenance and supply.
2. Reduces scope of knowledge/skill required.
3. Relatively less training and experience required.
4. Provides warrant officers for technical expertise.

Disadvantages

1. Splits staff responsibility for logistics.
2. Dilutes attractiveness of position.
3. Risk assignment of more junior and less competent officers.
4. Increases personnel requirements.

c. C/A 3

Co-equal battalion staff officers for maintenance and supply.

Battalion organization to include a motor officer but no warrant officers in supply or maintenance.

Advantages

1. Promotes distinct staff cognizance of maintenance and supply.
2. Decreases overall personnel requirements.

Disadvantages

1. Considerable depth of technical knowledge required.
2. Provides no "back up."

11. This distinction between the technical operations and staff facets of logistics at the battalion level is pertinent to an examination of this problem. Certainly effective performance in both areas is essential to

efficient performance of the battalion logistic functions. Direct supervision of logistics operations requires a considerable level of technical expertise. This need is recognized in the present organization which includes warrant officers to manage the maintenance and supply operations. There is also a requirement for staff planning and supervision of the total logistics effort. This effort exceeds the sum of maintenance and supply.

12. The S-4 position in an arms battalion should be recognized as a challenging position. Officers assigned these duties should have received qualifying training and should have sufficient Army experience to give them perspective in the role of logistics in these units. Officers now serving as battalion S-4's have been found to lack both this experience and training.

13. It appears that breadth of knowledge and experience, not depth of technical expertise is the salient qualification needed in this role. Splitting the logistics staff function would likely result in providing two unqualified officers where now there is one. Increasing the level of experience and training for battalion logistics staff officers stands out as the real need.

14. Intermediate conclusion:

a. C/A 1 which provides a single S-4 with a motor officer and warrant officers to provide technical expertise in depth is the best staff organization.

b. The scope of knowledge required when reflected in experience



and training prerequisites indicates that the grade of major is warranted for an S-4.

c. The officer knowledge/skill requirements are sufficiently different from those of other positions of commensurate level to merit special training.

15. Alternatives for staffing battalion logistics staff officer positions:

a. C/A 1

Staff all officer positions with Ordnance, Quartermaster or Transportation Corps officers.

Advantages

1. Places officer whose career is logistics in a logistics position.
2. Promotes "one Army" concept re arms and services.
3. Provides integrated logistics experience at relatively early level.
4. Is compatible with career pattern for OQT officers.

Disadvantages

1. May tend to dilute command awareness of logistics responsibilities.
2. Deprives arms officers of logistics experience at this level.
3. Requires additional training for OQT officers.
4. Limits commanders flexibility in assigning personnel.
5. Creates a low density requirement for specialists.
6. Complicates assignment in some Artillery Battalions where S-4 is also serv btry cmdr.

b. C/A 2

Staff all officer positions with officers of the branch with which battalion is identified.

Advantages

1. Gives commanders flexibility in assigning personnel.
2. Provides logistics experience for arms officers.
3. Serves to emphasize tactical officers' logistical responsibilities.

Disadvantages

1. Places an officer who is primarily oriented toward tactical operations in a logistical position.
2. Is not fully compatible with arms officer career pattern.
3. Requires additional training for arms officer.

16. Comparison of alternatives.

The fundamental objective of battalion logistics planning and operations is to support the tactical operations of the battalion. Full effectiveness is achieved when logistics fully support the tactical operation. Logistics support is deficient when logistical considerations restrict or dictate tactical plans. Hence, the battalion logistics staff officer (S-4) needs to be thoroughly versed in the mission, employment, capabilities and limitations of his unit to anticipate requirements and insure that logistical plans and operations support and complement tactical plans and operations. As a result of common experience and training, the arms officer as S-4 speaks the same language as the S-3 and battalion

commander. Certainly he should be able to recognize requirements and problems of that battalion better than an OQT officer who lacks this common background.

17. It appears that deficiencies noted by the Brown Board are in specific individual qualifications and not in broad qualifications or career orientation. Staffing battalion S-4 positions with arms officers is a system that has been proven workable over the years. Increased complexity of materiel and reporting systems may dictate special qualifying training for S-4 officers. At the same time, however, the need to be experienced in the tactical operations of the unit has not diminished.

18. A second major advantage of retaining arms officers in battalion S-4 positions is in the career development of these officers. Logistics is recognized as being of importance equal to tactics in contributing to mission accomplishment. An arms officer must develop an understanding of logistical support if he is to be an effective commander. These officers by serving as battalion S-4's now have an opportunity to get experience in planning and coordinating an integrated logistics function at a fairly early point in their career. Staffing this position with OQT officers while providing valuable experience to them would deprive arms officers of this experience. As a consequence, these officers in all probability would not have an opportunity to obtain logistics experience prior to becoming battalion commanders or division staff officers. Arms officers gain an early apprecia-

tion of the role of logistics which should serve them well throughout their career. To eliminate this early experience may very well contribute to further separation and divisiveness between logistics and tactics, and the officers who perform the functions.

19. An arms battalion, especially when in combat, must be able to function with personnel shortages and to adjust to rapid changes. The flexibility of a battalion commander to shift his officers is a strong consideration favoring retaining arms officers as S-4's. Should the S-4 become a casualty, the commander needs a replacement without delay. If all arms officers receive S-4 training in the advanced course, the commander will have a pool of qualified officers within his unit from which to draw a replacement. If the S-4 position is normally filled by OQT officers, however, it is not likely that arms officers will be trained for this position and, hence, a qualified replacement must come from external sources. Delay in receiving this replacement could have a adverse effect on the battalion's capabilities during a critical period.

20. There are distinct advantages in having an OQT officer as battalion S-4. His total training, experience, and career orientation is closely akin to the job requirements of this position. Experience with an arms battalion should help immeasurably in developing in these officers an awareness of the problems of the combat unit and a fraternity with the arms officers. The value of this shared experience cannot be discarded lightly. However, there are very real costs in buying this experience.

21. In summary, arms officers are seen to be oriented to the total role of the battalion. The job requires a sound knowledge of the unit's tactical and administrative operations as well as a knowledge of logistical plans and operations. The close relationship between logistics support and tactical operations and the career development of arms commanders seem to be the overriding consideration in reaching a decision on staffing the battalion S-4 position.

CONCLUSION:

22. Either an arms officer or an OQT officer, given proper training and experience, can perform the battalion S-4 functions adequately.

23. The predominate role of tactical considerations in logistical plans at this level and the need for arms officers to develop logistical experience are the overriding considerations and both favor an arms officer as S-4.

24. That the S-4 position in Armor, Artillery, Engineer, Infantry, and Signal battalions should be designated for officers of these branches respectively.

## ANNEX E

### LOGISTICS OFFICER PROGRAM

#### INTRODUCTION

1. The Department of the Army Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (The Brown Board) recommended eliminating the Logistics Officer Program (LOP) in the 1970 timeframe. The DA Steering Group non-concurred in the Brown Board recommendation on the basis that officers of other branches should not be deprived of the opportunity to serve in logistics. The group commented that logistics is not an exclusive club; that officers of the arms who are logistically inclined must always be able to serve in appropriate logistics positions; and that the LOP provides an excellent means for user oriented people to get into the field, especially at the top.

2. The SOQ study did not address the LOP. AMC concurred in the Brown Board recommendation.

3. The STOCQ Board therefore examined the LOP to determine what alternative would provide the best officers to staff the logistics system within the current DA organization, recognizing the trend throughout the Army to shift more into the functional alignment and away from commodity alignment.

#### PROBLEM

4. To determine if the LOP should be eliminated.

#### ASSUMPTION

5. That a functional realignment of the STOCQ branches will be approved.

## FACTS

6. Prerequisites for LOP participation is highly selective requiring officers with exceptional records, graduates of C&GSC, and in the grade of major and above or on the promotion list to major.

7. Key LOP positions are only identified at the O-6 level.

8. LOP is not a substitute for branch.

9. Provides a program for monitoring key logistics functional positions not associated with any one single branch.

10. One thousand three hundred seventy seven officers from 15 different branches now participate in the LOP.

11. Five hundred sixty six key LOP positions are currently identified with 200 more to be added in FY 68.

12. Sixty one percent of the LOP positions are now filled by officers from OQT branches.

13. The logistics function is an important aspect of the Department of the Army operations.

## DISCUSSION

14. The approach used by the STOCQ Board in its deliberations on the LOP was to examine the program and the basis for its establishment and determine if this basis is still valid and finally, select a system that will develop and provide the best skilled logistics officers to the Army in view of its mission, organization, and operational tasks.

15. The Specialist Branch, Executive for Career Planning, Officer Personnel Directorate is responsible for the management of the LOP, and defines a specialist program as: "An instrument of personnel management

C designed to develop and utilize officers who are particularly well qualified in certain functional areas. Such areas are of critical Army wide importance, but do not however, fall within the development patterns of any single career branch."

16. DA Memo 614-5 defines a functional area as "a distinct element or segment of the Army mission. It encompasses a group of related duties, responsibilities or tasks performed at either the staff or operational level."

C 17. AR 614-132 defines logistics as "the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces--in its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evaluation and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and acquisition and furnishing of services." Evacuation and hospitalization of personnel and operation and maintenance of installation will not be considered since both of these functions fall outside the normal responsibilities of the STOCQ branches.

18. The LOP came into being during a period when the technical services were organized around a commodity structure with each branch assigned a specific grouping of commodities and the responsibility for managing them across all life-cycle functions. However, the Army's logistics became more complicated due to the development and acquisition of highly technical equipment and weapons systems. This led to a need for



more specialization. More types of specialists with greater skills in a number of areas were needed. The career branches took care of the need for many specialist requirements, especially those in the commodity fields, but they did not provide sufficient emphasis and attention to specialists required in the functional fields embracing several commodities such as supply, maintenance, and movements. Consequently, the logistics officer specialist program came into being with the stated objective of identifying and developing officers of proven ability for assignment to the increasing important logistics positions of supply, procurement, production, and maintenance. These positions were functional in nature and involved several commodities throughout DA and DOD regardless of the officer branch affiliation.

19. The reorganization of 1962 and subsequent implementation of the COSTAR and TASTA-70 organization continued the emphasis on the Army's need for logistic specialist by functionalizing the Army in the field. The AMC organization on the other hand, remained aligned along commodity lines. These revolutionary changes left the branch structure of the old technical services in somewhat of a desultory condition, being neither functionally nor commodity aligned. It not only terminated the career branches' former command and operating responsibilities, but also relegated the role of the branches primarily to that of career development and assignment of officers. This condition continues to exist today and is in fact further complicated by the absence of specific guidance and direction to the branches on the logistics officer skills a particular branch is expected to develop. The branch status is also aggravated by

the rapid increase throughout the Army in branch immaterial logistics positions. Project TECSTAR found that less than one half of the officer duty positions are identified with a specific branch. Concurrent with the existence of these conditions, the STOCQ Board found the Army's requirement for logistics specialist has continued to increase. Because of the lack of an identifiable source responsible for the development of logistics officers through a planned assignment and educational career pattern, the Army has continued to rely heavily upon the LOP for its logistics specialists.

20. Although the LOP membership has increased, the STOCQ Board found that the Army's needs for qualified logistics officers are not being met in sufficient quantity and quality.

21. To satisfy both of these needs, the STOCQ Board considered three courses of action.

a. Eliminate the LOP and staff the positions with officers from the OQT branches.

b. Retain the program as it currently exists.

c. Retain the program, but modify membership requirements, expand OQT participation, and orient on function rather than branch.

#### ALTERNATIVE ONE

22. Eliminate the LOP and staff the logistics positions with officers from the OQT branches.

23. The Board in its deliberation on alternative one determined certain advantages would accrue to the Army if the LOP was eliminated. First and most important, it would align the OQT officers with the function for which they have been trained, i.e., maintenance, supply, and movements.

Today logistics throughout the Army is not being performed at its maximum efficiency. This fact was pointed out by both the Brown Board and TECSTAR. The STOCQ Board also found this to be true and attributes the existence of such a condition primarily to the lack of logistical experience, training, and education of the officer currently performing in the logistical functions. Today only 61% of the LOP positions are filled by officers from the OQT branches. The LOP as it is currently established is on a voluntary basis, allowing officers at will to withdraw from the program. The Board found that frequently officers once admitted to the program either never served in LOP positions or their tours were at infrequent intervals. The thrust of any officer's skill development program has been and remains with the branch rather than a function. Today 39% of the participants in the LOP are from branches whose thrust and primary function is oriented in directions other than logistics. The Board recognizes of course that many of the skills which exist today in the logistics field were developed under the old technical service structure where branch orientation contributed to the development of officers skilled in logistics. Today however the logistical field of endeavor has become so complex and demanding that it can no longer be performed using a system of officer skill development which is voluntary in nature and at best a part-time career for a large percentage of its participants.

24. Alternative one would also assist in better determining the logistic officer requirements. Currently, there are logistics officers in 15 branches. Any one of these branches can anticipate requirements for logistics officers; yet, no branch can forecast when the requirement

will be received or what specific skills will be required. This complicates any one branch's ability to forecast requirements for logistics officers. The inability of the branches to forecast requirements, both quantitative and qualitative for logistics officers adversely affects the development of the proper officer skills in sufficient number to accomplish the Army's logistical mission.

25. The OQT branches could not, however, meet the logistics officer requirement in the 1970 timeframe as envisioned by the Brown Board and therefore results in a short term disadvantage. Currently there are 560 key LOP positions identified with plans for adding an additional 200 positions. The composite strength of the O-6's in the OQT branches totals 756. It is readily apparent that the OQT branches could not support the key logistics positions and concurrently meet the demands of the OQT branch material requirements in the grade of O-6.

26. The elimination of the LOP would result in reduction of Army wide participation and would no doubt result in the short term loss of certain skilled logistics officer assets, particularly from the arms branches. Although this loss of skills would present a short range problem, the STOCQ Board felt that the key to a better logistics system in the Army hinged around skills rather than the branch orientation and that these skills were best produced within a branch whose thrust was on logistics rather than tactics. This is not to say that the tactician does not have an important contribution to make to any logistics system which may evolve, however, this contribution can best be made from a user standpoint rather than a key operator of the system.

ALTERNATIVE TWO

27. Retain the LOP as it currently exists.

28. Alternative two offers the Army a system whereby the best talent from within the entire Army can participate in and contribute to a vital function of the Army. The programs selectiveness of officer personnel with the highest demonstrated ability attests to its importance within the Army and lends a sense of pride and esprit among its participants. The program has as its major attribute the constant infusion of new blood into the system. It allows for maximum input from the arms branches to fully inject the user's viewpoint into the logistics system. It has as its objective the development of officers qualified to fill positions requiring specialization in all of the multi-function logistics positions.

29. The retention of the LOP does not take full advantage of the logistics officer talent which exists throughout the Army. The establishment of prior attendance at C&GSC as a prerequisite for acceptance with the LOP eliminates 50 - 65% of the exceptional officers from the OQT branches since the Leavenworth quota system precludes their attendance. This results in failure to utilize the talents of many exceptional officers who possess the skills, education, and experience necessary to the logistics functions.

30. The current LOP only identified O-6 positions. This is inconsistent with the current membership in that approximately two thirds of the LOP participants are in the grade of O-4 and O-5. In most cases, the branch selected to fill an LOP position below O-6 level is not aware of the skills required for that position until the requisition is received.

This then becomes a juggling act within the branch of filling the position from available assets rather than with an officer possessing the best skills for that particular assignment. The identification of all LOP positions, the skills required to fill the position, and the branch designation would facilitate preplanning by the branches and allow them to select the best qualified officers for the position. Until this can be accomplished, limited preplanning and officer development will continue,

31. Alternative two continues to allow the thrust of officer development to pivot around the branch rather than the function to be performed.

#### ALTERNATIVE THREE

32. Retain the LOP, but modify membership requirements, expand OQT participation, and orient on function rather than branch.

33. Alternative three envisions the abolishment of the C&GSC prerequisite. This in no way lessens the quality of the officers participating in the program. Selective criteria would still be heavily weighted by the officer's demonstrated ability to performing exceptionally well in positions of great responsibility. It does allow the Army to utilize skilled logistic officers in designated LOP positions who cannot expect to attend C&GSC because of the quota system limiting the technical service officer to 35% of the available quota.

34. Alternative three would expand the OQT participation in the LOP. This is in line with the concepts envisioned by the functional realignment of these branches. Since the OQT branch will become the prime source of logistics officers, the training, experience, and education these officer receive throughout their entire career better qualifies

them for the higher logistics positions than officers who devote the bulk of their time maintaining their qualification in functions other than logistics. It will also assist in broadening the base from which these officers may be selected, as well as contribute to the functional realignment of the OQT branches recommended by the STOCQ Board.

35. Most importantly, alternative three orients the Army on the function and not on the branch. Specialist programs as they now are established under the AR, emphasize that these programs are designed to complement, but not substitute for the basic branch.

36. Alternative three however has corresponding disadvantages. Although it would favor the OQT branches, it would still allow personnel to fill key logistics positions whose primary interest remains with the branch and not the logistics function. It would no doubt create turmoil among the current members adversely affecting the accomplishment of the logistics function. This however would only be a short term effect and should subside as OQT branch expansion absorbed the requirements.

37. Probably the singular most distinctive disadvantage of alternative three is that it puts logistics officer development on a volunteer basis and trends toward diffusing the logistics expertise by infrequent officer assignments in the functional area.

#### CONCLUSIONS

38. The Army's logistics system is complex and requires experienced operators skilled in the functions of supply, maintenance, and movements.

39. The management of logistics requires extensive experience and

education which cannot be, with rare exception, developed on a part-time volunteer basis.

40. The functional alignment assumed for the STOCQ branches establishes the OQT officers as the principal logistics functionalists, thus negating the requirement for the LOP which was established in an atmosphere of branch commodity orientation to manage logistics functional positions.

41. The experience, training, and education necessary to develop career logisticians closely parallel the career patterns of the OQT officers.

42. The current LOP does not insure development of logistics officers.

43. The logistics function should be the thrust of logistical officer development and not a secondary consideration.

44. The OQT officer strength in the grade of O-6 is insufficient to support the LOP key positions.

45. Major contributions by officers from other than OQT branches should be from a user standpoint and not as operators, and identified as such.

46. The LOP should be eliminated and positions staffed with officers from OQT branches when they can support the program.

47. Branch transfers from branches other than OQT should be encouraged.



## SECTION IV

### REALIGNMENT

#### GENERAL

1. This section deals with the manner in which branches should be aligned. It presents the alternatives considered, the relative merits of each alternative and the rationale which led to the conclusions arrived at by the Board.

2. The Board was tasked to resolve the differences between the recommendations of the Brown Board in Volume V and the OPO-SOQ study relative to realignment. An analysis showed that there was little difference between the two recommendations. Both recommended a functional alignment with Quartermaster officers to perform the supply functions (less medical supply and ammunition supply); Ordnance Corps to perform the maintenance functions (less medical maintenance); and Transportation Corps the transportation function. The differences were that the Brown Board recommended that repair parts supply should be a part of the maintenance function while the OPO-SOQ study considered it to be a supply function. In addition, the OPO-SOQ recommended that the alignment of aviation maintenance with Ordnance be deferred until after the Vietnam conflict and the Brown Board did not so recommend.

3. The Chief of Staff noted that previous studies were oriented primarily on the Army in the field and did not evaluate the ability of the personnel system to meet the requirements of Army Materiel Command (AMC)

if functionally realigned. He directed that this be considered by the STOCQ study.

4. The Board undertook the realignment task with the objective of grouping into each branch related skills requiring common education, training, and experience. This homogeneity provides the basis for similar career patterns and more efficient personnel management. It was accepted that the alignment recommended must be capable of satisfying the total Army commissioned officer requirements for STOCQ officers and not any one segment alone. Insofar as possible, it should overcome the problems existing in the current personnel system without generating new ones of magnitude. It must provide a basis for attractive career patterns and opportunity for continued advancement in all branches. The realignment, once decided, will become the basis for STOCQ roles and missions statements.

5. Four branch alignment alternatives were considered. These were:

- a. Alignment of branches on a basis of commodity skills.
- b. Establish a Materiel Corps by merging Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps.
- c. Alignment of branches on the basis of functional skills.
- d. Retain the present alignment.

6. The approach used by the Board was first to decide what is the best basis for alignment of branches in today's environment and, second, having decided this, to determine how to insure that the selected alternative will provide for the total Army officer personnel needs as determined

in the preceding section.

7. This section is terminated with a summary of conclusions resulting from this analysis and the ones contained in Sections II and III.

#### ANALYSIS

8. Following is a description of each alignment course of action considered with the strengths and weaknesses of each. Each alternative has its advantages and some are better suited for development of officer personnel for certain elements of the Army than others. This results chiefly from the inherent differences between commodity oriented organizations, like Army Materiel Command, and the functionally oriented COSTAR and TASTA-70 organizations typically found in the Army in the field. The conflict between functional and commodity alignment is discussed in detail following this analysis.

9. Course of Action 1: Alignment of branches on the basis of commodity skills:

a. This course of action will fix responsibility for providing the skills needed to perform all the life cycle functions for a specific group of items with a single branch much as existed with the Chiefs of Technical Services prior to 1962. The principal difference would be that there would be no chief of service.

b. There are numerous ways that branches could be aligned on a commodity basis. Some considered by this study were:

(1) Separate branch for each commodity group.

(2) Two commodity branches: A hardware branch (weapons, vehicles and communications equipment) and a software branch (POL, clothing and subsistence).

(3) The traditional technical service alignment of items.

c. In general, the major advantages and disadvantages apply to all. The commodity basis for alignment would place in a single branch the skills required for research, development, testing and evaluation, procurement, production, quality assurance, storage, distribution, maintenance, technical assistance, product improvement, and disposal.

d. The major advantages of this alternative are that it is conducive to the development of officers with a depth of knowledge and experience with a specific commodity group. This comprehensive knowledge and experience would enable him to integrate and coordinate all the tasks necessary to support the Army with these items. This alternative would be most suitable for grooming project managers, commodity command commanders, and officers to staff other positions concerned with all the life cycle functions of a single commodity.

e. The principal weaknesses of this alternative are that it tends to broadly qualify officers in many functional areas, but not specifically qualify him in depth in any one. While this alignment is well suited to many requirements of the AMC which is organized on the basis of commodity, it is not suited to the Army in the field which is organized on the basis of function. A duplication of skills would be required in the commodity

branches.

10. Course of Action 2: Establish a Materiel Corps by merging Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps:

a. This branch would have all the supply and maintenance and commodity skills and would be responsible for staffing the wholesale and retail supply and maintenance system as well as the R&D of all materiel. Signal, Transportation and Chemical Corps would be responsible for communications-electronics, movements and chemical and biological functions respectively.

b. This fixes responsibility for staffing with specific branches and has the added advantage of being compatible with the AMC and the Army in the field. It would reduce the duplication of skills among branches and would eliminate the branch barriers to assignments between functions and commodities. It would facilitate the integration of supply and maintenance functions.

c. The major weakness of this alternative is that although it appears to enjoy the advantages of both courses of action one and three, without their disadvantages, this is an illusion. Actually, this course of action does nothing to resolve the conflicts between courses of action one and three (function vs commodity) but merely buries it in a single branch. The same problems would have to be resolved internally by that new branch. An additional disadvantage is the large size of this branch which would detract from personalized management.

11. Course of Action 3: Alignment of Branches on a Functional Basis:

a. This alternative, this alignment of branches places in one branch the skills needed to perform the assigned function. the STOCQ branches would perform the following functions:

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
Signal	Communications and electronics
Transportation	Movements
Ordnance	Maintenance and ammunition
Chemical	Chemical and Biological operations
Quartermaster	Supply and services

The major advantage of this alternative is that it would conform to the current organizational structure of the Army in the field. It will provide officers with training and experience in the specific functions that they perform or supervise, thus correcting the primary personnel deficiencies found by the Baker Board and Project Aim. It virtually eliminates the duplication of skills among branches by fixing responsibility with a specific branch. This should also result in more reliable forecasts of personnel and training requirements and more realistic branch strengths based upon actual requirements.

b. The major disadvantage of this alternative is that it does not facilitate the development of weapons systems and equipment systems managers required by AMC.

12. Course of Action 4: Retain the present alignment:

a. This alternative would continue the current practice of designating most logistics positions as SM or BI and staffing these from various technical branches. The present system was thoroughly evaluated in Section II. The major advantage to this alternative is that it provides a great amount of flexibility and would avoid turbulence caused by other courses of action.

b. The major weaknesses are that it does not conform to the current organizational structure in the field, the duplication of skills among branches, and the uncertainty caused by a lack of specified roles and missions.

COMPARISON

13. Considering the above evaluations together with analyses contained in Sections II and III, the Board rejected courses of action two and four. Course of action two was favored over four but was rejected because it did not solve the problem, but merely buried it within a branch. The most attractive feature of this alternative is that it would eliminate a source of competition between branches for decisions that may be more beneficial to the branches than to the Army. Adoption of this course of action would pave the way for more objective consideration of alternatives by the officers affected by the decisions to be made.

14. Future changes in logistical support organizations, doctrine and procedures may lead to a closer integration of supply and maintenance

functions in the Army than exists today. If such changes occur, this would warrant reconsideration of this alternative as the logical step to keep branch alignment parallel to Army organization for mission accomplishment.

15. Course of action one, alignment based upon commodity skills, best suits the AMC commodity oriented organization, but is not compatible with the functional organizations of the COSTAR II and TASTA-70, the school system and CDC.

16. Course of action two, alignment based on functions is best suited for the major portion of the Army's requirements, but does not afford the best pattern for key AMC officers requiring a commodity orientation.

#### COMMODITY vs FUNCTION

17. A basic decision between the commodity and the functional approach to alignment of branches is required because the two concepts conflict.

18. The following charts show how the conflicts occur. Figure 1 depicts a career pattern based on functions (e.g., supply, maintenance, or transportation). An officer upon entry in the service would learn a specific function such as maintenance. Initially he would serve in positions involving a single type of maintenance such as mechanical maintenance. He would be concerned with various commodities. As he advanced, he would broaden his experience and would serve in positions requiring supervision of additional types of maintenance (i.e., electronic, missile or aircraft). Although he could progress to the grade of colonel



# **FUNCTIONAL APPROACH** **MULTI-FUNCTION**




FIGURE 1

IV-8A

servicing only in this field, many positions, particularly at the field grade levels, require a knowledge of several functions. Therefore he needs to broaden across several functions as he advanced in grade and responsibility as shown in Figure 1.

19. Figure 2 shows a typical career based on commodity. The officer initially serves in a position involving a single function and single commodity groups, such as missiles. As he continues he gains experience in different functions ultimately becoming well qualified in many of the functions related to that commodity. At the highest levels he can expect to broaden further and hold positions involving several commodities, as shown in Figure 2.


20. It can be seen that the two patterns are oriented differently, each crosses the other at 90 degrees. Both lead to multi-function and multi-commodity qualification and to qualified logisticians. (Figure 3) The difference is in orientation and the path followed to get there.

21. The commodity approach best provides the weapons systems and equipment systems managers, but does not provide the best path for the functional specialist. The functional approach best provides the functional specialist, but not the best path for a weapon systems and equipment systems managers. Thus the decision must be made on which concept to use as the basis for branch alignment.

#### ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

22. Previous studies considering realignment were primarily oriented

# COMMODITY APPROACH



M U L T I - C O M M O D I T Y

FIGURE 2

IV-9A




FIGURE 3

IV-9B

on the Army in the field and did not examine in detail the requirement for skills in the wholesale logistics system. This study focuses on both. The Board examined the AMC organization and missions, and studied duties and responsibilities of key officers in the AMC structure. In addition, discussions were held with the Commanding General of AMC to solicit his personal views. The Board studied his comments which are summarized in the following paragraph:

23. He believes that development of good weapons systems is ultimate and should be the fundamental consideration in any realignment action. The Army should develop officers with experience in a particular weapons system with a well-rounded knowledge of all the life-cycle functions that go into the successful management of that weapons system. OPO should manage aviation skills, weapons skills, combat vehicle skills, electronics skills, and other hard skills in the best manner to assure the development of good equipment for the future. The best time for an officer to decide upon his career is during the early stages of his service. In this way he can acquire experience in his commodity field early in his career. He can change direction later if desired. The objective should be to give the officer the broadest experience possible with that type equipment across several life-cycle functions. The functions such as maintenance or supply are subsidiary to basic development of a well-rounded weapons man who understands the problems of integrating the tasks that go into the successful fielding of a weapons system. The officers should have advanced degrees

in a scientific, management or engineering field as early as possible to enable them to gain acceptance, speak the language and discipline their minds to think in certain patterns. He favors a commodity alignment of branches to assure the development of the best equipment and weapons systems or an alignment with a branch to fix responsibility for weapons and equipment development. He believes that officers trained around materiel can staff the functional positions of the Army in the field.

24. From the analysis of AMC problems, the Board agrees that there is a valid need for officers with a comprehensive knowledge of specific materiel who can be depended upon to develop the most advanced equipment possible within the state of the art. The same qualifications are desirable for project managers and commodity command commanders for AMC. In addition, there are requirements elsewhere in the Army for equipment and weapons systems specialists such as DCSLOG and DOD staff.

25. The Board concluded that these positions are too critical and too important to ignore and therefore any alignment developed must satisfy these key personnel requirements.

26. In arriving at a decision on how to align the branches, the Board considered the AMC needs, findings of previous studies, and the total Army needs. TECSTAR, the Brown Board, and the OPO-SOQ studies all pointed out the need for functional alignment. The preponderance of the Army's requirements in today's environment is for functional specialists. This came about by COSTAR II and TASTA-70. In addition, the branch schools and Combat

Development Command are generally organized in a functional manner. These conditions lead to the conclusion that functional alignment (course of action three) would be the best alternative for alignment of the STOCQ branches but specific action must be taken to provide for the development of weapon systems and equipment.

#### WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT

27. Having concluded that course of action three was the most acceptable alternative, the next problem was to determine how to assure development of commodity or materiel specialists. The Board considered two methods that could be used in conjunction with the functionally aligned STOCQ branches, as follows:

- a. Specialist program with a sub-program for each commodity group.
- b. Assignment of responsibility for materiel development to functional branches.

28. The specialist program has the advantage of allowing maximum participation of all branches. It was rejected, however, because of problems involved in having two activities managing the officer's career and competing for his time (the branch and the specialist program).

29. It was concluded that branches should be assigned responsibility for development of weapons systems and equipment as follows:

Signal Corps	Communications and electronics equipment
Transportation Corps	Aircraft, rail and marine equipment

Ordnance Corps	Weapons, vehicles, ammo, missiles
Chemical Corps	Chemical and biological agents, equipment and weapons systems
Quartermaster Corps	Clothing and textiles, individual equipment, POL, subsistence
Corps of Engineers	Construction equipment, bridging and demolitions
Medical Corps	Medical equipment

30. This assignment fixes responsibility for development of these important skills with the branch having the greatest engineering competence for the equipment involved. There should be very little turbulence caused since responsibility is placed with the branch that today possesses the preponderance of technical skills for these items. Retention of the R&D specialist program allows continued use of available skills from other branches to include the necessary user input from the arms branches. This is compatible with functional alignment of branches and permits alternate career patterns within a branch. With this responsibility fixed, the branches can develop special career patterns that will provide the optimum schooling and experience to qualify officers to staff key positions in AMC involving materiel and weapons development.

31. The branches responsible for materiel development would also be responsible for the development of officers qualified to staff positions primarily concerned with the life-cycle functions of research, development, testing, evaluation, maintenance engineering, production engineering, production, quality assurance, product improvement, and technical assistance.



Other life-cycle function positions such as supply, maintenance and movements are assigned to functional branches.

#### QUALIFICATION

32. GAO, Baker Board, AIM and TECSTAR found that more emphasis should be placed on training an officer for the specific duties that he will perform in his assignment. The philosophy that the officer can do anything, be a "jack of all trades" was attacked.

33. The Board accepted this and agrees that the branches should be realigned functionally and that officers should receive the training to perform the duties that they must perform or supervise.

34. We recognize that within the functional branches there must be developed a commodity expertise by certain individuals to satisfy the requirements for positions requiring the commodity knowledge such as project managers, commodity command commanders, and R&D positions.

35. We also recognize that as an officer advanced in grade and assumes greater responsibility he must manage activities involving more than one function (e.g., supply, maintenance and transportation).

36. Ultimately, in the senior positions, he must be a logistician with a working knowledge encompassing multiple functions and multiple commodities in both the wholesale and the retail system.

37. It is reasonable to assume that AMC, too, needs officers specifically trained to perform the duties required by their jobs. Although AMC is essentially commodity oriented, it has the requirement for officers with

functional skills. If an officer in the field requires specific training to properly perform, the same will hold true in AMC. The functionally oriented officer with commodity experience or training should be well qualified to serve both in AMC and in the field. They should be developed with the commodity orientation required and should be knowledgeable in other functional areas as well. The problem of staffing the higher management positions in AMC which encompass multiple functions is the same problem that exists in the field army. Officers must broaden as they advance in grade and as the scope of their responsibilities cross functional lines.

38. Many other positions within the AMC organizational structure are function oriented. Every element of the organization does not do the same things that the other elements do. As in other organizations, each subdivision of the activity has certain responsibilities. The officer in charge supervises that activity, and the personnel in it. Normally his principal qualification should be a knowledge in the functions for which his activity is responsible. In staffing these positions, one should first look to these necessary qualifications not the commodity knowledge.

39. Branches can be organized on the basis of commodity or function. In either case, within the organization there will be a requirement for specific qualification in the other. For example, if branches are organized by commodity within the branch there will be a requirement for functionally trained personnel particularly at the lower grades. The alternative is to organize functionally and within the function develop

commodity expertise. In either case, the position to be staffed within AMC should be staffed by an officer with the specific skills required by the position based upon the functions of the activity to be supervised.

40. In general, research and development requires two types of input: (1) Engineering (or technical expertise) and (2) User. In some cases the user must have the engineering knowledge to perform adequately as a user. With other commodities, this is not normally the case. For the most part, R&D would logically fall to one or two branches regardless of whether the branches are functional or commodity branches. It would appear that R&D, if assigned to a branch, should go to the branch with officers possessing the engineer skills. If these are not predominately in a single branch, then R&D field should be open to all who possess the requisite qualifications.

41. Although management ability is an important prerequisite for most commissioned officer positions in R&D, the technical qualification is overriding. The importance of this qualification is not diminished even though the officer does not apply his technical skill in his supervisory position. He must nevertheless deal with engineers and other technical people and must be qualified in order to gain acceptance and respect needed.

42. Wholesale logistics consists essentially of two major areas: (1) R&D and (2) Provisioning of equipment. R&D deals essentially with development of new generations of equipment while provisioning deals with management of standard equipment. RDT&E requires primarily technical skills and

nontechnical user input. Provisioning requires primarily managerial skills.

43. Although provisioning is essentially wholesale supply, many of the officer positions are multi-functional in nature involving procurement supply, maintenance and transportation. It is essential that the higher level manager be knowledgeable in several of these functional areas as in the Army in the field. Some positions in the commodity commands of AMC and in AMC headquarters itself require a depth of knowledge across many of the life-cycle functions of a particular item. For positions like project managers or commodity command commander, this is the primary qualification.

#### CHEMICAL CORPS

44. Realignment of supply and maintenance functions with Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps divests other branches of these functions and in effect functionalize those branches. The Brown Board questioned whether the Chemical Corps should be retained as a branch once supply and maintenance functions were lost. This question was addressed by the STOCQ study and it was concluded that the Chemical Corps should be retained to perform the essential CBR functions for the Army and the U. S. armed forces and to assure a strong CBR capability in the interest of national security. Details of the analysis, approach, rationale, and conclusions are contained in Annex A to this section.

#### SIGNAL CORPS

45. The assignment of responsibility for communications and electronics

functions to the Signal Corps was accomplished by Chief of Staff Memorandum 66-282 and is now in process of implementation. The findings of this study are in full accord with that action. As a result, the proposals of this study will have little effect upon the Signal Corps except indirectly by realignment of supply and maintenance with the Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps.

#### MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY

46. Many existing MOS descriptions were designed for technical service units. They do not precisely suit existing functional positions of today. Steps have already been taken to discontinue use of some obsolete MOS for functional positions but more attention is needed to update MOS descriptions to more accurately describe the functional skills and reduce the overlap into other functional areas.

47. Alignment of functions with branches fixes responsibilities for developing and providing skills. It also aligns certain MOS with specific branches. In order to clearly fix this responsibility and to avoid misunderstanding, the Board concluded that AR 611-101 should be revised to establish branch proponentcy for those MOS which can be clearly identified with a branch. This action would facilitate development of branch strength based on valid Army skill requirements.

48. This realignment addresses itself primarily to the STOCQ branches; however, there is a secondary effect. The functionalization of these five branches in effect functionalizes the remaining branches by reducing their

participation in supply, maintenance, transportation, communications-electronics, and CBR.

49. The functional alignment of branches would be an extension of an established trend in DOD and DA organization. Both the DOD and DA are organized generally along functional lines to accomplish their missions. Although several functionalized elements (e.g., supply maintenance, and transportation) often are combined under a single command, the separate functions are usually clearly identifiable as distinct organizational entities. Alignment of maintenance and supply personnel by functional grouping would provide a personnel management structure reasonably parallel to the Army's organization for performing maintenance and supply functions in the field.

50. The above is especially true of the communications-electronics functions. The communications-electronics organization is clearly identified. It parallels Army organization. It begins at the battalion level, continues through the field army and to the Department of the Army major command - STRATCOM. In addition, a clearly identified communications element is found at the Department of Defense level - The Defense Communications Agency. The functionalization of the Signal Corps as to the communications-electronics branch is a positive step and establishes a distinct functional branch.

51. The clear and distinct organizational parallel apparent in the communications-electronics function is not as obvious in the supply and

maintenance functions. A functional grouping would provide a personnel management structure that reasonably parallels the Army's organization for performing maintenance and supply functions in the field. The reason that these are not as separate and distinct is that a close relationship exists between the two functions - both in the operational aspects and particularly in staff functions. This is especially true at supervisory levels where the functions are brought together. At the operating level, however, the supply and maintenance are separate and distinct for the most part. In some cases, particularly in the case of AMC, they are grouped into commodity-oriented organizations such as the Munitions Command. The realignment would be effective since it does follow the existing and proposed (COSTAR and TASTA-70) field organizations. It is limited in that it does not meet the need of higher level logistic positions. It is not the panacea for all personnel problems but it does resolve the most pressing ones. It is a good interim solution which better meets the needs of the logistics community.

52. It can be argued that supply and maintenance are closely related and cannot be separated. This close relationship is acknowledged. The essential coordination and unity of effort is directed toward mission accomplishment and is provided for in the structure of each organization. It is not provided by branch alignment or the organization for career management. Since realignment, as proposed, does not imply a change in the concepts of logistical support or a change in logistics organizations,

it will not in any way impair this close relationship.

53. The realignment would constitute a modification of roles performed by officers of some branches and will require some re-orientation. There would be no direct change of organization or operational concepts since the realignment deals principally with the personnel management aspects. It would require minor changes in TOE and TDA to make branch designation agree with the new alignment. As an example, a position calling for an Ordnance officer with a supply MOS would no longer be proper. Upon realignment the decision would be made on whether the branch or supply skill is the dominant prerequisite for the position. The impact cannot be accurately assessed at this time; therefore, the Board did not develop a grade structure. The grade distribution of officers serving in the affected duty positions at the time of the analysis is depicted in Section VI dealing with impact.

54. This realignment, being parallel to Army organization, is particularly well suited to centralized personnel management. Efficient control and better use of personnel resources should accrue from the realignment.

#### MEDICAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

55. The Board assessed the realignment and concluded that an exception should be made for medical supply and maintenance. Although medical supply and maintenance could be realigned, it should remain with the Medical Service Corps in order to maintain the integrity of the "Medical Team" concept. Project 80 left the responsibility of career management of Medical Service



officers with The Surgeon General rather than transferring it to OPO, since it believed that inclusion of the personnel function with OPO would not increase flexibility in the overall utilization of these officers. The Surgeon General controls all medical officer personnel assets and training. The Board believes that this reasoning is still valid.

#### CRYPTO LOGISTICS

56. Due to the security implications and the existence of an independent supply and maintenance system for cryptographic equipment, the Board concluded that these functions should not be realigned but should remain with the Signal Corps.

#### AVIATION

57. The distinction between the combat and transportation roles in Army aviation must be recognized. Air transportation is a mode of transportation in the functional field of movements as are highway, rail, and marine modes. Command and staff positions associated with aviation units whose primary mission is to transport supplies, equipment and personnel are movements functions and are appropriately aligned with the Transportation Corps. Aircraft primarily employed in the observation, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and weapons platform roles are functions of combat operations. Command and staff positions in these units should be the responsibility of the appropriate combat arms branch. Using the realignment rationale, the Transportation Corps becomes responsible for air movements support, both mode operations and movements

management. Maintaining the aircraft, regardless of the role it is used in, combat, combat support or combat service support, becomes the responsibility of the equipment maintenance branch - the Ordnance Corps. (Annex C, Section III)

#### AMMUNITION

The Board considered the ammunition function and promptly found itself involved in doctrinal and operational concepts and procedures which is beyond the scope of the study. With regard to the personnel aspects, of the 1292 officers serving in ammunition MOS, 1211 of them are Ordnance officers. The Board concluded (in view of the treatment of ammunition in COSTAR and TASTA-70) that until such time as organization and support concepts change the ammunition function should remain with the Ordnance Corps.

#### TOE AND TDA

58. The user's overriding concern is that the personnel system provide him with the personnel possessing the skills he needs to accomplish his mission. The system must provide a means by which the user can accurately identify these skills and be able to communicate his needs with reasonable assurance that he will receive a qualified replacement at the proper time. The MOS system does not precisely define the knowledge, skill, training and experience required in all the various duties. Realignment would not improve this tool; however, for those positions calling for a functional specialist, the proposed alignment should provide near optimum responsiveness in pro-

viding qualified personnel.

59. Alignment of personnel by functional specialties would permit those agencies having responsibilities for preparation of TOE and TDA to associate functional duties with a branch. For positions requiring functional specialist, requirements could be determined and expressed readily in terms of branch and MOS. This alignment would not associate with a branch those positions encompassing duties in more than one functional area. Hence, this alignment would be better for identifying requirements at the lower grades than for the higher grades where the scope of responsibility becomes more of a factor. Since total requirements are greater for officers of the lower grades, a functional alignment would be responsive to the greatest quantitative requirement. Field activities could readily identify a majority of their positions by branch. A weakness does exist, however, in relating generalist positions to a branch.

#### INDIVIDUAL

60. In the final analysis, any branch alignment must gain the acceptance of the individual. As the Army's ultimate resource, his realistic desires and aspirations should be met. In this regard, the Board finds the proposed functional realignment has some significant strengths and weaknesses.

61. Branches provide officers a means for identification which minimizes the feeling of being "just a number." Functional alignment would

provide a simple pattern in which an individual could relate actual missions with his branch and understand his role. He could identify positions and realistically evaluate his opportunities. He would have adequate opportunity to serve as a functional specialist and to serve in multi-functional positions.

62. Although the specialist programs would provide an opportunity for service across functional branch lines, the narrowing of branch assignments would tend to inhibit the development of broad logistical experience. Inevitably, branch lines impose some restriction on cross-assignment. If assignments are limited to those functional areas related to his branch, an officer may not obtain the experience necessary for satisfactory performance in key assignments at the higher grades. This appears to be the major shortcoming of functional realignment from the individual's standpoint as well as from that of the personnel manager.

63. Realignment of branches should be acceptable to the individual with some reservation. He desires and is anticipating a change and welcomes a means for relating his branch to a mission within the Army. Since Project 80 in 1962, officers of the technical services have faced the dilemma of branches without missions. Throughout their careers, these officers have been advised and have observed that broadening assignments were essential for career progression. To split the logistics skills along branch lines may cause the individual some concern about his prospects of becoming a logistic generalist and of attaining the grade and positions associated with

logistic generalists. To overcome this doubt, it is essential that the career management be used to the maximum to provide these officers with broadening assignments they require.

64. A realignment of any magnitude requires consideration of individual preferences and interests. Branch affiliation is too strong and too personal to ignore. The present branches of the Army result from specialization. They are traditional in our Army and are established by law. Because of branch traditions, their distinctive heraldry, their specialization, and their established doctrine, they serve to create high morale and esprit of the officer corps. The present branch names and branch structures of the Army are set forth in Section IV, AR 10-5. Branch identification has generally held a valid and stable position throughout the years. Each branch has a school which serves as a repository and as a source of branch doctrine which has a strong influence on its officers. This influence and branch orientation of officers undoubtedly represents the single most durable cohesive and stabilizing characteristic of the Army officer corps. In short, the present officer career branch structure has been and is today easily the most important element of the Army structure serving to link doctrine, organization, training, and personnel management together in a relatively coordinated and cohesive manner. The importance of the branch is such that forced transfers should be avoided. It may be necessary for some officers who are expert in a function that has been transferred, to continue to serve in this function. If so, this should be

a temporary requirement only and should be acknowledged as such. In specific cases, some officers would require additional training in the skill of their realigned branch, whereas others would find it to their professional advantage to branch transfer. Each case must be handled on an individual basis. No mass solution would be acceptable or desirable. The degree of turbulence would depend on the rate and manner of implementation.

#### BRANCH STRENGTHS

65. Using as tools the duty MOS and the assigned strengths in these MOS, the Board estimated the effect realignment would have on branch strengths. The MOS to be aligned, the rationale used and the procedures followed are discussed in detail in Section VI.

66. This analysis was based on a model of the personnel management structure that would result from the realignment of the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical, and Quartermaster Corps. Personnel engaged in communications-electronics were aligned with the Signal Corps; those engaged in movements with the Transportation Corps; equipment maintenance and ammunition with the Ordnance Corps; chemical-biological positions with the Chemical Corps; and supply positions with the Quartermaster Corps. The MOS that identified these functions were aligned with the respective Corps. Annex A, Section VI, lists recommended branch proponentcy for these MOS.

67. Two exceptions to this functional realignment were made; these were in the medical and crypto fields. The supply and maintenance functions

in these two areas were left with the Medical Service Corps and Signal Corps respectively.

68. The strength figures represent the assigned strength as of 31 March 1967. (OPD STAT 7 Report). The losses represent duty positions that the branch loses as a result of having officers from the branch performing duty in MOS that were judged to be the responsibility of other branches. Likewise, the gains represent duty positions that officers from other branches were serving in, but which would, under the realignment concept, be the responsibility of the functional branch. The difference between the loss of positions and gain of positions result in a net change. This net change was added to or subtracted from the assigned strength as given in the OPD Stat 7 Report. The resultant figure was accepted as the predicated strength of each of the branches after realignment. Following is a breakout of changes in the STOCQ branches.

a. Signal Corps

Strength before realignment	7,299
Losses	509
Gains	104
Net change	-405
Strength after realignment	6,894
Percentage increase/decrease	-6%

b. Transportation Corps

Strength before realignment	5,579
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Losses	673
Gains	115
Net change	-558
Strength after realignment	5,021
Percentage increase/decrease	-10%

c. Ordnance Corps

Strength before realignment	5,983
Losses	493
Gains	1,197
Net change	+704
Strength after realignment	6,687
Percentage increase/decrease	+12%

d. Chemical Corps

Strength before realignment	1,588
Losses	127
Gains	76
Net change	-51
Strength after realignment	1,537
Percentage increase/decrease	-3%

e. Quartermaster Corps

Strength before realignment	4,495
Losses	61
Gains	1,342



Net change	+1,281
Strength after realignment	5,776
Percentage increase/decrease	+28%

#### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS:

69. Following is a summary of the conclusions drawn from discussion in this and previous sections which have a bearing on the roles and mission statements.

- a. Realign the STOCQ branches on a functional basis.
- b. Assign responsibility for equipment development to branches.
- c. Commissioned officer repair parts supply positions require supply skills and should be staffed by a Quartermaster officer.
- d. Ammunition support should be a function of Ordnance Corps.
- e. Align the aircraft maintenance function with Ordnance Corps.
- f. Staff battalion S-4 positions of arms battalions with arms officers.
- g. Eliminate the Logistics Officer Specialists Program when the OQT branches can staff all the positions.
- h. Retain the Procurement Officer Specialist Program.
- i. Retain the R&D Specialist Program.
- j. Retain the present names of the branches.
- k. Establish branch proponency for MOS that can be clearly identified with a branch.
- l. Retain Chemical Corps.

## ANNEX A

### CHEMICAL CORPS

#### INTRODUCTION

1. The DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board) recommended a study be conducted in the 1970 time frame to reassess the need for a Chemical Corps (with a view of possible abolishment) after removal of the supply and maintenance functions, and the consolidation of the remaining functions with the Ordnance Corps special weapons area.

2. The Chief of Staff, Army directed in CSM 67-120 that a special study be conducted to develop roles and missions and officer training and career patterns of the Signal, Transportation, Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster Corps (STOCQ). The STOCQ Board, however, did not believe that the treatment of the roles and missions of the Chemical Corps could be developed until the reassessment recommended by the Brown Board was completed. The STOCQ Board therefore conducted the assessment.

3. The approach used by the STOCQ Board was to determine if the DA's needs for a Chemical Corps as a separate branch will continue even though the trend towards functionalization in the Army in the field has resulted in the realignment of the Chemical officer's functions from supply distribution and field maintenance of CBR type equipment.

4. Major areas considered by the STOCQ Board in its deliberation on the assessing of the Chemical Corps were: The CBR threat facing the United States; DOD and JCS position in CBR warfare; DA assigned

responsibilities for CBR weapons and equipment, development and training; CBR functional areas and skills needed to perform the functions.

5. The objective of the STOCQ Board's assessment was to determine the best alternative in view of today's environment, available to the DA for the development of officer personnel skilled in all phases of CBR operations, and the assignment of roles and missions to those officers that both conformed to the organization of the Army and fixed responsibility with a branch that best insured the development and management of CBR skilled personnel, weapons, and materiel.

#### PROBLEM

6. To determine the Army's needs for the retention of the Chemical Corps as a separate branch, and if retained, determine the roles and mission of Chemical Corps officers.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

7. None.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM (See classified Appendix 2 to Annex A to Section IV provided under separate cover for a more detailed discussion of specific DA responsibilities.)

8. The basic CBR capability of the free world is generally accepted as being concentrated in the United States.

9. The CBR capability of potential aggressor nations poses a significant threat to the national security.

10. The Department of the Army has been assigned by DOD and JCS certain responsibilities and missions in the development of a CBR capability not only for the Army, but for other DOD departments.

11. Both the Joint Strategic Operations Plan and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provide CBR guidance to the military services and information to the commander of unified and specified commands.

12. The CBR functions within DA which must be performed fall into the following broad areas:

- a. CB operations and training.
- b. CBR materiel development and management.
- c. CBR doctrine.
- d. CBR intelligence.

13. CBR skills needed within DA require expertise in the four functional areas. These skills incorporate expertise in basic research of agents, ammunition production, weapons systems testing and protective equipment development to operations and training in all offensive and defensive aspects of CBR warfare including: target analysis; unit and weapons employment; doctrinal matters; and intelligence estimates of enemy CBR capabilities. Expertise within one frequently contributes to the skills required in the others, thus building the necessary depth of skills in all areas required for an officer who repeatedly serves on staffs only authorized a single Chemical officer.

14. Recommendation 9 of the DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics System (Brown Board) was based primarily on the Chemical officer participation in supply and maintenance functions and not upon the role of the Chemical officer in RDT&E and operations and training, CBR intelligence, and doctrine in the Army and joint organizations. The Board found that

only 3% of the Chemical officers are now occupying positions directly related to supply distribution and maintenance.

#### DISCUSSION

15. In viewing the multiple responsibilities of DA in the CBR functions, the contribution a strong CBR capability makes to national security; CBR skills needed; and the role CBR plays in deterrence and flexible response; The STOCQ Board concluded that the requirement will continue to exist within the DA for officers skilled in CBR weapons and materiel development, operations, and training, doctrine, and intelligence.

16. In view of this conclusion, the STOCQ Board determined that the assessment of the Chemical Corps could best be accomplished by subdividing the considerations into two major areas. First, to determine the best alternative available to the DA to insure the existence of officer personnel sufficiently trained and possessing the degree of expertise needed in order for the DA to maintain a CBR capability and discharge its responsibilities, both internally and to other DOD agencies. Second, to fix the responsibility for the development of skilled CBR personnel needed throughout the entire Army and to determine the CBR roles and mission to be performed by the officers of whatever agency selected as the best alternative. The STOCQ Board discarded each alternative that did not provide the DA with the required CBR capability. Thus the alternative of establishing a DOD agency responsible for CBR matters was discarded since it did not provide the DA with the inherent controls and resources necessary to insure the existence of a CBR capability which contained the desirable flexibility and responsiveness commensurate with its mission.

17. In developing a solution to the stated problem, the Board found that several alternative solutions were feasible.

a. Alternative 1. Abolish the Chemical Corps and distribute the personnel and functions to multiple branches.

b. Alternative 2. Abolish the Chemical Corps and distribute the personnel and functions to a single branch.

c. Alternative 3. Abolish the Chemical Corps and distribute the personnel and functions to multiple branches, and establish a CBR officer specialist program.

d. Alternative 4. Retain the Chemical Branch as it currently exists and realign the functions as necessary.

18. Evaluation of alternative solutions.

CONSIDERATIONS	ALTERNATIVES			
	#1	#2	#3	#4
May release facilities and reduce overhead	X	X	X	
Broadens career opportunities for Cml officers	X	X	X	
Provides multi-branch interest in CBR	X		X	
Provides career opportunities in CBR for officers of other branches	X	X	X	
Retains groupment of CBR functions and skills		X	X	X
Provides formal recognition of CBR reqmt			X	X
Retains identity of officers with a function and separate branch				X
Relegates CBR to secondary role	X	X	X	
Provides only DOD agency whose primary interest is development of CBR capability, doctrine, and training				

CONSIDERATIONS	ALTERNATIVES			
	#1	#2	#3	#4
Fragments and dilutes responsibility for development of officers with CBR skills	X	X	X	
Minimizes officer turbulence			X	X
Continues to emphasize importance of CBR capabilities as national deterrent			X	X
Provides compatible career pattern				X

19. The Board in its deliberations and comparison of the various alternatives isolated certain key considerations as the most significant. These will be discussed in the body of this study. Appendix I to Annex A to Section IV contains a more detailed analysis of all considerations. The Board considered any alternative which trended toward lessening or weakening the CBR offensive and defensive capability of the DA as least desirable.

a. National Security and Deterrence

(1) The Chemical Corps consisting of approximately 1600 officers, today represents the only organized structure within the DOD establishment which is oriented, career-wise to providing the United States with a CBR offensive and defensive capability. This capability, as World War II and Korea experience suggests, has dissuaded others from resorting to CBR warfare. This was accomplished more by strength of US preparedness than by political agreements. The CBR threat contained within the Soviet Union coupled with the fact that the principal CBR capability of the western bloc nations lies with the United States magnifies the importance that a high state of preparedness has to the national security.

(2) Alternatives one and two withdraw all formal recognition of the requirement for the maintenance of a CBR capability, thus creating

an impression of de-emphasizing the importance of CBR as an effective weapons system organic to national deterrence.

(3) Alternatives three and four retain a CBR organization and provides an identifiable group of officers devoted to this function. However, alternative three does not allow an officer to participate in this program full time, thereby relegating the development of a CBR capability to a voluntary part-time status. Such an arrangement contributes little to the improvement of the national security by strengthening the CBR deterrence or providing a weapons system suitable for flexible response. On the other hand, alternative four has over the past fifty years provided the U.S. Army with a positive posture in the CBR field and provides a management system which develops officers on a full time basis, skilled in all of the functions of CBR operations.

b. Identity

(1) Officer identity was also considered by the Board to be of major significance in the analysis of the four alternatives. The very nature of human beings is to seek an identity of some sort. In the Army, this identity is established through the association and traditions of the branch structure, specialized training, and experience and an established branch role and mission.

(2) Alternatives one, two, and three have the inherent characteristic of diffusing this identity through the withdrawal of all formal recognition of the CBR function. Accepting this fact, it then logically follows that this identity will be sought with the branch to



which the officer belongs and with the primary function with which the branch is aligned. Since alternatives one, two, and three do not align CBR operations as the primary function of any one branch, loss of officer identity with this function will occur and the end result is one of dilution of the national CBR capability.

c. CBR Expertise

(1) Chemical and biological operations and radiological defensive techniques are highly technical and complex in nature necessitating officer personnel have extensive training and experience. Such qualified personnel are required in all facets of CBR operations ranging from R&D of agents, ammunition, weapons systems, and equipment to the very important task of operations and training throughout the entire armed forces. In most areas, the obtainment of one skill compliments an officers expertise in another. As the only agency possessing an organization devoted to the performance of these functions, the Army has been tasked to assist as needed in the training of other DOD personnel and allied forces as well as training its own personnel in the employment of CB weapons and defense against their use by aggressor nations. This unique position requires extensive coordination and continuity in the direction of research, development, training, and doctrine. The 1962 reorganization of the Army abolished the formal program hierarchy and distributed responsibilities along functional lines. The present separate career branch provides for that aspect of the required capability that depends on a body of personnel throughout the Army having the broad expertise, indoctrination, and

common purpose that an adequate CBR posture requires.

(2) The organization of the Army in the field frequently limits Chemical officer staffing to a single position. Such procedures magnify the importance of the Chemical officer possessing skills across all CBR functional areas since he frequently faces situations where timely and accurate decisions must be made without the advantage of consultation with other Chemical officers. The development of officers possessing such broad knowledge and experience requires repetitive assignments across the functional areas coupled with a formal educational program at the various civilian and military institutions. The management and development of personnel possessing the required CBR expertise cannot be left to chance or relegated to a secondary function of one of the existing branches whose primary interests lie in other than the CBR area.

(3) Alternatives one, two, and three risk this possibility without any compensating advantages. Each of these alternatives would not only fracture the development of the officer skill by putting it on a part time basis, but would also contribute to the diffusion of the responsibility for the management of these officers.

(4) Alternative four retains the centralized groupment of compatible skills, thus greatly simplifying the management, development, and the meeting of necessary officer personnel requirements in the CBR field.

20. Selection of Alternative Four. The Board, after careful consideration and examination of the CBR functions, required skills, and the mission of the U.S. Army, selected alternative four as the most logical

C and positive course of action. The Board considered the maintenance of a strong CBR capability too important to the national security to risk its relegation to a secondary role. CBR warfare today is an established threat to be reckoned with, not ignored; and since the U.S. does not traditionally choose its method of warfare, the Chemical Corps should be retained as the best solution to the maintenance of a corps of highly skilled and dedicated officers capable of guiding the Army's role in CBR operations.

21. Roles and Missions.

C a. After selecting alternative four, the Board next examined the roles and missions of the Chemical Corps officers in the functionalized army. The approach used was to first examine the CBR functions and the skills required to perform these functions, and then to superimpose these over the organization, responsibilities, and mission of the Army to determine where the Chemical Corps officer is required to best contribute to the maintenance of a CBR offensive and defensive capability.

b. The DA Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistical System (The Brown Board) questioned the need for the retention of the Chemical Corps since the functions of supply and maintenance had been removed as a result of the reorganization of 1962 and subsequent implementation of COSTAR and TASTA-70 concepts. The STOCQ Board interviewed members of the Brown Board who stated that their study did not assess the Chemical Corps' role in areas other than supply and maintenance. The STOCQ Board examined TOE and TD requirements and compared these with duty positions currently being filled in supply distribution and maintenance of Chemical Corps type

equipment. In both cases, less than 3% of the Chemical Corps strength of 1653 officers were required or were actually performing in these areas.

c. The Board, in its deliberations on the roles and missions of the Chemical Corps, first examined the Corps' historical roles and missions and found that the National Defense Act of 1920 assigned the following: "Investigate, develop, manufacture, procure, and supply to the Army all smoke and incendiary materials, toxic gases and gas defense appliances; research, design, and perform experimentation connected with chemical warfare and its materiel, to operate chemical projectile filling plants and proving grounds; supervise the offensive and defensive training of the Army in chemical warfare including the necessary schools of instruction; to organize, equip, and train a special gas corps and perform other such duties as the President may prescribe." These functions were later expanded to include biological and defensive radiological considerations and in essence gave the Chemical Corps major roles and missions in both combat support and combat service support.

d. The Board did not accept the roles and mission of the Chemical Corps prior to 1962 as being valid today, but instead examined the CBR functions and skills required within the Army as it is currently organized. The Board also evaluated these skills with the view toward alignment of those which are common with the Chemical Corps.

e. The results of these two tasks showed that the CBR functions requiring a commonality of skills and expertise remained much as they were prior to 1962 with three exceptions.

f. The first was that the functional reorganization of 1962 greatly reduced the Chemical officer's participation in supply distribution and maintenance of Chemical Corps developed commodities. The density of such commodities was insufficient to justify staffing the functional organization with a Chemical officer at the operating level, therefore CBR commodity trained enlisted personnel were integrated at battalion and lower levels. The Chemical officer positions were however retained at higher echelons and integrated throughout all major staff sections to supervise and coordinate all activities relatable to the CBR commodities to include adequate defensive and offensive CBR preparedness to operate in a hostile environment.

g. Secondly, the functionalized Army in the field created by COSTAR and TASTA-70 implementation absorbed the missions of the old Chemical Corps supply, maintenance, and service companies, battalions, and groups, thus causing their deactivation. This in essence withdrew certain command opportunities from Chemical officers. The Board feels inherent with this withdrawal is the possibility of degrading the career attractiveness of the Chemical Corps. This could have the long term effect of reducing the quality of officers seeking a career in the CBR field and thereby trend toward weakening the national preparedness in this vital area.

h. The ROAD concept placed increased importance on CBR combat support functions. For the first time, Chemical officers were required to staff positions in tactical units below divisional level and integrated

into the S-3 section. Chemical sections at division and higher staffs were removed from under the staff supervision of the G-4 and placed under the staff supervision of the G-3. Chemical officers are also required in all other arms agencies of CDC to insure that the combined arms team concept incorporates all aspects of CBR doctrine, training, operations, and weapons systems for maximum effectiveness in combat.

i. In line with this shift into the tactical structure of the Army, the Chemical officer also has a major role within certain types of Chemical Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. These type units perform in the CBR functional areas of smoke and flame operations, decontamination, technical intelligence, radiological monitoring, tunnel clearing, tactical employment of riot control munitions, crop destruction, defoliation, laboratory service, and CB munitions safety and surety. All functions, with the exception of the latter three are combat support in nature. Laboratory and decontamination and munitions safety fall more into the area of combat service support.

j. The last major area where the Board determined a requirement continues to exist for officers possessing skills common to those found in CBR operations in the field was in the various developmental cycles of CBR commodities and related equipment. Such requirements range from basic research and development to test and evaluation and procurement and production of agents, ammunition, weapons systems and equipment. It is the Chemical officer's role to conceive and bring into being CBR weapons systems and equipment necessary to the maintenance of a CBR capability,

not only within the Army but within all of DOD. Many positions were found within research and development requiring only "bench type" laboratory skills at the lower levels; however, as an officer progresses in rank, his responsibilities broaden into positions which rely heavily upon experience and knowledge gained from various command and staff assignments in the Army in the field and various military and civilian institutions.

CONCLUSIONS:

22. The Department of the Army is the only agency with a separate corps of officers specifically trained in CBR operations and will continue to be tasked as the agency primarily responsible for CBR warfare.

23. Current Department of the Army responsibilities in CBR operations, research and development necessitate that CBR functions continue to be performed.

24. The skills required to perform the CBR functions are best developed on a full time, dedicated basis.

25. The most efficient development of officers with CBR skills is best insured by assigning the responsibility for their development, management, and control to a single branch.

26. CBR functions and skills are not compatible with existing career fields of other branches.

27. The retention of the Chemical Corps is necessary to assure effective development, management, and control of officers skilled in CBR operations and training, weapons and equipment development, doctrine, and intelligence.

28. The roles and missions of the Chemical officer within the current organization of the Field Army are predominately combat support.

29. The roles and missions statements contained in Appendix A to Annex A, Section V provides the necessary guidance for the development of Chemical officers qualified to perform these roles and missions.



ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

## 1. Alternatives 1 and 3.

a. These alternatives are closely related in content and therefore will be discussed and analyzed concurrently. The only dissimilarity between the two occurs with alternative 3 which establishes a CBR specialist program after the abolishment of the Chemical Corps and the distribution of the personnel and functions to multiple branches. These considerations are examined in light of the importance CBR warfare has to the national security.

b. The principal advantage gained from alternatives 1 and 3 is the provision for participation of officers from multi-branches in the career field of CBR operations. Current branch separation greatly limits this participation for other than Chemical Corps officers. This tends to reduce the motivation among officers of other branches to gain detailed knowledge of CBR warfare. The two alternatives also provide an opportunity for the Chemical officer to broaden his career fields in areas now restricted because of the existence of branch lines.

c. In an attempt to functionalize training or consolidate CBR training with the branch school receiving the particular function from the Chemical Corps, certain facilities now in use may be released for other purposes. If this occurred, it could result in some monetary savings associated with the overhead involved in the operations in such facilities. It would not, however, reduce the training required to perform the Army's responsibilities in CBR operations and would not eliminate the need for

specialist facilities since the required CBR training now performed at the Army Chemical Center and School is of significant magnitude and has far reaching impact upon the U.S. Army as well as other DOD agencies such as the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Civil Defense, and Public Health Service. The schools current POI as approved by CONARC requires resident instruction be given in 26 different CBR courses for officers and enlisted personnel. Eleven of these courses are designed specifically for Chemical Corps personnel while the remaining 15 are for other military and civilian personnel from all services to include those of foreign nations. During FY 67, 6350 students attended resident instruction at the US Army Chemical School, including approximately 1150 from other DOD agencies and foreign nations. The average student population for this period was 749. In addition, 2400 students during the same period were enrolled in the various non-resident instruction offered by the school.

d. In addition to the instructional training, the Chemical Center and School is the prime source for all DA training literature concerned with chemical and biological operations and radiological defense. The Center and School also provides all training aids and films on these matters.

e. Alternative three has additional advantages not found in alternative one, the principal one being the retention of CBR specialist programs. This program provides the vehicle for the groupment and management of officers inherent to the development of the required skills in CBR warfare necessary for the continued fulfillment of the Army's CBR

responsibilities. In addition, the establishment of a CBR officer's specialist program provides formal recognition of the importance the DA places in CBR warfare, both as a deterrent to such an attack by an aggressor, and as a retaliatory weapon if deterrence fails.

f. Any functionalization which trends toward lessening or weakening the capability of the DA for CBR offensive and defensive warfare was considered by the Board to be a disadvantage, and must be weighed in the balance with national security. The distribution of the Chemical Corps personnel and functions carries the inherent characteristic of diffusion of the CBR functions. The very nature of human beings is to seek an identity of some sort. Accepting this fact, it follows then that this identity will be sought with the branch to which the officer belongs and with the primary function with which his branch is associated with a concurrent dissipation of individuals who identify themselves with CBR. Since there is no other function completely relatable or compatible with a career in CBR warfare, relegation of CBR to a part-time position will follow with either alternative. The specialist program as it now is managed only requires 50% of an officer's career be spent in the specialist career field. The Board does not feel this is sufficient for maintenance of the CBR expertise in view of the complexities and the pace of changes in CBR warfare.

g. Alternatives one and three carry the disadvantages of abolishing the only DOD agency that has officers fully occupied with the development of a weapons system, the ammunition and materiel associated with the system, and the training of personnel and units in the employment and

defense against such systems. Because the Army possesses a separate branch with these capabilities the thread of CBR warfare responsibility runs from the Army into other services in both materiel and training support. The abolishment of the Chemical Corps would remove the pivot around which CBR operations now revolve. Instead, it would be fractionalized into several isolated functions among the remaining branches. Here, because of the divergent interests of the officers from multi-branch, the Board does not consider the establishment of the CBR officer specialist program a strong enough vehicle to stabilize this pivot point. The acceptance of either alternative would then tend to complicate the unification and coordination of the CBR function. This coordination problem would not only occur within the DA in the establishment of the homogeneity necessary for the sound career development of the needed CBR skills, but will also tend to fragment the synchronization needed between the services on matters of joint interest or where CBR support has been directed between services. This particular approach to the function of CBR warfare was first tried prior to World War I when the U.S. first recognized the need for existence of such a capability. However, the opposing views and fractionalization of the responsibilities for the various functions associated with CBR warfare soon brought about the realization of the need for centralized management of personnel and materiel in order to better develop the skills and expertise paramount to the obtainment and retention of the capability.

h. Alternatives one and three withdraw the officer's identity with his function on a non-CBR assignment; creates turbulence in the

officer corps; and neglects or minimizes the national emphasis on chemical, biological, and radiological warfare. The end result of the selection of either of these alternatives is the fragmentation and dilution of the responsibilities for furnishing the insurance the Army is expected to provide against CBR attack and if deterrence fails, the capability to retaliate.

2. Alternative 2.

a. The Board examined alternative two and found that the advantages associated with alternatives one and three also apply. However, in addition to the advantages already mentioned, alternative two offers the additional attractiveness of retaining the more desirable centralized groupment of personnel and functions within a single branch. The Board felt this would greatly facilitate personnel management, career development, and coordination within the DA as well as in matters of a joint nature pertaining to CBR materiel development, training, doctrine, and intelligence. Such consolidation within one branch would no doubt better contribute to the needed CBR expertise than alternatives one and three.

b. Despite the additional advantages of alternative three, a close examination of the functions inherent in CBR operations reveals that they are unlike the principal function performed by officers of any other single career branch. Therefore, career assignments could not be mutually supporting between the CBR function and the function primarily performed by the realigned or gaining branch. In view of this, CBR operations again become relegated to a secondary function and could only result in a dilution of the expertise and a reduction in national capability.

Alternative three also has the disadvantage of withdrawing the formal recognition of the CBR requirements by abolishing the only identifiable agency within DOD solely oriented on the development of a CBR capability. This would tend to lend an air of de-emphasis on the importance of CBR warfare to the national security thus jeopardizing without any compensating advantages, the ability of the DA to emphasize the national strength in the CBR field as a deterrent.

3. Alternative 4.

a. The Board, in examining the need for the retention of the Chemical Corps, first considered the fact that the Corps exists today as a separate branch and that any change from the present structure, to be acceptable, must contribute to the effectiveness of the DA to better discharge its responsibilities to DOD and the nation.

b. The retention of the Chemical Corps continues to emphasize the importance of maintaining a CBR capability and provides the centralized groupment and control necessary for the management and development of the needed officer skills. It provides for the identity of the officer with a branch and a primary function, thus retaining the vehicle upon which has been built 50 years of esprit, tradition, and expertise that has enabled the U.S. Army to dissuade others from resorting to CBR warfare. Alternative four retains the only DOD structure devoted primarily to CBR warfare and greatly facilitates the coordination within DA as well as with other services on CBR matters pertaining to CBR materiel and agent development, training, doctrine, and intelligence. The retention of the Chemical Corps avoids the turbulence of mass transfers of Chemical officers and provides

a career field in the four sub-functional areas which mutually support the development of CBR expertise, thus eliminating the relegation of the CBR function to a secondary role.

4. Selection of Alternative.

a. After a comparative evaluation of each of the four alternatives, with the objective of providing the Army with the best solution and capability to meet its responsibilities, the Board finds that acceptance of alternative four will provide the most logical and positive course of action. This, in essence, assigns the Chemical Corps with the responsibility for all actions (less supply distribution and field maintenance of materiel not otherwise assigned) taken to obtain and maintain an offensive and defensive CBR capability.

b. The considerations used in reaching such a conclusion were multiple and complex in nature. The Board, after careful examination of the CBR functions and required skills, felt CBR warfare too important to the national security to risk the relegation to a secondary role within some other branch the responsibility for development of officer expertise. The distribution of the personnel and the functions to another single branch or to multiple branches is quite likely to result in a part time job for an officer in the field of CBR. This participation would certainly weaken or lessen the CBR capability to an unacceptable level, without any compensating advantages.

c. The Board felt these points coupled with the fact that CBR warfare today is an established threat to be reckoned with, not ignored;

the Chemical Corps should be retained as the best solution to the maintenance of the high quality CBR expertise required in today's world and military environment.

#### BROWN BOARD STUDY

5. The Study Group interviewed members of the Brown Board regarding their recommendation to reassess the need for a Chemical Corps in the 1970 timeframe. Members interviewed confirmed that the Brown Board recommendation centered around supply and maintenance participation by the Chemical Corps officers and did not consider their primary functions in operations and training, materiel, research and development, arsenal operations, doctrine and intelligence. The STOCQ Study corroborated this fact by examining worldwide TOE and TD requirements for Chemical Corps officers in supply and maintenance and comparing them against duty assignments of Chemical Corps personnel in similar positions. The vehicle used in this analysis was the MOS. A total of 20 maintenance and 31 supply MOS's were used to conduct the analysis. The Board found that requirements exist for six Chemical officers in the maintenance field and that nine were assigned. In the function of supply distribution, a total requirement exists for 41 Chemical officers with 34 actually assigned. The Chemical officers assigned into these MOS's represent less than 3% of the branch strength of 1653.

6. The STOCQ Board therefore concluded that the Brown Board recommendation is valid based solely upon the Chemical Corps participation in supply and maintenance. However, to recommend the abolishment of a corps based upon functions involving less than 3% of the corps was considered invalid in view of the requirements for Chemical officers in other functions.



## ROLES, MISSIONS AND ALIGNMENT

7. After recommending the retention of the Chemical Corps, the STOCQ Board next considered the future status of the Chemical Corps and the personnel which make up the corps. Specific areas of interest were: Roles and missions, branch alignment of CBR functions, determination of Chemical Corps status as an arms or logistics service.

8. To evaluate these three areas, the Board felt it necessary to examine the major historical events which propelled the Chemical Corps into its present status in the functionalized Army.

9. Facing the possibility of fighting a war in a toxic environment totally unprepared in both equipment and trained personnel, the War Department in 1917 decided to provide the U.S. Army with a chemical capability. Initially, the responsibility for development of this capability was divided among five agencies. The Medical Department was responsible for the procurement and supply of gas masks, defensive equipment, and defensive training. The Ordnance Department was responsible for the production of toxic agents and the filling of chemical munitions. The Signal Corps was responsible for procurement of gas alarms; the Corps of Engineers was responsible for offensive training and employment of gas. The Bureau of Mines was responsible for agent research and development.

10. Such functionalization of chemical operations soon led to widely divergent efforts and means in the development of a chemical capability. This manifested need for centralized control caused the War Department in October 1917 to establish the Gas Service with the purpose of coordinating

all gas activities. What was needed however, was not merely coordination of the various activities, but a single agency with the proper authority designated as being responsible for all aspects of gas warfare. Realizing this need, the War Department established the Chemical Warfare Service in 1918, which was to remain in existence for a period of six months beyond the cessation of hostilities. The Chemical Warfare service was assigned the responsibility of research, development, procurement, and supply of all chemicals to the Army as well as training of the entire Army in all offensive and defensive aspects of gas warfare.

11. Instead of abolishing the Chemical Corps, the National Defense Act of 1920 provided for its retention as a separate branch, designated the branch as a technical service branch to be headed by a chief, and assigned the following functions: "Investigate, develop, manufacture, procure, and supply to the Army all smoke and incendiary materials, toxic gases and gas defense appliances; research, design and perform experimentation connected with chemical warfare and its materials, to operate chemical projectile filling plants and proving grounds; supervise the offensive and defensive training of the Army in chemical warfare including the necessary schools of instruction; to organize, equip, train special gas corps, and other such duties as the President may prescribe."

12. These functions were later expanded to include biological and defensive radiological considerations. This in essence gave the Chemical Corps major roles and missions in both combat support and combat service support. The branch however was designated as a service by the 1920

C National Defense Act. Combat support roles included flame, mortar, smoke, incendiary and riot control agent employment, C-B employment, offensive and defensive target analysis related to C-B employment and instructional training to troops involved in CBR combat support roles, as well as the supervision of all Army training in CBR warfare to include the operation of chemical schools for officers and enlisted personnel. Combat service support roles and missions included all RDT&E for CBR weapons, munitions, and equipment, the procurement and distribution of the materiel, the maintenance of the materiel in the field, and the classification and disposition of the materiel. These roles and missions, with only minor changes such as mortar fire support, remained relatively the same until the reorganization of the Army in 1962.

( 13. During this period, however, the need for the retention of the Chemical Corps was a frequent topic for decision by both military and civilian leaders. Each such occurrence, however, has seen the balance weighed in favor of the retention of the Chemical Corps as a separate branch. These decisions were based primarily upon the overriding importance of the state of CBR preparedness to the national security.

14. Since 1962, the CBR functions have shifted from a branch-oriented responsibility to one of command orientation. COSTAR and TASTA-70 concepts further emphasize this trend by functionalization throughout all levels of command. The Board found that such functionalization has had a significant impact upon the Chemical Corps in establishing roles and missions in several areas.

15. The Board felt the most important was the impact functionalization had on Chemical supply, maintenance and service companies, battalions and groups. The missions performed by these units were absorbed into the functionalized COSTAR maintenance, supply, and service units. This resulted in the deactivation of the Chemical units. Since the chemical equipment density and volume of service was relatively low, positions at battalion and lower levels were staffed by CBR trained enlisted personnel rather than officers. The Chemical officer positions were established at brigade, group, and higher levels to provide the expertise necessary in the supervision of CBR training, combat support, and combat service support performed by lower echelons. Such organization structuring and staffing have, in effect, removed battalion command opportunities for Chemical officers.

16. COSTAR concepts and organizational structure recognized the need for chemical expertise in FASCOM and TASCOC units. In so doing, Chemical officers were integrated into the ACofS, P&O, ACofS Maintenance, ACofS Supply, and ACofS Services. Their functions in each of these staffs is of a dual nature. First, and of primary importance, is to insure adequate plans, policies, materiel and troop requirements and procedures in CBR matters related to that particular staff section are established. In so doing, a Chemical officer is required to have a general knowledge of supply and maintenance doctrine, procedures, and techniques if he is to perform professionally within a staff section oriented primarily on logistical support. Second, the Chemical officer must provide the commander with a source of knowledge necessary to insure that proper and adequate CBR

training exists throughout the command to allow the unit to perform its mission in a toxic environment with a minimum loss of efficiency.

17. The Board also found that coincidental with the functionalization of chemical supply and maintenance the evolutionary trends in the Army since 1962 placed increasing importance on CBR operations and training within the tactical structure of the Army in the field as well as at DA and DOD levels. The emphasis is typified in the organization by placing Chemical officers at Bde/Gp level under the staff supervision of the G-3/S-3 within the tactical units. This is the first time Chemical officers have been authorized below division level. Their functions within the tactical units and staffs at higher levels are primarily oriented in advising and assisting commands at all levels in maximizing the capability of U.S. forces for offensive CBR employment and minimizes the effects such weapons may have if employed against the U.S. forces. This responsibility requires knowledge of the tactics and techniques of CBR weapons and employment, doctrinal matters, intelligence, and training to include commanding units whose CBR tactical mission includes the employment of flame, smoke operations, defoliation, crop destruction, and riot control agents as well as conducting radiological surveys.

18. In addition to the roles and missions performed by Chemical officers in the Army in the field, the Board examined those activities in research and development and test and evaluation which require CBR expertise. Because of the responsibilities of the Army in the development of CB agents, weapons systems, and CBR equipment and the skills required to fulfill

these responsibilities are contained within the Chemical Corps, the Board determined that Chemical officers have a major role to perform in the RDT&E of CBR related commodities. Their role crosses the entire fabric of multifunctional positions necessary to the establishment of a sound CBR capability. Specific functional areas include research, development, test and evaluation, production, procurement, arsenal operations, and quality assurance on all CB agents, weapons and material related to CBR protective measures, as well as flame, smoke, riot control, decontaminants employment equipment. Supply and maintenance, while not predominantly a Chemical officer function, must be sufficiently understood by the Chemical officer, to assure the proper staff supervision of chemical commodity supply and maintenance procedures, doctrine, and techniques.

19. The Board thus concluded that the role of the Chemical Corps officer is complex and centers around preparedness as the keystone for the existence of a separate and distinct corps of officers devoted to this endeavor. In a broad sense, an implicit function of the Chemical Corps is to provide the military capability to support a national policy, that of dissuading others from resorting to CBR warfare. Explicit responsibilities derived from this broad mission as the only DOD agency fully devoted to CBR operations are: Maintaining a state of readiness for quick retaliation; providing insurance for American military forces and the civilian population against the shock of sudden CBR attack; and providing the capability to operate under the conditions of CBR warfare. Stated another way, the Chemical officer is responsible for conceiving and bringing into being

effective CB weapons systems, CB equipment, and CBR defensive materiel;  
to advise commanders at all levels on its employment and logistical considera-  
tion and to train as directed, personnel and units from all services in its  
offensive and defensive application.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
ASSIGNED  
CBR MISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
TO BE PROVIDED UNDER CLASSIFIED COVER

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A OF SECTION IV IV-61-65



## SECTION V

### ROLES AND MISSIONS STATEMENTS FOR STOCQ BRANCHES

1. This section is concerned with the development of roles and missions statements for the STOCQ branches. This is one of the tasks specifically assigned by the Chief of Staff.

2. The Board endeavored to develop statements which would clearly fix responsibility and be easily understood; be specific enough to avoid any uncertainty as to what is intended, yet to provide sufficient flexibility for the Army to cope with special cases or future staffing problems not now anticipated. The rationale for content of these statements is developed in the previous sections.

3. The proposed statements of roles and missions for each of the STOCQ branches are organized in the same format. There are three paragraphs. The first is a definition of the corps with a broad mission statement that orients the corps functionally. The second paragraph states in general terms what types of duties the officers will serve in. These first two paragraphs are of such a general nature that they should seldom require changes. The third paragraph is in greater detail and enumerates specific functions that comprise the responsibilities of the officers of that branch. This paragraph would require revision more frequently as the needs of the Army change.

4. The statement for Signal Corps is in complete accord with the one previously approved by CSM 66-282. It has been recast in the same format as the other statements for uniformity only, without changing the approved mission.

Proposed statements for the STOCQ branches are contained in Annex A through Annex E.

## ANNEX A

### STATEMENT OF ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE SIGNAL CORPS

The Signal Corps is that body of officers primarily concerned with communications/electronics aspects of the Army's mission. The Signal Corps is one of the arms. The mission of the Signal Corps is to plan, engineer, install, organize, operate and support communications/electronics systems, and facilities; develop and manage officers to perform duties requiring a special and comprehensive knowledge of multiple life cycle functions for communications/electronic equipment; and to provide communications/electronics services for the Army and other Armed services or DOD as directed by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Signal officers will serve in the command and staff positions primarily concerned with communications/electronics and pictorial services; serve in branch immaterial positions for which qualified; and perform other functions or roles designated by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Signal Corps officers have primary interest in and responsibility for the following functions:

1. Serve as the Army's technical experts at all levels in the field of communications/electronics.
2. Command organizational elements or portions thereof whose primary mission is to provide communications/electronics capabilities or support.
3. Serve as a communications/electronics staff officer at all levels, furnishing advice and assistance to commanders and their staffs, and coordinating assigned aspects of the planning and staff supervision of the engineering, installation, and operation of communications/electronics systems of all types in support of military plans and operations, to include the related functions of communications security, applications, C-E systems (other than pilot operated) for communications, surveillance, air traffic control and navigation, organizational maintenance of C-E equipment, frequency spectrum management and radio propa-

gation, prediction and analysis, logistics of communications security equipment where appropriate, integrated communications/computer/display (ADC) systems, centers and complexes, and C-E aspects of surveillance, air defense systems and electronic warfare.

4. Operate communications centers and terminals, integrated communications systems, air traffic control and navigation systems, photographic laboratories and Army motion picture, audio visual and television activities.

5. Develop organizations, concepts, doctrine, policies and procedures for Army communications-electronics operations.

6. Supervise the Army's communications equipment development program to include research, development, testing, evaluation, production engineering quality assurance and technical assistance. Participate in the development of other equipment in positions for which qualified.

7. Participate as a member of the Army specialists' programs for which qualified.

8. As a member of one of the combat arms branches, serve in command and staff positions requiring an arms expertise not peculiar to any one of the arms branches.

9. Serve on the Army General Staff, Joint Staffs, DOD staffs, and other high level staff positions for which qualified.

10. Serve as commandant, staff and faculty members of service schools primarily oriented toward communications and electronics in the Army or Defense establishment. At other schools, serve as faculty member conducting similar instruction.

## ANNEX B

### STATEMENT OF ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Transportation Corps is that body of officers primarily concerned with the transportation and movement aspects of the Army's mission. The Transportation Corps is one of the logistical branches of the Army. The mission of the Transportation Corps is to plan, develop, organize, allocate, operate, regulate and support the Army's transportation systems and facilities; develop and manage officers to perform duties requiring comprehensive knowledge of multiple life cycle functions for aircraft, mobility equipment and rail and marine equipment; and to provide transportation services for the Army and other Armed services or DOD as directed by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Transportation Corps officers will serve at all levels in command and staff positions primarily concerned with transportation; serve in branch immaterial positions for which qualified and perform other functions or roles designated by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Transportation Corps officers have primary interest and responsibility for the following functions:

1. Serve as the Army's experts at all levels in the field of transportation by all modes to include air, truck, rail and marine.
2. Command organizations or elements thereof primarily concerned with transportation services and movements operations by all modes, to include air, truck, rail and marine.
3. Serve as transportation or movements staff officers at all levels, furnishing advice and assistance to commanders and their staffs by planning, supervising and operating transportation systems.
4. Operate ports, harbors, terminals and transfer points and the related function of staging.

5. Develop organizations, concepts and doctrine, policies and procedures for furnishing transportation services to the US Army and participate in the formulation and development of logistical doctrine, policy and procedures for support of the Army.

6. Supervise the Army's equipment development program for aircraft, mobility equipment, rail and marine equipment, to include research, development, testing, evaluation, production engineering, quality assurance and technical assistance. Participate in the development of other equipment in positions for which qualified.

7. Participate as a member of the Army specialists programs for which qualified.

8. As a member of one of the logistics branches serve in logistics command positions (at all levels) and staff positions (above battalion level) requiring a broad logistical expertise not peculiar to any one of the logistics branches.

9. Serve on the Army General Staff, Joint Staffs, DOD and other high level staff positions for which qualified.

10. Serve as commandant, staff and faculty members of service schools oriented toward transportation support for the Army or Defense establishment. At other schools serve as a faculty member conducting similar instruction.

ANNEX B, Section V

## ANNEX C

### STATEMENT OF ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ORDNANCE CORPS

The Ordnance Corps is that body of officers primarily concerned with ammunition service and equipment maintenance. The Ordnance Corps is one of the logistical branches of the Army. The mission of the Ordnance Corps is to plan, organize, develop, coordinate, control, operate and maintain the Army's maintenance and ammunition systems; and develop and manage officers to perform duties requiring a comprehensive knowledge of multiple life cycle functions for ammunition, missiles, tanks, automotive equipment and weapons.

Ordnance officers will serve at all levels in command and staff positions primarily concerned with ammunition support and equipment maintenance, serve in branch immaterial positions for which qualified and perform other functions or services designated by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Ordnance officers have primary interest in and have responsibility for the following functions:

1. Serve as the Army's experts at all levels in the fields of ammunition service and maintenance of equipment.
2. Command organizations and elements thereof where the primary mission is to provide maintenance or ammunition support.
3. Serve as maintenance staff officers at all levels furnishing advice and assistance to commanders and their staffs by planning, supervising and directing all elements of maintenance operations and maintenance programs to include development of maintenance standards, inspection scheduling, calibration repair, rebuild, modification, classification, recovery and evacuation.
4. Operate maintenance points, collecting points, shops, and rebuild facilities and other maintenance activities. Operate ammunition supply points,

Greestock points, ammunition depots and other activities or facilities primarily engaged in storage, maintenance, issue or disposal explosives.

5. Develop organizations, concepts, doctrine, policies and procedures for furnishing ammunition and maintenance support to the Army and participate in the formulation and development of logistical doctrine, policy and procedures for support of the Army.

6. Supervise the Army's equipment development program for ammunition, missiles, tanks, automotive equipment and weapons to include research, development, testing, evaluation, production engineering, quality assurance and technical assistance. Participate in the development of other equipment in positions for which qualified.

7. Participate as a member of the Army specialists programs for which qualified.

8. As a member of one of the logistics branches, serves in logistics positions (at all levels) and staff positions (above battalion level requiring a broad logistical expertise not peculiar to any one of the logistics branches.

9. Serve on the Army General Staff, Joint Staffs, DOD staffs and in other high level staff positions for which qualified.

10. Serve as commandant and staff and faculty members of service schools primarily oriented toward ammunition or maintenance support and other Ordnance type services for the Army or Defense establishment. At other schools serve as a faculty member conducting similar instruction.

## ANNEX D

### STATEMENT OF THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS

The Chemical Corps is that body of officers primarily concerned with chemical, biological and radiological warfare. The Chemical Corps is one of the combat arms branches. The mission of the Chemical Corps is to plan, develop, organize, operate and support the Army's CBR system, facilities and services and to train personnel and units of the Army in the employment of and defense against CBR weapons and to develop and manage officers to perform duties requiring a comprehensive knowledge of multiple life cycle functions for chemical and biological equipment and weapons.

Chemical Corps officers will serve in the command and staff positions primarily concerned with CBR warfare; serve in branch immaterial positions for which qualified; and perform other functions or roles designated by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Chemical officers are primarily concerned with and have the responsibility for the following functions:

1. Serve as the Army's tactical and technical military experts at all levels in the field of CBR warfare.
2. Command organizations and elements thereof whose primary mission is to conduct chemical, biological and radiological operations and support.
3. Serve as a CBR staff officer at all levels, furnishing advice and assistance to commanders and their staffs and coordinating assigned aspects of the planning and staff supervision of CBR operations, training, intelligence and defense.
4. Operate laboratories, arsenals and other facilities for testing and producing chemical or biological agents.
5. Develop plans, organizations, concepts, doctrine, policies, procedures and intelligence techniques for CBR operations of the Army.



6. Supervise the Army's chemical and biological equipment, weapons and munitions development program to include research, development, testing, evaluation, production engineering, quality assurance and technical assistance. Participate in the development of other equipment in positions for which qualified.

7. Participate as a member of the Army specialists programs for which qualified.

8. As a member of one of the combat arms branches serve in command and staff positions requiring an arms expertise not peculiar to any one of the arms branches.

9. Serve on the Army General Staff, Joint Staffs, DOD staffs and other high level staff positions for which qualified.

10. Serve with the US Air Force and US Navy to provide technical assistance and scientific advice relative to training, equipping and organizing for employment of CBR weapons and defense against CBR attack.

11. Serve as commandant, staff and faculty members of service schools primarily oriented toward CBR warfare and chemical services in the Army or Defense establishment. At other schools serve as faculty member conducting similar instruction.

## ANNEX E

### STATEMENT OF ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS

The Quartermaster Corps is that body of officers primarily concerned with supply. The Quartermaster Corps is one of the logistical branches of the Army. The mission of the Quartermaster Corps is to plan, develop, organize, operate and support the Army's supply systems; and develop and manage officers to perform duties requiring a comprehensive knowledge of multiple life cycle functions for petroleum products and equipment, clothing and textiles, individual equipment, aerial delivery equipment and subsistence.

Quartermaster officers will serve at all levels in the command and staff positions primarily concerned with supply support, serve in branch immaterial positions for which qualified and perform other functions or services designated by the Chief of Staff, Army.

Quartermaster officers have primary interest in and have responsibility for the following functions:

1. Serve as the Army's experts at all levels in the field of supply.
2. Command organizations and elements thereof where the primary mission is to provide supply support or services.
3. Serve as supply staff officer at all levels furnishing advice and assistance to commanders and their staffs by planning, supervising and directing all elements of the supply operation to include requirements determination, procurement, supply management, stock control, inventory control, storage, maintenance in storage, distribution, salvage, disposal, standardization and cataloging.
4. Operate supply points, inventory control points, depots and other supply activities for the Army.

5. Develop organizations, concepts, doctrine, policies and procedures for furnishing supply support and services to the Army and participate in the formulation and development of logistics doctrine, policy and procedures for support of the Army.

6. Supervise the Army's development program for petroleum products and equipment, clothing and textiles, individual equipment and subsistence. Participate in the development of other equipment in positions for which qualified.

7. Participate as a member of the Army specialists programs for which qualified.

8. As a member of one of the logistics branches, serve in logistics command positions (at all levels) and staff positions (above battalion level) requiring a broad logistical expertise not peculiar to any one of the logistics branches.

9. Serve on the Army General Staff, Joint Staffs, DOD staffs and other high level staff positions for which qualified.

10. Serve as commandant and staff and faculty members of service schools primarily oriented toward supply support and OM type services for the Army or Defense establishment. At other schools, serve as a faculty member conducting similar instruction.

## SECTION VI

### IMPACT OF FUNCTIONAL REALIGNMENT

#### METHODOLOGY

1. In order to assess the impact of functional realignment the MOS was the tool used to identify and segregate officer skills. Although the MOS is not precise, it is the current system of skill identification and as such provides the most acceptable means of accomplishing this task.

2. For the most part, it was possible to identify a particular MOS with a function and place that MOS with a specific branch. MOS which were clearly logistical in nature, but which required multi-functional skills, were grouped in a Logistics Materiel (LM) category. Other MOS which were relatable to the functions performed by officers of several branches were not placed with a specific branch.

3. Some tasks, not related to one of the functional areas, historically have been performed by officers of one of these branches. For example, graves registration and food service duties, now performed by Quartermaster officers, are not supply functions. MOS in this category should remain with the present branch since these skills would not logically fall into the functional area of any other branch.

4. Using the guidelines discussed above, the Board identified and placed MOS with the appropriate branch under a functional realignment. MOS placed with the STOCQ branches are shown in Annex A.

5. After a review of data available, the Board concluded that the

best estimate of impact on all branches could be expressed in terms of current duty positions. These data most accurately reflect the manner in which the Army's logistics jobs are now being filled. Requirements forecasts available were not nearly so accurate, nor did they reflect up-to-date information. In addition, the many requirements listed as BI or NO cannot be assessed against any one branch. Because of these factors, current duty positions were used to determine the direction of change and general order of magnitude. Data relative to duty positions were extracted from a special report (COPD-OT-240) dated 5 May 1967. Current assigned strengths were derived from OPD STAT REPT-7, March 1967.

#### GAINS AND LOSSES

6. Gains and losses were compiled by branch, considering that all positions would be filled by officers of the branch or branches (OQT for LM positions) with which the MOS was placed. The strength changes shown below would result if all personnel currently serving in the MOS's considered were reassigned to the appropriate functional branch.

#### GROSS IMPACT ON DUTY POSITIONS

<u>LOSSES TO ARMS BRANCHES</u>		<u>OQT GAINS AND LOSSES</u>	
Infantry	-531	Ordnance	+704
Armor	-235	Quartermaster	+1281
Artillery	-362	Transportation	-558
Chemical	-51	Log Materiel (OQT)	+804
Engineer	-519	GAINS	+2231
Signal	-405		
OTHER LOSSES (excluding OQT)	-128		
TOTAL	-2231		

7. A more detailed, by grade breakout of these adjustments is shown by the table at Annex B.

8. It is recognized that the MOS for some duty positions in TDA could change should a functional realignment be directed. This is particularly true where the present MOS does not give a true indication of the primary skill required for the job. However, these changes should be few in number.

#### BRANCH STRENGTH AND GRADE STRUCTURES

9. Changes in present branch strengths which would result from a functional realignment are shown in the charts at Annex C. These changes, expressed as percentages of present branch strengths, could be applied to force structures currently proposed. This would give a reasonable indication of the impact such a realignment would have on future branch strengths.

10. The basic functional realignment shifts responsibility for 1427 additional positions to the OQT branches. (Chart 1, Annex C). This represents a 9% increase over current assigned strength. Some adjustment in the branch distribution of authorized strength will be required to accommodate the increased requirements in these branches. Since most of these positions are in the company grades, this adjustment could be accomplished in a reasonably short time (two to three years) without significant disruption.

11. The designation of logistics type positions as LM and the elimination of the logistics officer program with the requirement for the OQT

branches to fill additional logistics positions, now being filled by officers of other branches, requires adjustments of greater consequence, although fewer in number. This analysis is based upon the most extreme situation. In designating logistics positions as LM, the Board does not intend to exclude officers from other branches from serving with logistical staffs or units. They are required in order to provide user input and serve in other capacities; however, they should be identified as such and not as logisticians. Today, these officers who provide the branch mix are generally carried in logistic MOS's. Since a breakout between these officers and the "pure" logisticians is not available, the Board had to work with the data available. The result then is the most extreme situation. This impact will soften when TDA's are changed to reflect the actual need for logisticians and the mix of other branches. There are 804 LM duty positions now filled by officers other than OQT officers which amount to 5% of the current assigned strength of the OQT branches; however, most of these positions are in the field grades, resulting in a 12% increase in field grade officer positions for the OQT branches.

12. Most of the functional positions involved in the basic realignment are now filled by officers of the STOCQ branches. The impact of basic realignment on the rest of the Army is not significant; only about a 1.5% change. Designating logistics generalist (LM) positions for OQT officers results in a 4.9% shift of colonel positions, a 2.7% shift of lieutenant colonel positions, and less than 1% shift of major positions from all

other branches to the OQT branches.

13. The shift of field grade requirements has greater implications than a similar change in the company grades. This problem is illustrated by comparing OQT positions after realignment with a prorata distribution of field grade authorization under the officer grade limitation act (OGLA). For a commissioned officer strength of 125,597, the OGLA limits were computed by percentage:

Colonel	5,566	=	4.4%
Lieutenant Colonel	14,679	=	11.7%
Major	20,357	=	16.2%

Applying these percentages to the 18,288 OQT strength after realignment, the OQT branches could support 805 colonels, 2140 lieutenant colonels, 2963 majors, and 12,380 company grade officers. (Chart 3, Annex C). In order to support the 990 colonel duty positions which they would be required to fill, the OQT branches would need a total strength of 22,500 officers. Applying the OGLA percentages, the grade structure would consist of 990 colonels, 2633 lieutenant colonels, 3645 majors, and 15,232 company grade officers (Chart 4, Annex C). Chart 4 reveals that the greatest increase is required in company grade positions.

14. The grade structure problem is not a new one, nor is it restricted to the logistics field. Reasons for imbalanced grade structures vary; however, the following factors have contributed to the logistics structure problem:



- a. Civilianization of logistics jobs in the lower levels.
- b. Reduction of logistic troops in peace time and shifting dependency to the economy.
- c. Dependency on the reserve forces for the logistics troops needed in wartime.

15. Several approaches to resolving this problem are:

- a. Establish a separate promotion list for logistics branches.

Although the Army has a number of separate promotion lists at the present time, most officers compete with each other on one list. This allows the Army to select those best qualified from a broad base of eligible officers and, in turn, provides the individual officer with the most equitable opportunity to compete for advancement.

- b. Leave the logistics generalist positions as branch immaterial (BI) for fill by all branches. Most of these are positions of responsibility in which the incumbent is required to establish policies and make decisions affecting the Army logistics system. There is much evidence that indicates the need for trained, career logisticians in these positions.

- c. Reduce or eliminate the assignment of senior BI officers to non-logistics BI positions. This would improve the situation, since more than 200 colonels of the OQT branches are now serving in such positions. Assuming that a mix of backgrounds is desirable in these jobs, a reduction in the number of OQT officers so assigned might be more appropriate than a total elimination.

d. Increase the CONUS logistics base. The Brown Board recommended this; however, the Chief of Staff, Army, has deferred decision on this matter pending further study by ACSFOR. If approved, the resultant structure might provide the strength distribution required to support the realignment.

e. Increase the assignment of junior officers to BI positions. Since the primary shortage in the realigned OQT structure is in the company grades, any increase in positions for these officers would improve the situation. Many BI positions for company grade officers exist in AMC and other logistical organizations. In these organizations an expanded use of junior OQT officers might well be appropriate.

16. Some increase in the total officer authorization for the OQT branches beyond that resulting from the realignment of branches is required. Of the possible methods for accommodating these increases, a decrease in BI assignments for senior OQT officers, coupled with an increase in BI assignments for junior officers appear the most feasible courses of action for the immediate future. An increase in the CONUS logistics base offers the best hope for long-range, permanent improvement in the logistics structure.

#### CONCLUSIONS

17. Measured in terms of total positions affected, the functional realignment of the STOCQ branches does not have a significant impact on the total Army.

18. Alignment of LM positions with the OQT branches significantly increases the number of field grade officer positions for those branches without appreciable loss to any one other branch.

19. Alignment of LM positions with the OQT branches increases the grade imbalance within those branches.

20. Improvements possible in the performance of Army logistics under functional realignment outweigh the disadvantage of increased grade imbalance for the OQT branches.

21. Several courses of action are open which would improve the realigned OQT grade structure.

# ANNEX A

## SIGNAL BRANCH MOS PROPONENCY

0210	0221	0430	7052	7881
0213	0400	0500	7700	7899
0215	0410	0503	7860	8500
0220	0420	5522	7869	8510
				8511

## TRANSPORTATION BRANCH MOS PROPONENCY

0609	0692	0716	0740	0804
0612	0693	0717	0750	0815
0615	0694	0718	0753	0820
0660	0706	0720	0761	0823
0668	0715	0730	0801	0825

## ORDNANCE BRANCH MOS PROPONENCY

0735	4515	4815	4855	7210
0736	4516	4818	4856	7211
0737	4606	4823	4857	7221
0754	4800	4825	4860	7320
1723	4801	4850	4861	7539
4415	4802	4851	4862	9224
4513	4803	4852	4880	
4514	4808	4854	4892	

## CHEMICAL BRANCH MOS PROPONENCY

1415	7315	7319	7330	7360
7314	7318			

## QUARTERMASTER BRANCH MOS PROPONENCY

2430	4200	4310	4470	4601
4000	4201	4400	4474	4620
4112	4210	4403	4475	4714
4114	4220	4404	4500	4820
4120	4222	4419	4530	4830
4130	4223	4450	4600	4960

## LOGISTICS MATERIAL MOS (OQT)

2624	2625	4015	4512
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[illegible]

## ANNEX B, SECTION VI

MOS	
0210	0503
0213	5522
0215	7052
0224	7700
0221	7860
0400	7869
0410	7881
0420	7899
0430	8500
0500	8510
	8511

MOS		MOS		MOS		MOS	
0210	0503	0609	0735	4803	1415	2438	4244
0213	5522	0612	0736	4808	1419	4400	4419
0215	7052	0615	0737	4815	7315	4112	4450
0220	7700	0650	0754	4818	7318	4114	4470
0221	7850	0658	1723	4823	7319	4120	4474
0400	7853	0692	4415	4825	7330	4130	4475
0410	7881	0694	4513	4830		4200	4500
0420	7899	0700	4514	4851	7360	4201	4530
0430	8500	SERIES	4915	4852		4218	4580
0500	8510	0801	0706	4854		4220	4610
8511		0804	4806	4855		4222	4620
		0815	4800	4856		4223	4714
		0716	4801	4857		4310	4820
		0717	4802	4860		4400	4830
		6718	4851	4862		4403	4860
		0726	4880	4882			
		0736	4892	4920			
		0746	7210	7211			
		0750	7221	7320			
		0753	7539				
		6761	9224				

